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EDITORIAL*

We are very pleased to present the latest issue of the British Journal for Military History, covering material relating to a wide range of time periods, geographic areas and subject themes, including the role of animals in conflict and the ways in which combatants identified peoples and places in South Africa and the Levant.

We would like to flag the inclusion of another Research Note, in this issue, having initiated this type of contribution in our last issue. This offers a very significant way in which researchers may discuss their current projects, further enabling a more active conversation among those active in the field of military history. We hope that many readers will consider whether they have anything to contribute here, as this is a part of the journal which we are keen to develop.

There is now a steady flow of articles being submitted, and the future of the journal looks very bright indeed. Our next issue, in July, will be a Special Issue guest-edited by Zack White, featuring the work of new researchers. Following this, a further ordinary issue will be published in November.

RICHARD S. GRAYSON & ERICA WALD
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The Employment of War Dogs in the Medieval and Early Modern West

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ABSTRACT
This article explores the military use of dogs in the west, principally from the thirteenth to the eighteenth century. It is argued that the use of 'war dogs' was a recurrent but essentially ad hoc, sporadic and localized practice, quite distinct from the regular dog handling units that were established in the late nineteenth century. However, from the earliest phases of European colonization in the fifteenth century, another tradition, which employed dogs as weapons and instruments of torture, developed in the context of racialized warfare. The legacy of this infamous practice would be felt again in the twentieth century.

Introduction

The much-publicized presence of military working dogs (MWDs) in recent global conflicts has stimulated interest both in the history of the use of war dogs and a commendable concern for the treatment of such animals after their service. Yet scholarly studies remain comparatively rare and much of the more popular work is problematic. Two recurrent aspects of the established literature are particularly noteworthy. Firstly, they tend to posit a long continuity in the employment of dogs in a military context. Scattered references to 'war dogs' in ancient and medieval sources are accepted uncritically and serve as a prologue for contemporary MWD programmes. Sébastien Polin, for example, begins his study in pre-history, commenting that the dog was 'man's first auxiliary in war' and then 'remained for several millennia by his side during the fighting.'[1] Yet the MWDs on current deployments are very much

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[1]Sébastien Polin, *Le chien de guerre utilisations à travers les conflits,* (PhD Thesis: Ecole Nationale Veternaire D' Alfort, 2003), http://theses.vet-alfort.fr/telecharger.php?id=467, Accessed 5 September 2020 p. 3. The fact that many nineteenth century advocates of 'war dogs' tended to cite ancient precedents for rhetorical purposes has perhaps misled subsequent historians. See, for example,

part of a modern tradition dating only from the late nineteenth century: professional, regular military units of dogs and dog handlers, whose personnel, both animal and human, have been carefully selected and rigorously trained for specific military purposes.[2] Secondly, while correctly noting the centrality of the human-canine affective bond to the effectiveness of war dogs, they tend to place an emphasis almost wholly on such appealing qualities as mutuality, courage and loyalty.[3] Yet, as Sara E. Johnson and Robert Tindol have demonstrated, the human exploitation of dogs' obedience, aggressiveness and desire to please their handlers has been characteristic of an altogether darker history: the weaponizing of dogs and their use as instruments of torture.[4] In this, we find a long and disturbing continuity.

The historiography of pre-modern war dogs is even less substantial than that of modern MWDs. David Karunanithy has provided the most comprehensive survey of the sources, literary, material and artistic, all surveyed with a critical eye.[5] Yet Karunanithy's ambitious scope (his approach is global and his chronology stretches from the second millennium BCE to the early 19 Century CE), largely precludes detailed analysis on any specific period or location. More period-specific work is scattered and dated. Classicists, for example, have long depended on two venerable articles by E. S. Forster and G. B. A Fletcher published during the Second World War as a response to reports of the use of MWDs in that conflict.[6] Their intention was

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Nicolas Édouard de La Barre Duparcq's *Les Chiens de Guerre. Étude historique,* (Paris: C. Tanera, 1869), pp. 8-9.

[2]For the establishment of modern military working dog units, see Kimberley Brice O'Donnell, *Doing their Bit: The British Employment of Military and Civil Defence Dogs in the Second World* War, (Warwick: Helion, 2018); Christopher Pearson, '"Four-legged poilus": French Army Dogs, Emotional Practices and the Creation of Militarized Human-Dog Bonds, 1871-1918,' *Journal of Social History*, 52 (2017), pp. 731-760 and Gervase Phillips, 'Technology, "Machine Age" Warfare, and the Military Use of Dogs, 1880–1918,' *Journal of Military History*, 82 (2018), pp. 67-94.

[3]See, for example, Lisa Rogak, *Dogs Of War: The Courage, Love, and Loyalty of Military Working Dogs,* (New York: Thomas Dunne, 2011).

[4]Sara E. Johnson, '"You Should Give them Blacks to Eat": Waging Inter-American Wars of Torture and Terror,' *American Quarterly* 61, (2009), pp. 65-92; Robert Tindol, 'The Best Friend of the Murderers: Guard Dogs and the Nazi Holocaust,' in Ryan Hediger (ed), *Animals and War: Studies of Europe and North America,* (Leiden: Brill, 2013), pp. 105-122.

[5]David Karunanithy, *Dogs of War: Canine Use in Warfare from Ancient Egypt to the 19th Century* (London: Yarak Publishing, 2008).

[6]E. S. Forster, 'Dogs in Ancient Warfare', *Greece & Rome*, Vol. 10, No. 30 (1941): pp. 114-117 and G.B.A. Fletcher, 'Another Word on Dogs in Ancient Warfare', *Greece & Rome*, Vol. 11, No. 31 (1941), p. 34.

merely to collect references to the use of war dogs, rather than subject those sources to critical analysis. As the most recent study, by Owen Rees, has demonstrated, the material they gathered, much of it legend, non-contemporaneous hearsay and fanciful invention, cannot be taken at face value. Rees draws the crucial distinction between 'a "dog of war", that is a dog trained for the military environment, and a "dog in war", that is a dog utilised in the military environment without military-specific training.'[7] Rees dispels notions of any specific 'breed' of 'war dog' in the ancient world. Rather dogs that were neither trained nor bred for war were, occasionally, 'caught in the midst' of conflicts. There is no reliable contemporary evidence for dogs being used as combatants. The more reliable sources, such as the fourth-century BCE tactical manual on siege-craft written by the Greek Aeneas Tacticus, confirms the sporadic and extemporised use of dogs as sentries, couriers and with patrols.[8]

This pattern was broadly consistent with the military employment of dogs in the west until the late nineteenth century. However, there is some evidence for localised traditions of using dogs as part of military garrisons, or in the guarding of military or naval supplies. Furthermore, by the sixteenth century, clear evidence exists for the training of aggressive dogs for quasi-military functions, in manner redolent of the training of modern guard dogs. There was also a recurrent practice of deploying such dogs in campaigns of conquest and pacification, against subject peoples whose treatment was considered outside the normal bounds of ethical restraint that operated in warfare. During the colonisation of the western hemisphere, in campaigns waged against both indigenous peoples and rebellious enslaved African Americans, this recurrent practice would become a continuous tradition and thus has a particular, deeply unsettling, significance in the history of war dogs.

Medieval Guard Dogs

Dogs would have been a common sight accompanying medieval armies in the field, but rarely would they have had an explicitly military function. They were, in Rees' terms, 'dogs in war'. The personal retinue of England's King Edward III in his 1359-60

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[7]Owen Rees, 'Dogs of War, or Dogs in War? The use of dogs in Classical Greek warfare', *Greece and Rome* Vol.67, No.2 (2020), pp. 230-246. I am grateful to Dr Rees for allowing me to see a copy of this article ahead of publication.

[8]Aeneas Tacticus, *On the Defence of Fortified Positions*, XXII.20, XXXI.31-2. edited by Jeffrey Henderson (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1928), pp. 111-112, p. 115, p. 173. The idea that specific 'breeds' were used in antiquity as 'war dogs' is problematic as contemporary notions of dog 'breeds' are modern, see M. Worboys, J.-M. Strange, and N. Pemberton, *The Invention of the Modern Dog: Breed and Blood in Victorian Britain,* (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 2018), p. 7. *Cf*, for a more traditional view of 'fighting dog' breeds, Dieter Fleig, *History of Fighting Dogs*, translated by William Charlton, (Neptune City, NJ: T.F.H. Publishing, 1996).

campaign in France included sixty pairs of hunting dogs, for when opportunity arose for sport. His lords maintained similar packs.[9] Where occasional evidence does point to their military deployment, it is in roles familiar from antiquity, especially as guard dogs. The extent of this practice is difficult to gauge. The documentary record is usually sparse; it may be that the use of guard dogs, especially in fortified locations, was so routine that it largely passed without note. Indeed, in one region where the surviving administrative records are particularly rich, there are strong indications that dogs may have been commonly assigned to garrisons. Robert Burns has undertaken an examination of a large sample drawn from two thousand paper charters and documents produced by local notaries in newly-conquered Valencia, during the last twenty years of the reign of King James I of Aragon (*r.*1213 – July 1276). This revealed the frequency and scale of the provision of canine sentinels. The strategically important border castle of Biar is typical. In March 1271, the castellan, Pedro de Segura, received his garrison of '12 men and 1 woman and 1 muleteer and 1 pack animal and 3 dogs.' Burns notes that 'The stipulation of a woman sounds odd in this bellicose context but seems to have been normal in war dog assignments in those parts,' and he suggests that the women of the garrisons may have had a particular responsibility for the animals.[10]

This intriguing documentary record for Valencia is particularly full because James was able to exploit 'the captured paper industry of Islamic Játiva to record his reconstruction of conquered Valencia into a multi-ethnic Christian kingdom,' thus bequeathing historians an especially rich source.[11] Yet, without similar evidence from other regions, it is difficult to establish if the use of guard dogs by Valencian garrisons is typical of the period or not. Other scattered evidence that has been cited by modern historians as evidence for the military use of dogs in the medieval period tends to be very questionable. Both Sébastien Polin and Andrea Steinfel, for example, take an imaginative illustration from a fourteenth century Byzantine military tract, of a dog in the unlikely act of carrying a pot of 'Greek fire' on its back as an anti-cavalry weapon,

[9]Yuval Noah Harari, 'Strategy and Supply in Fourteenth-Century Western European Invasion Campaigns', *The Journal of Military History*, 64 (2000), p. 302.
[10]Robert I. Burns, 'Document: Dogs of War in Thirteenth-Century Valencian Garrisons', *Journal of Medieval Military History*, IV, (2006), p. 167.
[11]Burns, 'Dogs of War in Thirteenth-Century Valencian Garrisons', p. 164. Hugo O. Bizzarri has also drawn attention to a Castilian late medieval tradition of depicting dogs as 'warriors', especially those engaged in ancestral war against wolves; "Hunde im Krieg: ein Bild der Macht im mittelalterlichen Kastilien", in Mechthild Albert, Ulrike Becker, Elke Brügge and Karina Kellermann (eds) *Textualität von Macht und Herrschaft*, (Bonn: Bonn University Press, 2020), pp. 129-150.

entirely at face value.[12] By the later fifteenth century, and on into the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the proliferation of both printed literature and administrative documentation gives us yet greater, and more reliable, evidence. This includes some suggestions of long-standing, but probably localised, traditions of employing dogs in military and quasi-military contexts, especially in the familiar roles of sentry.

In Brittany's ports the practice of guarding naval facilities with large, aggressive dogs, 'worked loose' in the streets during the hours of darkness, was attested by numerous sources. A Bohemian nobleman, Leo of Rozmital, travelling across Europe on a diplomatic mission between 1465 and 1467, recorded that in St Malo, 'They breed great dogs which at night run about the streets in place of watchmen. When they are loosed from their chains no one can walk through the town, for the dogs would immediately tear him to pieces.'[13] In 1620, James Howell, clerk to the Privy Council of Charles I, visited the town and wrote to his cousin of its fearsome sentinels, 'which are let out at night to guard the ships and eat carrion up and down the streets…' The animals he saw, however, had not been bred locally but were imported: '[St Malo] hath a rarity to it, for there is a large garrison of English, but they are English *dogs*…' [emphasis in original].[14] Samuel Pepys (1633-1703) thought this garrison worthy of mention in his diary too. In 1665 Pepys recorded that their precise purpose was 'to secure the anchors, cables and ships that lie dry which might otherwise in the night be liable to be robbed.' He also recorded how dutifully the dogs responded to the sound of a horn in the morning, that recalled them to their kennel, which suggests that they were, to some degree, trained.[15]

Certainly, by the sixteenth century there is some literary evidence for the systematic training of dogs for guard duties and personal protection. This training echoes modern practice. The pioneering Bolognese naturalist Ulisse Aldrovandi (1522-1605) wrote of 'dogs that defend mankind in the course of private, and also public, conflicts...' who would 'be an enemy to everybody but his master; so much so that he will not allow himself to be stroked even by those who know him best.' Besides giving a strong

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[12]Polin *Le chien de guerre utilisations à travers les conflits*, p. 19. Andrea Steinfeldt, *Kampfhunde: Geschichte, Einsatz, Haltungs probleme von "Bull-Rassen"– Eine Literaturstudie* (PhD Thesis: Tierärztliche Hochschule Hannover, 2002), [https://elib.tiho-hannover.de/dissertations/steinfeldta_2002 Accessed 5 September 2020, p. 26.

[13]*The Travels of Leo of Rozmital*, translated by Malcolm Letts, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), p. 64.

[14]James Howell, *Familiar Letters on Important Subjects,* (Aberdeen: Douglas and Murray, 1753), p. 34.

[15]*The Diary of Samuel Pepys*, edited by Charles Wheatley, Vol.V, (London: George Bell, 1904), pp. 298-299.

indication of the necessarily very close personal ties of loyalty and affection that such dogs developed with individual humans, Aldrovandi's evidence describes how they were prepared to perform their duties:

> This dog ought to be trained up to fight from the earliest years. Accordingly some man or other is fitted out with a coat of thick skin, which the dogs will not be able to bite through, as a sort of dummy; the dog is then spurred upon this man, upon which the man in skins runs away and then allows himself to be caught and, falling on the ground in front of the dog to be bitten.[16]

However, it is unlikely such dogs were widely used in a military context within Europe. Such dogs are dangerous to friend and foe, especially when worked loose as appears to have been the Breton practice. Experience with modern guard dogs has demonstrated that when they are worked off the leash, they may well bring down any unwary friendly personnel who wander into their territory. A British Army memorandum of 1943 noted '[working loose] is discouraged at the majority of V.P.s [vulnerable points] in case a loose dog should attack any authorised person who may be moving about the area by night.'[17] Indeed, if more than one animal was being used, there was every chance they would attack each other, unless they were well acquainted: 'Combat dogs [the term used by the post-war British Army for the large, highly aggressive dogs employed on guard duty] are often worked in couples and, to avoid fighting among themselves when attacking a man, should be kennelled together.'[18] This danger appears to have ended the Breton tradition. According to David Karunanithy this practice of letting them run loose continued until 1770, when one killed a young French naval officer.[19]

Besides the inherent risk in the practice, the fact that visitors to the region were so struck by it, and thus recorded it in their diaries and letters, suggests that the particular reliance placed by the Bretons upon their watch dogs was exceptional enough to attract note. Yet similar localised traditions may be identified elsewhere. A few brief and otherwise unverified, references indicate that English armies may have made some use of war dogs on campaign during the sixteenth century. According to Olaus Magnus (1490-1557), historian and archbishop of Uppsala, Henry VIII sent military auxiliaries accompanied by 400 dogs to the Emperor Charles V, possibly in 1544, 'to provide a guard for the army.' There is also the suggestion, by one of Robert Cecil's spies, that the Earl of Essex included mastiffs in the English force he led to Ireland in 1598. If the

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[16]Michael G. Lemish, *War Dogs: Canines in Combat,* (London: Brasseys, 1996), p. 3
[17]The UK National Archive (hereinafter TNA) WO 199 2537, Report on Visit to 7 V.P.s in Eastern Command, 3 November 1943.
[18]War Office, *Training of War Dogs* (1952), p. 41.
[19]Karunanithy, *Dogs of War*, p. 23.

spy was correct about these dogs, they may have part of a Tudor tradition of employing guard dogs on campaign.[20] The Breton example itself was explicitly cited in another well-documented British use of guard dogs. During their brief and contested occupation of Tangier, 1662-84, the British employed watch dogs in defence of their fortifications. Lancelot Addison, the garrison's chaplain, described how in 1663 the colony's governor, the Earl of Teviot, 'placed a (St. Malo's) Guard of Dogs' in his outermost works, who reliably gave advanced warning on the approach of Moorish forces.[21]

Sleuth Hounds: Dogs in Border Warfare and Campaigns of Conquest

While the role of guard dog took advantage of the canine's natural territoriality and capacity to give warning by barking, their ability to track quarry was also militarised in the specific context of border warfare and the aftermath of campaigns of conquest. These campaigns were conducted in conditions analogous to modern counter-insurgency operations, in which 'trackers' and 'patrol dogs' have proved their worth again and again. Post-Second World War British tests and experience in the field during counter-insurgency conflicts such as the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) and the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya (1952-60), demonstrated the potency of dogs in these roles. Even in jungle conditions, trackers picked up trails up to 36 hours old. During the Korean War, it was found that 'in flat country and with the wind in his favour the [patrol] dog will alert [warn of] an enemy up to 400 yards away.'[22]

For the medieval period, Anglo-Scottish conflict provides some of the richest and most reliable evidence. Two sources in which we can have much confidence, *The True Chronicles of Jean le Bel* (c.1360) and John Barbour's poem *The Actes and Life of the most Victorious Conqueror Robert Bruce King of Scotland* (1376), maintain that the English King Edward I employed 'sluth hund' [sleuth hounds] in Scotland, to pursue the fugitive King Robert and his followers through 'wilds and forests haunted by the Scots', during the campaigns of 1306-1307. Barbour, while an author of chivalric poetry rather than

[20] Quoted in Karunanithy, p. 109. Letter, April 29, 1598, Giles Van Harwick [alias of William Resould] to Peter Artson [alias of Robert Cecil], *Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Elizabeth, 1598-1601*, ed. Mary Anne Everett Green, (London, 1869), p. 43.

[21] Lancelot Addison, *The Moores Baffled: Being a Discourse Concerning Tanger*, (London: William Crooke, 1681), pp. 15-16.

[22] TNA WO 291/1475, 'Investigation of range of detection of human quarries by patrol dogs', (1953); TNA WO 291/1571, Investigation into ability of tracking dogs to follow a human quarry, (1951*)*; Imperial War Museum (hereinafter IWM) 11300, Private Papers of General Sir Michael West GCB DSO, 'Order on Use and Usefulness of Patrol Dogs', (Korea Records, 1952-53); Director of Operations (Malaya), The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya (1958), Chapter XXI, Section 4: p. 8, p. 4.

history, was a near contemporary, well-informed and appears to have drawn on first-hand accounts of the events he described. Similarly, the Flemish clerk Jean le Bel drew for his chronicles on his own direct experiences, interviews with eyewitnesses and other reliable testimony. In the case of the use of dogs used to pursue King Robert, his evidence was 'a history commissioned by King Robert himself.'[23] Barbour also offers the compelling detail that the sleuth hounds were recruited locally with their handlers, two hundred men of Galloway.[24] Again, the assertion has the ring of truth to it, for dogs perform most effectively when working singularly or in small groups in close co-operation with humans with whom they have an established affective bond.[25] It seems most likely that these were 'dogs in war', hunting dogs, redeployed on an *ad hoc* basis to pursue Edward's scattered enemies. When circumstances in the Anglo-Scots Marches demanded, such 'sleuth hounds' were again pressed into military service. In the sixteenth century, conditions along that border veered between open warfare between the nations (in 1513, 1523, 1542, 1544-51, 1557-59) and a more persistent, low-intensity conflict of foray, 'hot-trod' pursuit and livestock rustling (between the clannish marcher 'riding families') during the years of 'peace.'[26] It was in the latter circumstances, so characteristic of frontier warfare generally, that dogs proved particularly useful, chiefly as guards and trackers. In August 1596, during a spike in raiding, the Bishop of Durham wrote to the Earl of Huntingdon, 'To order the justices strictly to revive the good orders for watches of all kinds, slough houndes, following hue and cry, and putting themselves and servants in better order for service under their tenures and leases, in these remote partes.'[27] The English chronicler Raphael Holinshed (c.1520-80), drawing on the authority of the Scottish scholar Hector Boece (c.1465-c.1536), described these dogs as 'verie exquisite in following the foot … upon the borders of England and Scotland where pillage is good purchase

[23]*The True Chronicles of Jean Le Bel,* translated by Nigel Bryant, (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2011), p. 62.

[24]*John Barbour's The Bruce*, Book 6, Lines 30-40, translated by James Higgins, (Bury St Edmunds: Abramis, 2013), pp. 113-114.

[25]For the importance of such affective bonds, see Robert G. W. Kirk, '"In Dogs We Trust?" Intersubjectivity, Response-able Relations and the Making of Mine Detector Dogs,' *Journal of the History of the Behavioural Sciences*, 50 (2014), pp. 1-36; E. H. Richardson, *British War Dogs* (London: Skeffington, 1920), p. 65 and TNA WO 204/7732, Instructions on Use and Training of Dog Police, Corps of Military Police, 20 February 1944.

[26]For an excellent guide, see George Macdonald Fraser, *The Steel Bonnets: The Story of the Anglo-Scottish Border Reivers,* (London: Barrie & Jenkins, 1971).

[27]Letter, Bishop of Durham to Earl of Huntingdon, August 1595, in *Calendar of Border Papers*: Volume 2, 1595-1603, ed. Joseph Bain, (London, 1896), pp. 43- 53. British History Online https://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-border-papers/vol2/pp43-53 . Accessed 5 July 2018.

indifferentlie on both sides.'[28] By the late eighteenth century the animal that had been 'distinguished by the name of Sleuth Hound' was more usually referred to as the blood-hound: 'taller than the old English hound, most beautifully formed and superior to every other kind in activity, speed and sagacity.'[29]

The *montería infernal*: Dogs and Colonisation

As noted, the use of sleuth hounds along the Anglo-Scottish border is redolent of twentieth-century deployment of patrol and, especially, tracker dogs (British Army tracker dogs in Kenya in the 1950s, for example, were similarly used to pursue cattle thieves).[30] Before, however, too many parallels are drawn between pre-modern antecedents and modern practice, it is important to draw some distinctions. The use of dogs bred for the hunt for military or quasi-military functions was still *ad hoc* even if part of a recurrent tradition. Even as professional, standing military forces were developing in Europe, there were no regular, trained dog units. Furthermore, in the context of Europe's early wars of colonisation against enemies dismissed as heathens, savages or rebels, there developed a horrifying practice of 'weaponizing' aggressive dogs. Against a background of hardening notions of racial difference, these were deliberately set upon enemies considered outside the bounds of the established customs of war that limited violence, for example against prisoners or non-combatants.[31] This practice was then sustained as an instrument in the policing of the enslaved and in military campaigns against maroon colonies and servile insurrections. This would lead to a continuous tradition of deployment of specialist dog and handler teams in a military context. As Sarah E. Johnson notes 'the axis of Spanish, French, British, and North American slave-holding powers in the region collaborated in

[28]Raphael Holinshed, *Holinshed's Chronicles of England, Scotland and Ireland*, Vol. 5, (London: J. Johnson, 1807-08), p. 12.

[29]Account of the Blood Hounds, *The Town and Country Magazine*, 25 (October 1793): p. 454

[30]TNA WO 276/89, General HQ East Africa, Dogs.

[31]For the lack of customary restraints in early American warfare, see Thomas S. Abler, 'Scalping, Torture, Cannibalism and Rape: An Ethnohistorical Analysis of Conflicting Cultural Values in War', *Anthropologica*, Vol. 34, No. 1 (1992): pp. 3-20; John Grenier, *The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Adam J. Hirsch, 'The Collision of Military Cultures in Seventeenth-Century New England', *The Journal of American History*, Vol. 74, No. 4 (1988), pp. 1187-1212; Ronald Dale Karr, '"Why Should You Be So Furious?": The Violence of the Pequot War', *The Journal of American History*, Vol. 85, No. 3 (1998), pp. 876-909; Wayne E. Lee, *Barbarians and Brothers: Anglo-American Warfare, 1500-1865,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

subduing non-white enemy combatants, using canine warfare techniques that dated back to the Spanish conquest of the Americas.'[32]

Indeed, these practices date back to the very earliest phases of European colonisation, pre-dating Columbus's landing in the Americas. Jean de Bethancourt, who conquered the Canary Isles for Castile in 1402, is alleged to have unleashed hunting dogs against the indigenous people, the Guanches. Although armed in only a rudimentary fashion, the Guanches were skilful in laying ambushes and evading pursuit, for they were 'swift of foot and run like hares.' Hunting dogs could detect their presence before they unleashed their surprise attacks and could track them as they fled. Combat thus took on the qualities of the chase and Bethancourt's soldiers 'took dogs with them as if they were going sporting down the island.'[33] The peculiar horror associated with this campaign, though, is the development of the *montería infernal* (infernal chase), in which hunting dogs did not merely track their victims but were deliberately set upon them. This abhorrent practise apparently became a feature of the pacification of the Canaries over the course of the next hundred years. And it would travel to the New World in the ships of the *conquistadors*.

The Dominican friar Bartolomé de Las Casas (1484-1566), an outraged critic of the cruelties his compatriots inflicted upon Native Americans, penned vivid descriptions of the use of dogs as instruments of warfare, torture and execution, that still have the power to horrify: 'As has been said the Spanish train their fierce dogs to attack, kill and tear to pieces the Indians … [they] keep alive their dogs' appetite for human flesh in this way. They have Indians brought to them in chains and unleash the dogs. The Indians come meekly down the road and are killed ...'[34] Some caution about the extent of this practice is needed here. Bartolomé de Las Casas was a politically motivated polemicist, whose denunciations of the violence against indigenous peoples committed by his compatriots extended sometimes to fabrication and exaggeration. He, and other priests who wrote similar accounts, were caught up in a contest with soldiers and settlers over the exercise of power in the new colonies and the tension between exploiting Native American labour and recognising their humanity and prospects for salvation. Making allegations of appalling and, under Spanish law criminal, acts furthered

[32]Sara E. Johnson, '"You Should Give them Blacks to Eat"', p. 67.
[33]Pierre Bontier and Jean Le Verrier, *The Canarian or the Conquest and Conversion of the Canary Islands by Messire Jean de Bethancouurt*, edited and translated by Richard Henry Major, (London: Hakluyt Society, 1872), pp. 149-150.
[34]Bartolomé de Las Casa, *The Devastation of the Indies: A Brief Account*, translated by Herma Briffault, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1992), p. 127.

their cause before the Spanish crown. However, many of the specific instances they describe appear to have been apocryphal.[35]

Furthermore, these accounts then became a fertile source of atrocity stories for Spain's enemies, chiefly North European Protestants, who perpetuated the 'Black Legend' of peculiar Spanish cruelty and fanaticism. This legend has cast its shadow even over the modern Anglophone historiography. The fullest account of the place of war dogs in the Spanish colonisation of the New World, is that by John Grier Varner and Jeanette Johnson Varner.[36] This is an exhaustively researched work but fails to consider the reliability of the primary sources.[37] Verifying the common assumption that dogs were routinely and deliberately set upon humans during the Spanish campaigns of conquest is thus difficult. Familiar with the conventional wisdom on the subject, archaeologists who examined the skeletal remains of people of the chiefdom of Coosa, apparently massacred by Spanish soldiers during Hernando de Soto's 1540 incursion into what is now Georgia, were 'puzzled by the fact that we found no injuries inflicted by the huge war dogs brought on the expedition.'[38]

However, we cannot discount the sheer volume of evidence we have for the weaponizing of dogs during the colonisation of the New World. It is likely that the significant numbers of dogs that accompanied the Spanish were deployed primarily in their established roles as trackers, guards, and, when supplies ran short, as rations, along with the horses.[39] However, it is also very probable that, in the same manner as modern military police dogs, working closely with handlers, some were indeed trained to pursue and bring down enemies, combatants or non-combatants, allowing them to be captured or killed. Again, drawing on the modern experience of military working dogs, both the effectiveness and the potential for injury to the victim of this weaponised canine is easily attested. As the instructions to British dog handlers during Second World War made clear '*The Police Dog is the Policeman's weapon*, and if not correctly handled he can be a very *dangerous* one.' [emphasis in the original]. During that conflict, British military police handlers were very restricted in the circumstances in which they were permitted to release their dogs and if they did so were

[35]Douglas T. Peck, 'Revival of the Spanish "Black Legend": The American Repudiation of Their Spanish Heritage', *Revista de Historia de América*, No. 128 (2001), pp. 27-28.
[36]John Grier Varner and Jeanette Johnson Varner, *Dogs of the Conquest,* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1983).
[37]Amy Turner Bushnell, '*Dogs of the Conquest* by John Grier Varner and Jeanette Johnson Varner', *The Florida Historical Quarterly*, Vol. 63, No. 1 (1984), pp. 99-101
[38]Robert L. Blakely and David S. Mathews, 'Bioarchaeological Evidence for a Spanish-Native American Conflict in the Sixteenth-Century Southeast', *American Antiquity*, Vol. 55, No. 4 (1990), p. 739.
[39]Varner and Varner, *Dogs of the Conquest*, p. 122.

subsequently required to justify their decision. Nor were these dogs trained to maul those they pursued; they brought them down and held them until their handlers arrived on the scene.[40] In earlier colonial warfare, its conduct inflected by the perception of indigenous and enslaved peoples as heathen 'savages', barely removed from the animal kingdom, no such restrictions or sense of accountability would have operated.

Dogs and Colonial Warfare in North America

Dogs also served both the French and English in North America in a number of military capacities from the earliest days of their incursions onto the continent. In 1603, the English sailor Martin Pring landed on the shores of what, almost two decades later, would become the Plymouth colony. His landing parties were escorted by 'two excellent Mastives', natives of Bristol named Foole and Gallant, 'of whom the Indians were more afraid, than twentie of [my] men.' The English mastiff was a large, formidable dog, bred for fighting, and for baiting bulls and bears and they looked the part; Foole and Gallant thus proved effective primarily as deterrents. When they were loosed, 'suddenly without cryes the Savages would flee away.'[41] When, within a few years, the English planted colonies in Virginia and New England, the use of both sentry and tracker dogs would become a recurrent feature of the conflicts they provoked with Native Americans. Conveniently forgetting their country's previous outrage at the Spanish use of dogs in hunting humans, the settlers of Jamestown, Virginia, established in 1607, were soon following their example. In 1622, following a devastating surprise attack by warriors of the Powhatan confederacy, Edward Waterhouse, the secretary of the Virginia Company of London, denounced them as 'that perfidious and inhumane people' and as 'naked, tanned, deformed Savages.' The English, he bitterly seethed, should now emulate the Spanish, 'by pursuing and chasing them with our horses, and blood-Hounds to draw after them, and Mastives to seaze them.'[42]

To be sure, dogs served in other capacities during colonial conflicts. In late 1665, for example, a 600-strong French punitive force moved against the Mohawks, striking, as they did so, into territories claimed by the English near Fort Albany. They coped with the harsh winter conditions by adopting Native American military practices, wearing snowshoes and making use of dogs as draught animals: 'their provisions being laid in

[40] TNA WO 204/7732, Instructions on Use and Training of Dog Police.

[41] Mark A. Mastromar, 'Teaching Old Dogs New Tricks: The English Mastiff and the Anglo-American Experience', *The Historian*, Vol.49, No.1 (1986), p. 18.

[42] Michael Guasco, 'To "Doe Some Good upon Their Countrymen": The Paradox of Indian Slavery in Early Anglo-America', *Journal of Social History*, Vol. 41, No. 2 (2007): p. 396.

slight sledges drawn by mastiff dogs.'[43] Yet it would be the blood-hound and the mastiff as sentries, trackers, and sometimes as weapons, that would epitomise the war dog in the North American conflicts. Thus in 1675, during the New England colonists' war against Metacom ('King Philip') of the Wampanoag, one English official, bemoaning the 'skulking' tactics of his enemies, observed that 'great guns and dogs will do the best service, both which being a terror to them.'[44]

Similarly, when Britain's entry into the War of Austrian Succession (1740-1748) ignited renewed conflict with Abenakis allied to France, dogs were mobilised again for frontier warfare. The scouting parties that ranged from Fort Dummer, in what is today Vermont, down to Pittsfield, Massachusetts, were accompanied by tracking dogs who swiftly picked up the trails of raiders moving through the wilderness. After re-occupying the abandoned settlement at Charleston, on the Connecticut River, in March 1746, the garrison was alerted to a body of French and Abenaki troops creeping forward against them by the barking of their dogs. That July, a foraging party from that same garrison were looking for horses outside their post, when their dogs again scented danger and barked their alarm. An enemy war band was hidden nearby but, thanks to the early warning, was successfully driven off.[45]

Notwithstanding the peculiar cruelties born of racialised conflict, the use of dogs in frontier warfare in North America fitted largely into the established historical pattern. It appears to have relied upon essentially untrained 'dogs in war', deployed on a relatively small-scale, in an *ad hoc* and essentially recurrent, rather than continuous or systematic, practice. On the outbreak of the French and Indian War, 1754-63, some individuals again advocated the use of dogs. In 1755, for example, Benjamin Franklin urged his fellow colonists to set vicious dogs upon Native Americans, and referred to this as 'the Spanish method.'[46] A British officer, Colonel Henry Bouquet, took

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[43]'America and West Indies: December 1665', in *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and West Indies:* Volume 5, 1661-1668, ed. W Noel Sainsbury, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1880), pp. 338-351. British History Online http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol5/pp338-351. Accessed 10 June 2018.

[44]Letter, Benjamin Batten to Sir Thomas Allin, Boston, June 1675, in *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and West Indies*: Volume 9, pp. 1675-1676 and Addenda pp. 1574-1674, ed. W Noel Sainsbury, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1893), pp. 238-253. British History Online, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol9/pp238-253 . Accessed 10 June 2018.

[45]E. Hoyt, *Antiquarian Researches; comprising a history of the Indian wars in the Country bordering Connecticut river and parts adjacent, etc.,* (Greenfield, Mass.: 1824), p. 232, p. 236 & p. 242.

[46]Mastromar, 'Teaching Old Dogs New Tricks', p. 22.

Franklin's suggestion seriously and arranged to 'have Fifty Couples of proper Hounds imported from Great Britain with People who understand [how] to train and manage them.'[47] Bouquet envisaged that these were to serve alongside light cavalry, where they 'would be useful to find out the enemies ambushes; and to follow their tracks; they would seize the naked savages, or at least give time to the horsemen to come up with them; they would add to the safety of the camp at night by discovering any attempt to surprise it.'[48]

In the event, after Britain's victory over the French and their native allies in North America, only sporadic further use seems to have been made of dogs for military purposes on the frontier. For professional soldiers of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the dog had little place in warfare waged between trained, regular soldiers. In 1779, Roger Stevenson, a British lieutenant, published a treatise for officers leading small detachments in the field. He acknowledged that 'the ancients employed dogs to discover the enemy in ambuscade' but warned that 'it will be well to distrust such spies and suffer none with the corps', for their barking 'will furnish the enemy with a hundred opportunities of observing you before you can know where they are.'[49] An oral tradition in Ireland suggested that the British Army had employed bloodhounds locally, in the pursuit of United Irishmen during the rising of 1798, in the familiar context of counter insurgency.[50] Similarly a local, and unsuccessful, experiment was made employing six blood hounds, purchased from Tennessee by a Minnesota militia regiment, against the Dakota in 1865.[51]

The Modern Legacy: Dogs and Racialised Warfare

The bloodhound continued to perform an important quasi-military function in the Americas into the mid-nineteenth century: policing the communities of enslaved Africans and their descendants upon whose labour colonial plantation economies depended. Resistance to enslavement, a phenomenon that encompassed a range of activities from large-scale organised rebellions through to spontaneous acts of individual defiance and flight, was a characteristic of American slavery from its earliest establishment. One of the greatest challenges to slave-holding regimes came when communities of fugitives, generally referred to as maroons, were able to establish

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[47]Mastromar, 'Teaching Old Dogs New Tricks', pp. 23-24.

[48]William Smith, *An Historic Account of the Expedition Against the Ohio Indians,* (London: T. Jeffries, 1766), p. 50.

[49] Roger Stevenson, Military Instructions for Officers Dispatched in the Field (London: 1779), p. 66.

[50]Mrs. O'Toole, as told to Pádraig Ó Tuathail, 'Wicklow in the Rising of 1798', *Dublin Historical Record*, Vol. 40 (1987), p. 150.

[51]Theodore E. Potter, 'Captain Potter's Recollections of Minnesota Experiences', *Minnesota History Bulletin*, Vol. 1 (1916), pp. 419-521 & p. 506.

sanctuaries in isolated or difficult country, such as the mountainous regions of central Jamaica. There, they could maintain their own autonomy, through armed resistance if necessary, and forge alliances with indigenous peoples, rebels, pirates, and other outcasts of empire.[52] The environmental and demographic circumstances in which colonial regimes waged war against the rebellious and the fugitive slave, gave rise to the familiar characteristics of frontier and counter-insurgent warfare. Tracker dogs made for useful auxiliaries during raids, ambushes, pursuits and scattered, running fights in difficult terrain.

In February 1686, the Council of the English colony of Jamaica met to 'advise as to the means of suppressing the rebel negroes who are now more formidable than ever before.' It was decided that 'twelve parties be forthwith raised out of the several regiments [garrisoning the island], each of eighteen men with suitable officers' and sent in pursuit of the rebels. They were to be assisted in this task by locally-sourced dogs and motivated by the offer of bounties: 'every party [should] have a good gang of dogs and be empowered to impress hunters and dogs. Every man killing a negro to have £20, or, if a servant, his freedom; every man taking a negro to have £40; and party killing a negro to divide £20 round.'[53] However, this was, once more, a localised and temporary mobilisation of trackers and their handlers, an improvisation that fitted well into the familiar patterns of military dog use.

The Spanish case in Cuba was different because they established a permanent force of dogs and handlers, which, through the eighteenth and well into the nineteenth century, served against those who challenged slavery, the *Chasseurs del Rey*. An account in a British journal of 1803 recorded 'these people live with their dogs from which they are inseparable.' Yet their upbringings were harsh; '[the hound's] coat, or skin, is much harder than that of most dogs, and so must be the whole structure of the body, as the severe beatings he undergoes in training would kill any other species of dog.' Each *chasseur* maintained three dogs at their own expense, taking two into the field when called upon to 'hunt'. The author notes that, ideally, these hounds were 'perfectly broken, that is to say they will not kill the object they pursue unless resisted…' Yet the author adds that among some *chasseurs* such well-trained hounds, although the

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[52]See, Herbert Aptheker, 'Maroons Within the Present Limits of the United States', *The Journal of Negro History*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (1939), pp. 167-184; Mavis C. Campbell, *The Maroons of Jamaica, 1655-1796: A History of Resistance, Collaboration and Betrayal,* (Granby, Mass.: Bergin & Garvey, 1988).

[53]Minutes of Council of Jamaica, February 2, 1686, in *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and West Indies: Volume 12 1685-1688 and Addenda 1653-1687*, ed. J W Fortescue, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1899), pp. 147-157. British History Online, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol12/pp147-157. Accessed 10 June 2018.

ones usually used on 'hunts', were also the minority. The *chasseurs* of Bejucal, for example, had but seventy 'properly broke' hounds. The others, 'of which they had many … will kill the object they pursue: they fly at the throat or other part of a man and never quit till they are cut in two.'[54]

These *Chasseurs del Rey* provided both dogs and handlers to other colonial regimes as they fought to preserve white racial hegemony. In 1802, Donatien-Marie-Joseph de Vimeur, Vicomte de Rochambeau, was dispatched to take command of the French forces attempting to suppress the servile insurrection in Saint Domingue (Haiti). He was a veteran of revolutionary warfare, having served as an *aide de camp* to his father the Comte de Rochambeau, architect of the decisive Franco-American victory over the British at Yorktown in 1781. Yet in Saint Domingue he proved no friend to liberty or rebellion, for there he fought a race war. One of his first acts was to purchase twenty-eight dogs from Cuba, which would play a central role in his strategy of pacification through savagery. The nature of these dogs' duties, as weapons and instruments of torture and intimidation, was quickly made apparent. Rochambeau instructed an *aide de camp*: 'I send you my dear commandant... 28 "bouledogues." These reinforcements will allow you to entirely finish your operations. I don't need to tell you that no rations or expenditures are authorized for the nourishment of the dogs; you should give them blacks to eat.' Upon their arrival, the ferocity of the dogs had been demonstrated to a crowd in the most appalling fashion, by setting them upon the enslaved servant of a French general, bound on a platform erected for the display. The dogs 'devoured his entrails and didn't abandon their prey until they had gorged themselves on the palpitating flesh. Nothing was left on the post but bloody bones.'[55]

The French were not the only purchasers of such dogs for employment against those who resisted enslavement. British Captain Marcus Rainsford noted the success of Cuban bloodhounds serving with British forces in Jamaica, in 1795-96. He claimed that, unlike the French and Spanish, the British had employed the dogs only to track and to terrify maroons, and had never deliberately set them on men, women or children. Yet he was fully aware that the dogs had been bred for that very purpose and described how their ferocity was instilled in some detail.[56]

Bloodhounds were also an important tool in upholding slavery on the North American continent, serving both the slave patrols that policed the institution on a day-to-day basis, and the slave hunters who pursued runaways. The animals were, in practice,

[54]'Description of the Spanish Chasseurs and Blood Hounds', *The Edinburgh Magazine* August 1803, pp. 94-97.
[55]Johnson, '"You Should Give them Blacks to Eat"', pp. 67-68.
[56]Marcus Rainsford, *An Historical Account of the Black Empire of Hayti,* (London: Albion Press, 1805), p. 90, p. 327, & pp. 426-427.

weapons as well as trackers. Although the practice was technically forbidden by law in many Southern states, they were sometimes deliberately set on runaways, without legal consequences. Louisiana planter David Barrow recorded the torture he inflicted upon one re-captured fugitive from his plantation: 'dogs soon tore him naked, took him home before the negro[es] at dark & made the dogs give him another overhauling.'[57] The example of purchasing Cuban bloodhounds was followed by the United States government itself. In the course of the conflict the US fought against maroons and their Seminole allies in Florida, the Second Seminole War (1835-42), thirty-three dogs and their handlers were imported from Cuba. Like Marcus Rainsford, both General Zachary Taylor, the commander in Florida, and Joel R. Poinsett, Secretary of State for War, insisted that these hounds only served 'to track and discover Indians, not to worry or destroy them.' However, this 'atrocious and barbarous policy' was widely denounced by abolitionists such as Joshua Giddens who, with considerable justification, regarded the nation's successive wars against the peoples of Florida as little more than federal 'slave catching expeditions'.[58] As it turned out, the hounds performed poorly in Florida, where the swampy Everglades offered a poor environment for tracking by scent.[59]

However, the continued use of bloodhounds to police American slavery ensured the dog a bit-part, but well remembered, in the drama of the Civil War, 1861-65. Their principal deployment was as guards at prisoner of war camps, and as trackers in the event of an escape. Although their use in these roles was not confined to the Confederate camp at Andersonville in Georgia, it was there that the practice acquired its notoriety. The trial of the camp's commander, Henry Wirz, for war crimes in September 1865, received much testimony on the subject: 'Henry Wirz, did conspire with Wesley Turner, Benjamin Harris (Hound Keepers) and other citizens and did keep and use ferocious and blood-thirsty dogs, dangerous to human life, to hunt down prisoners of war and did incite and encourage the dogs to seize, tear, mangle, and maim the bodies and limbs of the fugitive prisoners of war.'[60] Wirz was subsequently executed. The episode is a stark reminder of the racialised nature of canine warfare in the Americas. Wirz's crime had not been setting dogs on people, a practice that had been long tolerated within slavery, but setting dogs on *white* people.[61] Less

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[57]John Hope Franklin and Loren Schweninger, *Runaway Slaves: Rebels on the Plantation,* (Oxford: OUP, 1999), pp. 161-162.
[58]Joshua R. Giddens, *The Exiles of Florida,* (Columbus, Ohio: Follet and Foster, 1858), p. 39, p. 264 & p. 268.
[59]James W. Covington, 'Cuban Bloodhounds and the Seminoles', *The Florida Historical Quarterly*, Vol. 33, (1954), pp. 111-119.
[60]Larry H. Spruill, 'Slave Patrols, "Packs of Negro Dogs" and Policing Black Communities', *Phylon* Vol. 53, (2016), p. 57.
[61]Ibid., p. 58.

infamous than the guard dogs patrolling POW camps, but equally striking in terms of the blurring of the established racial mores of canine warfare in the Americas, was the Confederate military's use of bloodhounds for internal policing duties. For instance, James M. Dancy, a Confederate artilleryman stationed near Chattahoochee in Florida in early 1865, recalled that 'the most disagreeable service [he] was called upon to render' was 'hunting deserters' with bloodhounds (and they would be deployed again to track armed draft resistors in Arkansas in 1918).[62]

Conclusion

In the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71), regular military dog units, the lineal antecedents of today's military working dogs, were established by most continental European armies. Whether serving as sentries and patrol dogs, and in locating the wounded, on widely extended battlefields or working as draft animals to supply ammunition to units armed with rapid firing weapons, their use was a response to the changing conditions of modern 'machine-age' warfare. That modernity was evident too, in the professionalisation of dog handling units composed of regular soldiers and carefully selected and trained dogs. The sophistication of modern training methods and behaviour modification also overcame many of the older objections to employing dogs. In 1893, a British journalist who had witnessed trials of patrol and guard dogs with a number of continental armies noted that they did their duty without barking and could distinguish friend from foe at range: 'They can be trained to announce the approach of a known friend in a quite different way, viz., by leaping to and fro or crouching down and jumping up by turns, but without the warning growl of the danger approach.'[63]

These highly trained, regular teams of dogs and handlers were thus an innovation, distinct from the largely sporadic, localised and *ad hoc* traditions of deploying dogs as sentinels and trackers that characterised pre-modern warfare. Yet, in some ways, it is not so easy to draw clear distinctions between the older and the newer practices. Chronologically, they overlap. As late as the Second South African War (1899-1902), British soldiers were still using untrained, locally adopted strays as extemporised guard and 'scout' dogs.[64] More strikingly, in one respect the modern and the traditional showed a disturbing convergence. In the Americas, a continuous tradition of canine warfare had developed in the service of maintaining white racial hegemony. And the

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[62] James M. Dancy, 'Reminiscences of the Civil War', *The Florida Historical Quarterly*, Vol. 37 (1958), p. 80. See also Arnold Shankman, 'Draft Resistance in Civil War Pennsylvania', *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, Vol. 101, (1977), p. 200. For the events of 1918, see James F. Willis, 'The Cleburne County Draft War', *The Arkansas Historical Quarterly*, Vol. 26, (1967), p. 27.

[63] 'The Dogs of War', *Manchester Times*, November 24, 1893, p. 5.

[64] Richardson, *War, Police and Watch Dogs,* (London: Blackwood, 1910), pp. 105-106.

earliest deployments of regular dog units would occur in colonial warfare, such as by the French in Madagascar in 1895.[65] Yet more infamously, and also in the context of racialised warfare, dogs would again be used as instruments of torture and execution in Nazi concentration camps.[66] All who seek to write the history of war dogs need to reckon with this dark legacy.

[65]'Interesting Facts', *The Manchester Times*, May 10, 1893, p. 5.
[66]Tindol, 'The Best Friend of the Murderers' pp. 107-109.

The Economics and Logistics of Horse-drawn Armies

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ABSTRACT
The capabilities of horse-drawn armies were recorded by contemporary observers and by later historians, nonetheless there has been a continuing debate regarding the capacity and workings of these forces, particularly once they were integrated with and then superseded by, newer forms of transport such as railways and motor vehicles. This paper argues that little attention has been paid to the wider economic environment in which these armies operated, and in turn the supply of these armies can be considered as an economic system in its own right.

Introduction

The horse was so ubiquitous in military life that they became almost invisible to contemporary writers. As a result, there are fewer written accounts of how they were used than one might expect, especially during campaigns. Yet their usage is key to our understanding of military operations. This article aims to use civilian accounts to understand how transportation was operated in the wider economy and the scope of trading links across Europe. It uses military accounts to understand how horse-drawn armies functioned, how they integrated with the civilian economy and how this changed over time. This allows the creation of a model incorporating the fundamental factors that affected horse-drawn armies between 1618 and 1945.

The most coherent account of the operation of a horse-drawn army was given by Géza Perjés in his 1970 paper on the last quarter of the seventeenth century.[1] This was used by Martin van Creveld as his principal source in his canonical 1977 book *Supplying War*. It formed the basis for van Creveld's theory that most horse-drawn

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[1]Géza Perjés, 'Army Provisioning, Logistics and Strategy in the Second Half of the 17th Century', *Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 16 (1970), pp. 7–51.

armies drew on the local area for supply, and only resorted to magazine supply to conduct siege warfare. This view was challenged by John Lynn in *Feeding Mars* in 1993[2]. Believing that some of van Creveld's calculations were misleading, he claimed that the limitations on local supply had been ignored. The number of local ovens and mills were only sufficient to feed the local population and so Lynn shifted the emphasis back towards magazine supply. In the second edition of *Supplying War* in 2004, van Creveld addressed some of the gaps in the first edition, such as the American Civil War, but chose to ignore Lynn's challenge.[3]

This article seeks to widen Perjés viewpoint beyond the last quarter of the seventeenth century. Contending that while the viewpoint of both van Creveld and Lynn have their merits, neither adequately explain that horse-drawn armies represented a fine balance between competing factors and these in turn had an impact on the mobility of such armies. Similarly, armies represented a complex micro-economy, balancing their demand against a variety of available supply inputs. Nor have previous accounts taken into consideration the extent to which these armies were influenced and impacted by the economic landscape that each operated across. Finally, it is argued that this was not a static situation, as this landscape changed considerably between the seventeen and twentieth centuries as a result of wider technological and social evolution.

In order to understand these themes, this paper will examine three interconnected factors: *supply*, *demand* and *transport,* and how the relationships between them combined into a single output; *mobility*. Moreover, each factor represented a complex interaction between a variety of different elements, in the case of *supply* between elements such as population density, local trade networks and international merchants.

Theories on supply and mobility

Central to the debate as to whether armies supplied themselves from the local area or from distant magazines is the determination of the agricultural production of a region. Measuring agricultural production has always been a challenging problem for historians and the usual solution has been to use population density for pre-industrial societies.[4]

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[2]John A. Lynn, *Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993).

[3]Martin van Creveld, *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (2nd Edition)*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 307 note 10.

[4]E. A. Wrigley, 'Urban Gowth and Agricultural Change: England and the Continent in the Early Modern Period.', *Journal of Interdisciplinay History* 15, no. 4 (1985): p. 684.

This is not a new idea. Perjés cites Georg Kankrin's book *Über die Militairökonomie im Frieden und Krieg und ihr Wechselverhältniss zu den Operationen* from 1820[5]. Kankrin used his experience as an Intendant in the Russian Army during the Napoleonic Wars to establish that a 30,000 strong corps, could maintain itself from a local area for one to two days so long as the population density was greater than 35 inhabitants per km². From this Perjés concluded that for the second half of the seventeenth century, most of Europe outside of France and the Low Countries could not support armies without the use of magazines, because the population density of these countries was too low. In reality Kankrin adopted a more nuanced approach, as he considered that local supply did not cease, rather the shortfall was met by supply inputs from other sources: requisition across a wider area supplemented by transport from magazines and distant sources. Kankrin's ideas surrounding population density are given in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Kankrin's estimate of population density and supply methods

Type	Countries	Population density: Head per Q Meile in 1820[6]	Converted into head per km sq	Supply methods
Highly cultivated, food rich, great natural resources, roads and towns	Prussia, Silesia, Bohemia, Moravia, Germany, France, Belgium, Holland, northern Italy	1500-2000	36 – 27	Requisition from local area and quartering
Medium cultivation	Poland east of Vistula, Posen, Galicia, greater part of Hungary	1000	18	Mix of requisition, quartering with the aid of some supplies from a wider area or magazines
Medium cultivation, wealthy population but little grazing	Switzerland, central and lower Italy, Spain and Portugal and the mountains in France & Germany. North America and East India	1000	18	
Little cultivation, thinly populated	Very poor on the whole: Sweden, Finland, Belorussia.	< 1000	< 18	Magazines and supply

[5]Egor F. Kankrin, *Über Die Militairökonomie Im Frieden Und Krieg Und Ihr Wechselverhältniss Zu Den Operationen - Drei Band [On the Military Economy in Peace and War and Their Relationship to Operations - in Three Volumes]*, 3 vols (St Petersburg: 1820), http://reader.digitale-sammlungen.de/de/fs1/object/display/bsb10526340_00005.html.

[6]A "Meile" was a Prussian unit of length equal to approximately 7.5 km and a Q[uarter] Meile was a measure of area equivalent to approximately 57 km sq.

or lacking grazing and grain production.	Better: Lithuanian, Liefland, Kurland			transport required to sustain armies which must not be too large
	Quite good: Russia, Greater and Lesser (Ukraine quite good) Vltava, Wallachia, parts of Bulgaria. South America, Anatolia in Turkey and Romania			
Semi desert, thinly populated with mountains or steppes	Norway, northern part of Russia, cultivated part of Siberia, Astrakhan, Caucasia, Georgia, large part of European Turkey, Bulgarian mountains, Persia and Western China	300	6	Unsuitable for large armies
Desert with few inhabitants but with little or no arable land, mainly nomadic herders	Lapland, greater part of Siberia, Kyrgyz steppe, Caucasian mountains around Mount Ararat. High mountains of Switzerland, Scotland, Pyrenees, greater part of Africa, North Africa.	< 300	< 6	Impossible to travel long distances but short distances or small corps can find the means.

Using this model, we come to a much more complex approach, as armies utilise numerous methods of supply that might change with time, circumstances, seasons or cost. The analogy with an economy is clear as an army's daily demand is met from a range of sources and via different routes. Determining factors might be availability, or cost, or physical effort, that is, a measure of moving one tonne a distance of one kilometre.

Previous authors have concentrated on the weight of cargo without considering the effort required to move it to the place of consumption. For instance, Lynn estimates the amount of horse fodder consumed daily per horse as 25kg of cut wet grass.[7] However Perjés is quite clear that green fodder was only fed from May to August and that for the remainder of the campaigning season, September to December, dry fodder of oats, hay and straw weighing 10kg was used.[8] By using his constant, Lynn overstates

[7]Lynn, *Feeding Mars,* p26 note 9. Compare with Prince de Ligne, *Military prejudices [and fantasies] by an Austrian officer [ie. the Prince de Ligne]. Volume I,* (Brussels: A. Kralovelhota, 1780), p. 20, https://neptun.unamur.be/s/neptun/item/2112. Accessed 1 July 2020. Using his experiences during the Seven Years War the Prince gave the cut grass ration as 48kg (100 livres) and dry fodder ration as 3kg oats, 2.7kg hay and 4.5kg straw while others suggested a 12kg ration.

[8]Perjés, *'Army Provisioning'* p.15; see also Lee B. Kennett, *The French Armies in the Seven Years' War: A Study in Military Organization and Administration,* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1967), p. 106.

the demand of the army horses for half of the campaigning season. If the effort required to deliver the forage to the army is considered, a different picture emerges. Cut grass, harvested within 10km and eaten within two days before it turned to compost: 0.05 tonne weight X 10 km = 0.5 tonne km. Dry forage carried the maximum distance: 0.01 X 140 km = 1.4 tonne km. Even when using the Prince de Ligne's heavier figure for green fodder, it can be seen that the effort required to provide dry forage required three times greater effort than collecting it locally.

It is probable that Clausewitz had read Kankrin's book and used it as the basis for his ideas on linking population density to the number of troops supported.[9] He assumed a unit would march three Prussian miles a day (23km) taking eight to ten hours or ten to twelve hours in hilly country and that it lost 1/150th of its strength daily from straggling. Clausewitz identified four methods of subsistence; subsisting on the inhabitants, contributions levied by the troops, general contributions and magazines, 'All of which were applied together, one generally prevailing more than the others'.[10]

For 'Subsistence on the inhabitants', the army used a 'system of subsisting troops by compulsory demands for provisions on the spot'.[11] 'Therefore in quarters which have never been occupied there is no difficulty in subsisting troops three or four times the number of the inhabitants for several days.' This he calculated at 2,000 inhabitants per Prussian *meile* square (57km^2) or 36 inhabitants km^2 with a corps of 30,000 men spread over four square *meile* (225 km^2 or an area with sides of 15km) holding 8,000 inhabitants, not including any large towns. Three corps spread out across 45km frontage could thus be supported with a second wave following on behind making the total force supported 150,000 men in total. Clausewitz notes that 'Forage for the horses occasions still less difficulty … only the deliveries of forage should certainly be demanded from the community at large'. In case of a halt in the march, the troops

[9]Kankrin's book, written in German, was published in 1820, the period when Clausewitz was doing his most intensive work on 'On war'. It cannot be definitely established that his book was available to Clausewitz at the Prussian *Kreigsakademie* but it was certainly held by other libraries across Germany. Kankrin was well known as he was the Russian army's chief intendant and had presented the report on the war to the Czar, together with his sponsor, Barclay de Tolly. See Dominic Lieven, *'Russia Against Napoleon'* (London: Penguin Book, 2016) p. 143, p. 544 n.14

[10]Carl von Clausewitz, 'On War. trans. Colonel J.J. Graham (London: Nicholas Trübner, 1873), Book 5, Chapter 14 "Subsistence"', online at https://www.clausewitzstudies.org/readings/OnWar1873/BK5ch14.html#a. Accessed 9 April 2019.

[11]Clausewitz, 'On War'', Ch. 11, 'Marches', https://www.clausewitzstudies.org/readings/OnWar1873/BK5ch11.html#a . Accessed 9 April 2019.

could feed themselves from the four days rations that they carried and then an additional four days' rations from the baggage train. Here, Clausewitz is providing a mathematical rationale for Kankrin's rule of thumb of linking population density to the size of military force and the area it forages. Similarly, Clausewitz's figures can by compared with Turenne and Montecuccoli's views from the middle of the seventeenth century, who considered 30,000 man armies to be the maximum sustainable size.[12]

Clausewitz stated that the ration of a horse weighed about ten times that of a man, that horses accounted for one third the number of men and therefore the total weight of forage required is 'three, four or five times as much as that of the soldiers' rations', so this requirement was met by local foraging expeditions. Although more modern scholarship puts the ratio at a lower minimum of 1 horse per 7 men the principle still applies.[13] Clausewitz notes that forage

> …is the most difficult supply to procure from a distance, on account of its bulk, and the horse feels the effect of low feeding much sooner than the man. For this reason, an over-numerous cavalry and artillery may become a real burden, and an element of weakness to an army.[14]

In his 1960 paper John G. Moore considered the transport implications for distant supply by comparing a *supply train* with an *expedition.*[15] He defined a *supply train* as columns of wagons moving supplies from a magazine to the army and then returning. Whereas an *expedition* saw the army and transport marching together from a railhead, using the wagons as a rolling depot. He showed that a typical army of the American Civil War, using 4,105 wagons, could be supplied at five days march or 160km by a *supply train* and the same army conducting an *expedition* could march for 14.3 days or 280km. So, an *expedition* could cover almost double the distance using the same amount of transport, simply due to its greater efficiency. However, the operational risk increased as the army had to reconnect with a source of supply at the end of its march or risk ruin. Moore's work was used by Edward Hagerman in his study of the American Civil War, particularly in his study of horse numbers.[16] He showed that

[12]David Parrott, *The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 184.
[13]Jean-François Brun, 'Le cheval dans la Grande Armée', *Revue historique des armées*, no. 249 (15 December 2007).
[14]Clausewitz, 'On War. Book 5, Chapter 14 "Subsistence"'.
[15]John G. Moore, 'Mobility and Strategy in the Civil War', *Military Affairs* 24, no. 2 (1960), pp.113.
[16]Edward Hagerman, *The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare: Ideas, Organization, and Field Command,* (Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 1988), pp.44 & 279.

armies in the West remained mobile despite seemingly large numbers of horses with ratios often as high as 1 horse per 2 men and 52 wagons per thousand men, because baggage remained light with most horses used for re-supply. In the east, the Army of the Potomac struggled to move at all, with a ratio of 1 horse per 5 men and 45 wagons per thousand due to its mountains of baggage.

The Triangular Model

By considering the army in the field as an economic unit, it can be seen to possess three interrelated fundamental factors: *demand*, *supply* and *transport* all influencing the output of *mobility*.

Demand is a largely a function of the size and composition of the army, multiplied by the scale of rations. It varies because some armies were frugal and efficient, carrying minimal baggage and having optimal artillery and cavalry numbers, while others had excessive baggage, artillery, cavalry, rations, and medical care. Clausewitz noted 'Generally the diminution of baggage tends more to a saving of power than to the acceleration of movement.'[17] Horse numbers alone were not a good indicator, as some horses were consumers waiting in camp to be fed (artillery, baggage and heavy cavalry,) while others were net contributors, providing supplies (foraging light cavalry and horses pulling supply wagons).[18]

Supply represents the available stock of a wide range of commodities needed by the army and can be divided into three categories. The army train carried the army's baggage, equipment, stock of rations, munitions and repair materials in the wagons and caissons of the army. Close supply was the sustenance drawn from the local agricultural networks in the foraging area of the army, plus whatever additional supplies can be gathered by local officials using networks across the province. While distant supply represented commodities carried to the army by its own transport or contactors from a depot or magazine. In turn, these depots had been filled using strategic transport routes such as rivers or railways or sea to carry the commodities from distant agricultural markets by merchants or government agencies.[19]

Transport moderated the available supply and was divided into an operational transport fleet provided by military, conscripted or civilian contractors which operated at both the close and distant supply levels providing the convoys linking the army with its magazines and depots. These depots were filled by the strategic transport fleet which was usually provided by civilian or conscripted contractors who delivered the distant supply from national and international markets. Operational transport had limited

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[17]Clausewitz, 'On War'. Book 5, Chapter 11 "Marches".
[18]Kennett, *The French Armies in the Seven Years' War*, p. 67.
[19]Ibid., p. 99.

carrying capacity, short range and travelled slowly while strategic transport carried greater loads, more quickly and over much longer distances.

The outcome of the interaction of these three factors was mobility, and since horse-drawn armies varied little in the distance they could travel in a day's marching, (usually under 30km,) this was expressed as the number of days a week the army could march. The highest mobility was seen in a frugal corps, unencumbered by excess cavalry or artillery or baggage, marching through a well-populated landscape, drawing its supplies from the immediate area. The number of marching days was reduced as more effort was required in collecting supplies and friction increased once supplies needed to be delivered by convoys from afar and by excess baggage and horses.

Figure 1. The logistics triangle



Using Kankrin's threshold of thirty-five inhabitants per km^2 in Clausewitz's foraging zone of 230 km^2 (8,000 inhabitants) supporting a corps of 30,000 men, a table can be produced plotting national population density over time, which shows when countries became viable for self-supporting corps, as shown in Table 2.

Table 2: Population density by period

	Numbers of inhabitants per km²				
	1600	1700	1820	1850	1900
Great Britain	20	28	68	87	132
Netherlands	20	25	31	41	68
Belgium	52	66	112	146	220
France	39	46	66	77	86
Spain	16	18	24	30	37
Portugal	12	22	36	41	59
Italy	44	45	68	83	114
Switzerland	24	29	48	84	80
Germany	22	21	35	47	76
Poland	16	19	32	40	77
Austria	30	30	40	47	71
Hungary	13	16	45	55	77
Russia	5	7	14	19	31
Europe	19	21	35	44	62
United States				7.9	
Confederacy				4.6	

Shaded cells denote population density higher than the 35 inhabitants km² threshold for local supply of military forces of 30,000 men

Source: 'Maddison Historical Statistics | Historical Development | University of Groningen'. Accessed 15 October 2019. https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/historicaldevelopment/maddison/.

This only applies to a frugal, well-balanced force with a typical horse to men ratio of 1:7 which might have a demand of 146 tonnes a day (30,000 x 2kg + 4,300 x 20kg). By contrast, the Grande Armee of 1812 had a ratio of 1:4 which might translate into a demand of 210t (30,000 x 2kg + 7,500 x 20kg) or 40% greater.[20] Similarly the technique of 'marching divided, fighting united' in corps, only came into widespread use during

[20]Brun, 'Le cheval dans la Grande Armée', p.2.

the French Revolutionary Wars under General Moreau. Although the earliest example of splitting an army into 'corps' to reduce the burden on local supply was done by Peter I of Russia, the practice did not become widespread and eighteenth century armies generally marched in several columns ready to deploy into their battle formation. So individual armies must be assessed for their overall demand in relation to the standard and adjusted accordingly. When making these assessments, the model utilises fundamental factors that apply to all horse-drawn armies across the time period. There are other cultural factors arising from military custom, the ruler's whims or societal pressures which may influence a particular nation's armies for a number of years.

Supply: Economic Landscape

Central to Kankrin's theory is the link between agricultural production and population density which he measured in 1820. However, this did not remain constant, as the Agricultural Revolution raised productivity levels by a series of improvements in animal husbandry, crop varieties and agricultural machinery. These reforms were not uniformly carried out across Europe, with the greatest impact found in England, Belgium and the Netherlands, with middling performance in France, Germany and Italy and the weakest in Spain.[21] The rise in agricultural output per worker rose from a factor of 1.00 in 1500 to 1.15 in 1700 to 1.43 in 1800 in England yet the overall rise in agricultural production was less due to urbanisation and the reduction in the agricultural workforce. Increased availability of food allowed country dwellers to move into towns to pursue manufacturing and trade instead of agriculture so production per capita fell, in England from 0.85 in 1700 and 0.68 in 1800, while France remained steady at 0.65 throughout the period and the Netherlands went from 0.7 to 0.8 between 1700 and 1800 (England 1500 = 1.00). Overall the effect was that it was harder, or at best the same, to support an army from local supplies in 1700 than in 1800 for any given population density.

Care needs to be taken not to apply these factors in isolation since international trade was delivering foodstuffs by water from Eastern Europe to the cities of Western Europe as early as 1550. By 1670s Amsterdam was known as 'the granary of Europe'[22] and by 1750 Great Britain was a net importer of grain, with Polish grain being traded in the markets of London and Antwerp. This trend grew with the introduction of trans-oceanic steamships in 1819, followed by the mass importation of grain into

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[21]Robert C. Allen, 'Economic Structure and Agricultural Productivity in Europe, 1300–1800', *European Review of Economic History* 4, no. 1 (April 2000): p. 16, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1361491600000125. Accessed 7 April 2019.

[22]O. Van Nimwegen, *De subsistentie van het leger: Logistiek en strategie van het Geallieerde en met name het Staatse leger tijdens de Spaanse Successieoorlog in de Nederlanden en het Heilige Roomse Rijk (1701-1712)* (Amsterdam: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 1995), p. 34.

Europe from North America from 1860s and this began to uncouple the relationship between population density and agricultural production.

For seventeenth century armies, Perjes proposed a cultural factor in that the number of mills was only sufficient to produce flour for a local population and could not meet the demand of a far larger army.[23] This seems unlikely for centres of the grain trade such as the Dutch Republic, which would have needed extra milling capacity. A problematic argument as agriculture was a surge activity, the entire harvest appeared in August and had to be processed for storage in the three months before November with sufficient flour ground to cover consumption over the next six months. Yet windmills only run for a third of the year, around 3,000 hours due to adverse wind conditions, too light in summer and too fierce in winter. When conditions are right they can process a 9kg bag of flour in 10 minutes, giving an annual production of approximately 150 tonnes per mill. Where watermills were used they suffer fewer restrictions, however they were limited by low water levels in summer and icing of ponds and damp conditions worked against milling flour in winter. At their height in 1850 there were 200,000 windmills and 500,000 watermills (many of these powered industrial processes such as forges and sawmills) across Europe.[24] Given these factors, a high proportion of the grain harvest was quickly turned into flour in the autumn and the balance in the spring and stored, available for the campaigning season. Magazines stored no more than a third of its stocks as grain because it was subject to mould and had to be changed every three years while the balance was stored as flour since this kept almost indefinitely.

In a similar vein, Lynn proposed another cultural factor during the wars of Louis XIV - the time it took to build of ovens constructed of bricks cemented with mortar.[25] These ovens took anything from two days to two weeks to build and so encouraged bread supply direct from magazines. In these circumstances the armies of Louis XIV managed to march less than 500 km in a campaign season, even though marching across some of the most productive farmland in Europe possessing a good infrastructure of roads and canals. However, the 'oven cultural factor' is challenged by events at the other end of Europe, as Charles XII's Swedish army marched up to 1,500 km in a campaign season between 1700 and 1709 and Peter I of Russia's army was not much slower. Moreover, their campaigning area had a lower population and far less developed infrastructure. How, then, did these armies march so far and fast when they

[23]Perjés, *'Army Provisioning'*, pp. 7-9
[24]Kris De Decker, 'Wind Powered Factories: History (and Future) of Industrial Windmills', *Low-Tech Magazine,* Vol. 2009, Iss. 10, (October 2009). https://www.lowtechmagazine.com/2009/10/history-of-industrial-windmills.html. Accessed 3 May 2020.
[25]Lynn, '*Feeding Mars',* p. 20

should have been constrained by their ovens in a similar way as the French? In reality these armies were small enough to live off local supply and so avoided the need to draw supplies from magazines and build ovens.

As noted above, Peter went one step further by marching his army in separate bodies, so that it was spread out across a wider area. By comparison the armies of Louis XIV had a greater demand due to their larger numbers of soldiers, cavalry and artillery, extensive baggage train and numerous camp followers. This level of demand exceeded local supply and necessitated distant supply and ovens. The fundamental factor at work here was the size of armies in relation to the ability of the local area to support them. Large armies' problems with ovens may have been a contributory factor in making them slower, however the introduction of iron-hooped ovens in the 1740s, capable of being built in a day, did not increase French mobility significantly. It is interesting that Perjes in an earlier work states:

> The leaders of the Revolution and Napoleon were able to turn away from the magazine system because, in contrast to earlier times, the number of people in Europe increased, the population density increased and the productivity of agriculture increased. The armies found more food in the theatres of war, making the magazines superfluous. However, in those areas where the population density was just as high around the turn of the 18th to the 19th century, as in Western Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries, the magazines were still indispensable.[26]

Supply: State Agents, Entrepreneurs and the Contractor State

In 1988 John Brewer conceived the idea of the 'Fiscal-Military State' with its emphasis on nation state administration enacting effective fiscal policies so as to produce monetary resources to enable the waging of war sustainably.[27] This evolved through the work of Sanchez after 2004, into the concept of the 'Contractor State' where state administration worked with existing commercial supply chains, both domestic and international to deliver the resources of war.[28]

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[26]Géza Perjes, 'Die Frage der Verpflegung im Feldzuge Napoleons gegen Rußland [The question of supply in Napoleon's campaign in Russia.]', *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen.* 1968, no. 2 (1968): p. 35. Author's translation.

[27]John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783* (Routledge: London, 1994).

[28]Rafael Torres Sánchez, *War, State and Development: Fiscal-Military States in the Eighteenth Century* (EUNSA: Pamplona, 2008). See also Richard Herring and Sergio Solbes Ferri (eds.), Contractor State Group. International Congress (4°. 2011. Las Palmas de Gran Canaria), The contractor state and its implications, 1659-1815, (Las

From this perspective, an army in the field was sitting at the centre of a web of pre-existing commercial flows of material and finance of the agricultural economy, that linked producers such as peasant farmers to distant consumers in towns and cities, through a series of merchants and hauliers. It can be seen that these flows had their own geography and were not uniformly spread across the landscape. So, while the army's own foraging and collection activities in the local area are important, it must be recognised that its own buying power pulled in goods and commodities from local peasants, regional merchants and through sutlers activities. Yet for some commodities such as flour, oats and meat, the demand was so large that the state had to contract with international markets to deliver these goods either to local magazines or, as was more common in the earlier period, direct to the army in the field. In contrast, the need for smaller amounts of commodities, such as firewood, candles, iron, wheels, cloth and spare parts, could be met from suppliers province-wide for use by the army's craftsmen (gunsmiths, blacksmiths, farriers, tailors, cobblers, wheelwrights and saddlers.)

This viewpoint provides an important explanation to the phenomenon of two armies in the same theatre of war, one of which had adequate supply while the other did not. With the theatre divided, so were the areas of production and trade networks which had to re-order themselves in order to keep functioning. Inevitably this gave one army an advantage in *supply,* yet the scale of that advantage depended on the efficiency of the armies in terms of contemporary military customs of organisation and operation. A frugal and efficient army could counter a disadvantageous supply position while one which had an inherently heavy demand might find itself in dire straits.

An example of these networks can be seen in the Combined Army in Germany in 1758-62 when the British government paid for an army of 100,000 men, of whom no more than 22,000 were British troops.[29] It employed '…British commissaries and contractors, and also Germans – as commissaries and other army employees, contractors, merchants, shippers and farmers….'[30] Supplies were drawn from Russia, the merchants of the Dutch Republic and Germany and even British farmers sent grain, even though Britain was a net importer. Local Bremen merchants such as *Schröder, Behrens and Wetzlar* handled contracts to obtain 500 tonnes (5,000 sacks or a week's supply for the army) of rye meal. These commodities were warehoused at Bremen,

Palmas de Gran Canaria: Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, Servicio de Publicaciones, 2012) p. 13.

[29]Stephen Conway, 'Provisioning the Combined Army in Germany 1758-1762: Who Benefited?', in Harding and Ferri (eds.), *The Contractor State and Its Implications*, pp. 77–98.

[30]Ibid., p. 79

then shipped down the Weser by German bargemen to a magazine at Hameln, where the flour was baked into bread and then transported to the army in locally hired German wagons, by British contractors such as Lawrence Dundas and Richard Oswald. This meant that the army commander, Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick-Lunëburg, was reliant on a supply chain stretching a distance of 415km from Bremen to his headquarters at Dulmen, with 250km transported by water as far as Hameln, then 135km by road to the forward magazine at Munster, which forwarded them the last 30km to Dulmen.[31]

In terms of overall costs subsistence represented the major expenditure. For instance, the Austro-Hungarian Army of 1758 spent 56% of its 37,320,000 florin budget on a daily supply of 214,011 bread rations, 76,786 fodder rations and 700 oxen a week driven from Hungary and Poland.[32] Similar figures for the French army in 1741, showed that meat and bread supply accounted for 38%, transport 20%, pay 15%, clothing 14%, fodder 8% and recruiting 5% of expenditure.[33]

For all this effort and expenditure, the reality was that supply often failed with soldiers and horses going hungry for long periods, as a French Napoleonic cavalryman, De Brack commented 'I made eight campaigns in the time of the Empire and always with the outposts; I did not see during all that time one single *'commissaire des guerres';* I did not receive a single ration from the army's depots.'[34] These depots need closer consideration at this point.

Supply: Magazines and depots

The creation of major magazines is usually attributed to the work of François-Michel Le Tellier, Marquis de Louvois, in 1660s, and the development of the French magazine system certainly accompanied and facilitated a somewhat unexpected expansion of the French army. Magazines represented a considerable, sustained effort in terms of planning and finance. By 1752 Frederick II of Prussia had acquired 43,300 tonnes (53,000 bushels) of flour and grain stored at Berlin, Stettin, Magdeburg and Breslau,

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[31]Reginald Savory, *His Britannic Majesty's Army in Germany during the Seven Years War,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 101.

[32]Christopher Duffy, *Instrument of War: The Austrian Army in the Seven Years War,* (Rosemont IL: Emperor's Press, 2000), pp. 101, 323.

[33]Jöel Félix, 'Victualling Louis XV's Armies. The Munitionnaire Des Vivres de Flandres at d'Allemagne and the Military Supply System.' in Harding and Ferri (eds.), *The Contractor State and Its Implications,* pp. 101.

[34]John R. Elting, *Swords around a Throne: Napoleon's Grande Armée* (London: Orion, 1999), p. 554.

sufficient to supply an army of 60,000 men for two years.[35] On this basis, each magazine could supply the field army for around 6 months. He built a fleet of thirty barges carrying around 4,000 tonnes to move this cargo on its 400km journey along the canals and river Oder to Breslau and from there it was hauled by wagon 55km to the forward magazine at Schweidnitz.[36]

Acting as the link between long distance transport and the army in the field, magazines were usually placed in large, fortified towns on navigable rivers or canals with a good road infrastructure. This allowed them to forward supplies to the field army by wagon convoys, or to act as depots by armies that were conducting an expedition. The local civil administration was often involved in the collection of supplies from the surrounding province while the state sent supplies from further afield. They often formed victualling and rest points for *etappen*, the fixed routes of march for reinforcements or drafts of recruits, the most famous example of which was the Spanish Road linking Lombardy with the army in Flanders.[37]

By the end of the eighteenth century, agricultural production had grown sufficiently to allow armies to support themselves by requisition, albeit at the cost of constant movement. This transition period saw a number of examples of magazine supplied armies facing requisition supplied armies such as the British campaign on the Portuguese-Spanish border between 1809-1813.[38] Sir Arthur Wellesley's frugal army contained limited cavalry, artillery and baggage and was supplied by river transport which filled a chain of inland magazines, 65km apart using bullock carts travelling six km a day. The link between magazines, army and transport for the train was provided by columns of mules marching 22km a day carrying 100kg per mule. This antiquated transport system not only supported a force of 50,000 men but also sustained a number of sieges of frontier towns. By contrast French forces were larger, like Masséna's Army of Portugal of 65,000 men, contained greater numbers of horses and artillery and struggled to maintain themselves in the country using requisition. Two logistical systems therefore produced different tactical forces with varying levels of

[35]Christopher Duffy, *The Army of Frederick the Great*, (Newton Abbot: David & Charles, 1974), p. 134.

[36]Neil Cogswell, *Zweybrücken in Command, The Reichsarmee in the Campaign of 1758*, (Warwick: Helion, 2019), *p.* 21.

[37]Geoffrey Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659: The Logistics of Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries' Wars* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 45.

[38]Troy Kirby, 'The Duke of Wellington and the Supply System During the Peninsula War', master's thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College: Fort Leavenworth, KN, 2011. https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a547395.pdf. Accessed 1 July 2019

mobility for the generals to use in theatre according to their abilities. These forces would make varying demands on resources, reflecting their tactical and operational needs and their composition.

Demand

Armies were in large part a product of their society and their composition was based more on what could be raised than a rational balancing of weapon and troop types. Army commanders attempted to exert some level of control over the number of horses and baggage carried yet these attempts were quite limited in scope, as armies attracted large numbers of servants, sutlers and camp followers who provided both food and entertainment for the officers and men. The benefits and the penalties of excess baggage were clearly understood by contemporary writers:

> Since the wars of the French Revolution, armies have completely done away with the tents on account of the encumbrance they cause. Partly it is found better for an army of 100,000 men to have, in place of 6,000 tent horses, 5,000 additional cavalry, or a couple of hundred extra guns, partly it has been found that in great and rapid operations a load of tents is a hindrance, and of little use. But this change is attended with two drawbacks, viz., an increase of casualties in the force, and greater wasting of the country.[39]

Similarly, a British Army instruction of 1789 correctly identified baggage and artillery as the main culprits,

> In opposing the enemy in this manner, everything depends on the Alertness of the troops, on the Lightness of their equipment, and being free from every Incumbrance of Baggage and Carriages and even the Artillery employed should neither be numerous or heavy.[40]

In this case each regiment was restricted to bread wagons each carrying 1,200kg (1,600 rations of 0.7kg each,) four wagons and two sutlers carts with 35 bat-horses carrying tents, officers baggage and the surgeons chest.[41]

The effect of controlling demand on logistics can be seen at the end of the horse-drawn period, when the standard model of European armies in the Second World War, was of an army comprising a small armoured/motorised force with the bulk rifle-

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[39]Clausewitz, On War, Ch. 9 "Camps".

[40]Sir William Fawcett, *Instructions Relative to the Baggage and Marches of the Army* (War Office: London, 1798), p. 7, http://archive.org/details/instructionsrela1798grea. Accessed 1 July 2019.

[41]Ibid.

armed infantry supported by heavy artillery, little different from that of the First World War. Mobilisation, strategic and operational movement was conducted by rail while tactical movement was horse-drawn. Motor vehicles supported armoured forces, pulled the heavy artillery and provided the supply link between the rail-head and the armies. The wartime Red Army was no different, fielding 6,750,149 men, 366,959 vehicles (268,428 cargo,) and 791,611 horses (or roughly 9:1, men : horse) in the operational army on 1 January 1945 and, even with Lend Lease vehicles, was no more motorised in 1945 than it had been in 1941.[42] In order to reduce the demand on long-distance transportation, these types of armies still drew large amounts of sustenance for both men and horses from their local areas with the Red Army drawing 65% of its food supplies locally.[43]

The fundamental change in demand was for the large amounts of artillery ammunition which now exceeded all other types of supply combined. Soviet military science demonstrated that the main demand for ammunition came in breaking through the enemy lines and that further fighting during the pursuit or in encounter battles was relatively modest. Typically the plan for conducting a fifteen day army operation used 2-3 *boekomplekt* (ammunition loads or 9,000 tonnes) for the breakthrough battle, 0.5 *boekomplekt* a day (1,500t) for further fighting and 0.25 a day (750t) for the pursuit.[44] So long as the breakthrough battle could be fought from depots established just behind the front line and close to a railway, the rest of the munitions demand could be met by horse-drawn transport conducting an expedition and was of a similar order of magnitude to previous eras.

Typically, in the mid-war period a Combined-Arms Army fielded 55,000 men, 3,000 vehicles and 9,000 horses and relied for its supplies on railways. The Rifle Divisions were horse-drawn leaving the bulk of motor transport to draw heavy artillery guns, leaving just 300 supply vehicles (700t) sufficient to meet day to day needs, carrying supplies 75km from the nearest rail-head. In order to gather stocks behind the front line to sustain the offensive, most of the army's vehicles had to be stripped from the combat units and used for hauling supplies. The build-up lasted two weeks then motor

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[42]H. G. W. Davie, 'Logistics of the Combined-Arms Army – Motor Transport', *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 31, no. 4 (2 October 2018): pp. 474–501, https://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2018.1521360. Accessed 1 July 2019

[43]Wendy Goldman & Donald Filtzer, *Hunger and War: Food Provisioning in the Soviet Union during World War II* (Indiana IN: Indiana University Press, 2015), p.104 note.19.

[44]G.E. Peredel'skiĭ, A.I. Tokmakov, and G.T. Khoroshilov, *Artilleriı͡a v Boı͡u i Operat͡sii : (Po Opytu Velikoĭ Otechestvennoĭ Voĭny) [Artilllery in Battles and Operations]* (Moskva: Voenizdat, 1980), Ch. 2 Artillery Offensive authors calculations, http://militera.lib.ru/science/peredelsky_ge/index.html. Accessed 1 July 2019.

vehicles returned to their units. Once the offensive started, the army relied for the bulk of its supplies for the next 12 days on the stocks carried in the horse-drawn transport marching alongside the infantry, motor vehicles pulling the heavy artillery and motor transport shuttling between the depots on the old front line and the advancing troops. This depended on the Rifle Divisions having a light cargo weight and minimising demand to just rations, fuel and ammunition during the period of the advance to ensure maximum horse-drawn mobility. It should be obvious that an understanding of mobility requires an exploration of the different modes of transportation available.

Transport

> A broad-wheeled waggon, attended by two men, and drawn by eight horses, in about six weeks time, carries and brings back between London and Edinburgh near four ton weight of goods. In about the same time a ship navigated by six or eight men, and sailing between the ports of London and Leith, frequently carries and brings back two hundred ton weight of goods. Six or eight men, therefore, by the help of water-carriage, can carry and bring back, in the same time, the same quantity of goods between London and Edinburgh as fifty broad-wheeled waggons, attended by a hundred men, and drawn by four hundred horses. [45]

In the above, Adam Smith succinctly demonstrated the 50:1 ratio of costs of moving across the landscape by land or water and further calculated that the land needed to graze one horse could feed eight men. As a result of these costs, towns were built close to waterways, trading routes followed rivers and coastal patterns and roads were fewer, expensive and limited the type of goods it was economic to carry. The sole advantage of road travel was that it was faster, keeping to time compared to wind powered shipping. The result was that the main means of moving low value, bulk industrial and agricultural commodities such as coal and wheat was by river or coastal shipping, while long distance road transport was reserved for high value, finished goods, such as textiles or perishables like fish or butter which warranted the extra expense. This is what Braudel meant when he coined the phrase 'The tyranny of distance.'[46] Yet as Onorato, et al have shown in the case of France, transport was the main determinant of the size of armies and railways made mass armies possible by changing the dynamics of mass mobilisation rather than affecting the ability to supply them.[47]

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[45]Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (London: A. Strahan & T. Cadell, 1793), p. 31, http://online.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.49748 Accessed 1 November 2020

[46]Fernand Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism: 15th-18th Century* (London: Collins, 1985).

[47]Massimiliano Gaetano Onorato, Kenneth Scheve, and David Stasavage,

Consequently military, strategic long distance travel was often easier by water and later by railways, which could carry large amounts, cheaply and speedily, though across a limited network. Meanwhile, travel at the operational level by road was expensive, slow and difficult. For the military establishment this posed a particular problem as its main cargo was bulky materials such as flour, oats, hay and straw. In civilian life, these commodities would normally be carried by water or turned into finished products shipped by road. In this sense, the standard military cargo was an unusual cargo for land transport.

There were three types of road conveyance, packhorses, two wheeled carts and four wheeled wagons, with the first two being used from medieval times and the wagon appearing around the 1560 from the Low Countries and gradually superseding carts by 1630.[48] Carts might use up to five horses pulling a one tonne load while wagons might use up to eight horses in file pulling four tonnes. Packhorses could cover up to 60km in a day or 240km in a week and waggons 200km but the speed began to increase from the 1690s in England, as roads improved along major routes, with a second increase in the 1790s with the introduction of new designs of lighter wagons and the use of relays of horses in "stages" along the route. A stage system saw the wagon and load moving continuously throughout a 24 hour period while the horses and drivers are changed every six to eight hours. The service from Southampton to London, 130km away, took sixty hours in the 1770s along the turnpike, but had dropped to thirty-six hours by 1820 by using stages and fly-wagons. Furthermore, between the early 17th century and 1820 horses doubled the load they could pull, while at the same time the amount of provender (fodder and grain) was reduced by a quarter. This is borne out by calculations on the efficiency of working horses in 1924, which showed horses pulled 1.5 tonne 32km a day or heavy horses pulled 5 tonnes, 15km a day, producing 380 tonne-km a week which was three times the work generated by carrier's horses in 1816.[49] This greater efficiency was achieved largely through road improvements, by reducing gradients and through developing better and stronger breeds of horses.

The characteristics of different types of waggons are given below in table three and examples of mid eighteenth century vehicles are illustrated in *"Die Österreichische Armee im Siebenjährigen Krieg"*[50]

'Technology and the Era of the Mass Army', *The Journal of Economic History* 74, no. 2 (June 2014): p. 473, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022050714000321. Accessed 1 July 2019

[48] Dorien Gerhold, *Road Transport in the Horse-Drawn Era,* (Aldershot: Scolar, 1996).

[49] Ibid., p. 221.

[50] Lars-Holger Thümmler, *Die Österreichische Armee im Siebenjährigen Krieg*, (Berlin: Brandenburgisches Verlagshaus, 1993), p. 101–8.

Table 3: Wagon characteristics from contemporary sources

Date	Name	Details	Draft horses	Weight of wagon	Load carrying (kg)	Days march (km)
1756	Commissariat wagon	Frederick the Great	4 horses in pairs		980 kg	29
1756	Company bread wagon	Frederick the Great			760 kg	29
1795	Wagon	British Commissary	4 horses in pairs		800 kg on unpaved roads	
1795	Wagon	British Commissary	4 horses in pairs		1360 kg on paved roads	
1812	Comtoise	Napoleon's light baggage wagon	4 horses in pairs		1000 kg	32
1812	Fourgon	Napoleon's heavy baggage wagon	4 oxen in pairs		1090 kg	
1813	Brandy wagon	Barrel wagon	single horses			
1813	Deckelwagen	Heavy baggage wagon	4 horses in pairs	25 Zentner or 1,250 kg	28-32 Zentner or 1,400-1,600 kg	
1813	Vorratswagen	Light baggage wagon	4 horses in pairs		20 Zentner or 1,000 kg	
1865	Escort wagon	Sherman	6 mules in pairs	907 kg	2,040 kg	45
1865	Escort wagon	Hollabird good roads + 5-10 days of horse grain ration	6 mules in pairs	907 kg	1,820 kg	45
1865	Escort wagon	Hollabird dirt roads + 5-10 days of horse grain ration	6 mules in pairs	907 kg	1,365 kg	34
1865	Escort wagon	Hollabird wild country + 5-10 days of horse grain ration	6 mules in pairs	907 kg	910 kg	34
1914	GS Wagon Mark IX	British Army First World War	4 horses in pair	891 kg	1,224 kg	40
1940	leichte Heeresfeldwagen Hf.1	German Army Second World War light cargo wagon	2 horses in pairs	610 kg	750 kg	40
1940	schwerer Heeresfeldwagen Hf.2	German Army Second World War heavy cargo wagon	4 horses in pairs	800 kg	1,200 kg	40

Sources:
Duffy. *The Army of Frederick the Great*.
H. le Mesurier, *The British Commissary, in Two Parts. Part I. Part II.* (London, 1801).
Ségur, Philippe-Paul. *Histoire de Napoléon et de la Grande-Armée pendant l'année 1812. Tome I & II*, (Paris, 1824). https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/19972.
E.F. Kankrin, *Über Die Militairökonomie Im Frieden Und Krieg Und Ihr Wechselverhältniss Zu Den Operationen - Drei Band [On the Military Economy in Peace and War and Their Relationship to Operations - in Three Vols]*. (St Petersburg, 1820.) http://reader.digitale-sammlungen.de/de/fs1/object/display/bsb10526340_00005.html.
Edward Hagerman, *The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare: Ideas, Organization, and Field Command*, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1988)

War Office. *Field Service Pocket Book, 1914*. H.M. Stationery Office, (London 1914). This gives the average draw weight of a light draught horse of 1200lb (544kg) and a heavy draught horses of 1,600 (726kg) for 20 miles (32km) a day
Wolfgang Fleischer, *German Infantry Carts, Army Field Wagons, Army Sleds, 1900-1945*. (Atglen, PA: Schiffer, 2000.)

Yet enough waggons and beasts had to be found. An illustration of limited amount of transport available can be seen in a letter written by Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick to the Marquis of Granby during the Seven Years War.[51] He complained that he needed to support his army over a distance of 135km from its magazine at Kassel to Gleissen and that the main problem for the army was obtaining sufficient transport. The 30,000 daily rations were carried in 600 waggons with four stages covering the distance (each a day's travel of 30km between towns) which would require 2,400 waggons, with another 2,400 waggons to account for the return journeys. To sustain this operation, further horses were required to allow rest days, yet the entire Kingdom of Hesse could only provide 2,400 wagons in total. It was consequently far from easy to ensure mobility that was adequate for operational needs.

Mobility: frequency of marching or the tempo of operations

A good example of a commander benefiting from high mobility is King Frederick II of Prussia during the Seven Years War. The challenges he faced in 1757, at both strategic and theatre levels, virtually dictated a need for speed and endurance. The enemy forces ranged against him consisted of a French army in Hannover, a French force with the *Reichsarmee* in Franconia, Austrians in Saxony, the main Austrian army in Bohemia, Russian armies approaching Brandenburg and Swedes in Pomerania. Assembled to counter these threats were the Combined Army of German states in Hesse, Prince Henry's Prussian corps in Saxony and Frederick's main army moving between Prussia's southern and eastern provinces. In such circumstances, Frederick needed to fight a series of decisive battles to destroy the enemy armies one after the other, and to avoid long sieges.

However, things did not go according to plan, and by June 1757 Frederick had been forced out of Bohemia and the Franco-Austrian armies were threatening to converge in overwhelming numbers on Silesia. In order to forestall this, Frederick conducted three marches between theatres. From 25 August to 15 September he marched from Lobau in Upper Lusatia to Gotha in Thuringia, a distance of 320km. Then he conducted a second march from 11 to 19 October from Thuringia towards Berlin in pursuit of Count Hadik's raid, a distance of 170km. Then following the defeat of Soubise and the *Reichsarmee* at Rossbach, Frederick marched from 13 to 28 November between

[51] John Manners, Marquis of Granby, *A Letter to the Most Noble John Manners, Marquis of Granby, Commander in Chief of the British Forces under Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick* (London: Printed for J. Pridden, 1760).

Leipzig to Parchwitz in Bohemia, a distance of 310km before winning a victory at Leuthen on 5 December 1757.

He conducted these marches by taking a core army (18 battalions and 23 squadrons of cavalry around 12,000 strong[52]) then reinforcing it at the destination with local troops. Loading the train with eighteen days supplies so that he could conduct an *expedition* and drawing further supplies from towns along his route of march. The importance of this is shown during his return march through an already denuded Bautzen, as he sent a supply column from Leipzig to re-stock it before his arrival.

Importantly, once in theatre Frederick reverted to a system of weekly movements between fortified camps, supplied by convoys from magazines 'especially in Bohemia, where the country is but little better than a desert'.[53] The army drew some supplies locally since it had a large body of sutlers who performed a vital function in supplying food and other commodities.[54] By comparison Soubise's army that year had 12,000 camp followers for his army of 30,000 men, The official Prussian bread and meat ration were carried from some distance travelling down a western route carried by boats along the river Elbe, from the magazine at Torgau to Pirna at the border and then by a 140km *etappe* by a combination of road and water to Prague. For the eastern route, the starting point was Zittau, down the textile trade road to Reichenberg and then along the river Iser to Prague, a distance of 140km.[55]

This illustrates that Frederick's army was quite capable of rapid marches since it had a proper balance of cavalry and artillery with restrictions on its baggage train. Other armies such as the French, weighed themselves down with too many horses, too much baggage and large numbers of camp followers. It must be stressed that tactical considerations were the main inhibition to rapid movement, as Frederick having conducted his rapid march from Bohemia into Saxony, then spent a period of eight weeks, from 15 September to 4 November operating in this theatre from fortified camps supplied by magazines. He was waiting for the French and *Reichsarmee* to make

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[52]Christopher Duffy, *Prussia's Glory: Rossbach and Leuthen 1757* (Helion: London, 2019), p. 43.

[53]King of Prussia, Frederick II and Thomas Foster, *Military Instruction from the Late King of Prussia to His Generals: Illustrated with Plates* (Sherborne: J. Cruttwell, 1818), p. 14, http://archive.org/details/militaryinstruc00prusgoog. Accessed 1 July 2019

[54]Thomas Cardoza, *Intrepid Women: Cantinières and Vivandières of the French Army* (Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 2010), p. 22.

[55]Grosser Generalstab. Kriegsgeschichtliche Abteilung II, *Die Kriege Friedrichs des Grossen*. (Berlin: Mittler, 1890), vols 3. Der Siebenjährige Krieg. 1756-1763., https://archive.org/details/diekriegefriedr00unkngoog2. Bd. Prag. Skizzie 12. Accessed 1 July 2019.

a mistake and allow the tactical opening that resulted in the battle of Rossbach. All through this period the Austrians were allowed free rein in Bohemia, so Frederick was under intense pressure to defeat the French and return there.

An equally illuminating pattern of mobility, but for an entire war, can be found several decades earlier. It is a shame that we do not know the identity of 'An Impartial Hand' since the source provides an excellent table showing the activities of the British Army during the Spanish War of Succession between 1701 and 1713.[56] These activities divided the year into Garrison and in the Field, how many days were marched and the distance. Of the 12 years and one week covered or 4,387 days, only 2,184 were spent in the field, of which 500 days were spent marching 8,864km. Essentially this shows that the army only marched every 4.4 days when in the field or 1.6 days a week and that these marches covered only 17km a day or 24km a week. Even allowing for lengthy sieges, this stately progression allowed plenty of time for supply convoys to deliver supplies from magazines over quite limited distances. However, as Perjés has observed, the regular cycle of army activity left little time for advancing into enemy territory.[57]

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[56]Richard Kane, *A System of Camp-Discipline, Military Honours, Garrison-Duty, and Other Regulations for the Land Forces. Collected by a Gentleman of the Army. In Which Are Included, Kane's Discipline for a Battalion in Action; with a Map of the Seat of War, Lines and Plans of Battles, &c. To Which Is Added, Kane's Campaigns of King William and the Duke of Marlborough, from 1689 to 1712. Second Edition Continued ... to 1757. By an Impartial Hand.* 2 volumes, (London: Milian, 1757). https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=YEEIAAAAQAAJ Accessed 1 July 2019

[57] Perjés, *'Army provisioning',* p. 43-44

Table 4: Examples of changing tempo of operations

	Spanish Succession	**Seven Years War**		**Napoleonic Wars**	**American Civil War**
	1702-1712	1757		1812	1 Jan 1863 - 24 Mar1864
	Allied	Austrian	Prussian	French	Union
Garrison Days	178	131	107	192	115
Campaign Days	195	234	258	117	323
Marching Days	39	46	90	66	112
March Days in campaign	20.0%	19.7%	34.9%	56.4%	60.1%
Distance march (km)	706	600	1535	945	1826
March per day (km)	16	13.0	17.1	14.3	16.3
Days march/week	1.4	1.4	2.4	3.9	4.2
Distance/week (km)	22	18	42	57	69

Similar data can be collected for other periods using personal diaries such as the one kept by Horace St. Paul during the Seven Years War, or by Charles Wills during the American Civil War and in some cases there is sufficient detail from military histories to study King Frederick II's or Napoleon's movements during the 1812 campaign and these are given in Table 4 above.

This table shows that the tempo of operations steadily increased over time. Armies did not march significantly harder to increase the distances covered during their campaigns, rather they simply marched more often, spending less time in camp or tied down in sieges. This posed a problem for horse-drawn supply convoys since they only maintained a narrow advantage in speed over that of their army and they relied on it staying in camp for extended periods to catch up. Once these stays became shorter, different transport methods were needed if armies were not to become overstretched and burned out. Armies increasingly conducted expeditions from temporary depots provided by railways in preference to basing themselves on fixed magazines in frontier fortresses.

While Perjés sought to understand the mechanics of late seventeenth century horse-drawn armies, this paper widens that view including the whole period from 1618 to 1945. This facilitates a whole and different set of influences, incorporating Perjés earlier work on Napoleonic armies, the works of Moore and Hagerman on horse numbers in the American Civil War and Soviet ideas about the timing of demand. By considering this broader picture, a number of fundamental factors which were common to all horse-drawn armies emerged and the possibility to establish

relationships between these factors and their outputs. As we have seen, all horse-drawn armies lived within the landscape through which they travelled and this limit on *supply* imposed a restriction on both the size of armies and their ability to concentrate. Exceeding this limit required distant supply, which was very costly and restricted by the available *transport*. These two factors represented two sides of the *logistics triangle* and were to a great extent beyond the control of military commanders or their governments. Nonetheless they could control *demand*, the third side of the triangle, which was determined by societal factors and military custom, as in the composition of armies, number of horses, scale of rations, medical support and operational practice.

Within the framework imposed by *supply* and *transport* on horse-drawn armies, controlling *demand* determined whether they could reach the limits of mobility and logistics. Nor was this situation static, as population growth and economic improvement gradually provided more resources and improved transport infrastructure to armies. This military activity was maintained and supported by an invisible web of commerce and trade that linked the field armies to the wider economy through a number of mechanisms and agents, from the humble soldier's wife acting as a regimental sutler buying chickens from local farmers to resell as soup, right through to Amsterdam merchants laying out contracts to buy wheat in Poland and deliver it to soldiers a thousand kilometres away.

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'Very Prejudicial to the Service of the Revenue': The British Army on Coastal Duty in Eighteenth-Century East Anglia

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ABSTRACT
Throughout the eighteenth century, one of the main peacetime functions of the British Army was to supplement the Customs in combatting smuggling, but it remains little studied. The article aims to explore the structural features of the cooperation between the British Army and the Customs service on coastal duties by giving particular emphasis to matters of potential conflict. A second aim is to study such matters for the East Anglian counties. The article ultimately aims to show that while successful coastal policing depended on the cooperation between the Customs and the army, the supposedly frictionless cooperation was anything but straightforward.

Throughout the eighteenth century, one of the main peacetime functions of the British Army was to supplement the revenue service of the Customs in combatting the illicit landing of goods. But whereas the arrangement has been described as "part of the routine of the peacetime standing army", this aspect of British military history in the eighteenth century in fact remains – with few exceptions – surprisingly unexplored.[1] J. A. Houlding has provided details regarding the strategic visions of the War Office behind such measures as well as the general patterns in the deployment of troops.[2] This gives a helpful overview of such activities, but any details on how this cooperation between different government officials might have worked in practice are obscured by the one-sided approach from the perspective of the War Office and its records. Paul

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[1]John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783,* (London and New York: Routledge, 1989), p. 51.
[2]J.A. Houlding, *Fit for Service: The Training of the British Army, 1715-1795,* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), pp. 77-89.

Muskett, on the other hand, has taken the opposing view by studying the involvement of the military in anti-smuggling operations for the first half of the century from the viewpoint of the Customs Board and the Treasury.[3] His, however, is an at times anecdotal account that does not explore the structural features of such cooperation in detail. Muskett also restricts himself, as other studies that touch on the matter routinely do, to the counties of Kent and Sussex. Overwhelmingly, moreover, the concurrent service of the army and the Customs officers on the coast is seen in a rather dichotomous perspective that perceives these forces as harmoniously pitched against the daring and violent activities of the smugglers.[4] Wherever any rifts between the different rationales of the Customs officers and the army have been encountered, these were downplayed as sporadic and largely 'unimportant disputes'.[5] This, however, does not seem to be accurate. In a report to the Treasury by the Commissioners of the Customs from October 1764, the latter related the results of a recent inspection into the port of Arundel, which found:

> that the several Non Commissioned Officers and private Men belonging to the Regiment of Dragoons Quartered in Sussex, upon the Smugling Service, have signed a general agreement, that whatever Share of Seizures shall be paid to any one party upon the Coast, the same shall be given to one of the Officers, and afterward distributed amongst the whole Regiment, and that, in Consequence thereof, the Men, when called upon, do not go chearfully upon Duty, as they know their Share will be but trifling. And they having further represented, that Instances can be given, where the Officers of the Customs have been betrayed to the Smuglers, by the party of Dragoons, they had taken out, in order to assist them in the Execution of their Duty. And as these practices may have already been and in future may be very prejudicial to the Service of the Revenue and a discouragement to the Officers to exert themselves, the Commissioners direct me to signify the same to you.[6]

As this letter indicates, the cooperation between the army and the Customs in coastal policing operations was fraught with complications and at times open conflict that

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[3]Paul Muskett, 'Military Operations Against Smuggling in Kent and Sussex, 1698-1750', *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, 52 (1974), pp. 89-110.

[4]Aside from Muskett and Houlding, see also the literature on smuggling in this period Frank McLynn, *Crime and Punishment in Eighteenth-Century England,* (London: Routledge, 1989), ch. 10; Cal Winslow, 'Sussex Smugglers', in Douglas Hay, Peter Linebaugh, John G. Rule, E.P. Thompson, Cal Winslow (eds.), *Albion`s Fatal Tree. Crime and Society in Eighteenth-Century England,* (London: Allen Lane, 1975), pp. 119-166; Paul Muskett, *English Smuggling in the Eighteenth Century,* (Diss. Open University, 1996)

[5]Muskett, 'Military Operations', p. 108.

[6]The National Archives (TNA) Treasury (T) 1/429, No. 29.

seriously threatened to defeat the very purpose of sending troops on coastal duty in the first place. As of now, such dynamics remain largely unexplored even for Kent and Sussex and particularly beyond. The purpose of this article is thus twofold. It aims to explore the structural features of the cooperation between the British Army and the Customs service on coastal duties by giving emphasis to matters of potential friction and conflict. Such matters include the stationing of the soldiers, the supervision of coastal efforts, the terms of cooperation, as well as fraud and remuneration. A second aim is to study such matters beyond the usual location for eighteenth-century studies on smuggling by looking at the East Anglian counties instead of Kent and Sussex. The article ultimately aims to show that the supposedly frictionless cooperation of the Customs and the military was anything but straightforward. It also calls into question whether the army, as Houlding suggested, was more effective at coastal policing than the allegedly 'ineffective' Customs officers.[7] Success, as the article will show, depended on the cooperation of these forces – and yet cooperation was never a given. Highlighting these difficulties also underscores the more general problems of combating illicit trade in eighteenth-century Britain.[8] In particular, the article shows that the limited success of enforcing Customs duties was – in no small part – due to enforcement efforts fraught with internal competition. In advancing these arguments, the article makes use of records of the War Office, the Treasury, the Customs and Privy Council, thereby extending the range of sources previously used for such questions.[9] Whereas basic information, e.g. the stationing of troops etc., can be established reliably, especially with the records of the War Office, many of the sources used in the chapter originate in complaints being raised by the Customs or the military, usually mediated by the Treasury or Privy Council. Such sources tend to be partisan and scattered. Informed by the intensity and recurrence of such complaints, the article aims to highlight the most prominent areas of conflict and debate.

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[7]Houlding, *Fit for Service*, p. 77.

[8]On the extent and problems of smuggling see Hoh-Cheung Mui, Lorna H. Mui, 'Smuggling and the British Tea Trade before 1784', *The American Historical Review* 74 (1968), pp. 44-73; on the challenges of enforcement see Hannes Ziegler, 'The Preventive Idea of Coastal Policing. Vigilance and Enforcement in the Eighteenth-Century British Customs', *Storia della Storiogafia* 74 (2018), pp. 75-98.

[9]Among the sources of the War Office, use is made of the marching orders (WO5), communications with the Treasury and the Customs Board (WO1) and general out-letters (WO4). From Privy Council are used its unbound papers (PC1) and its registers, containing minutes and orders (PC2). Treasury documentation used here includes Treasury in-letters (T1), out-letters to Customs (T11), minutes (T29), and miscellaneous papers (T64). For the Customs, the focus is on the letters from the head official at Great Yarmouth to the Customs Board in London and vice versa (CUST97).

There are good reasons why Kent and Sussex have received much scholarly attention in relation to smuggling, coastal policing and the army's coastal duties. It was here that designated efforts at systematic coastal policing were first made from the 1690s onwards. With the ascension of William III and Mary II, and in the context of the French war, a growing amount of government attention was paid to the southern coasts. Both because of rising levels of smuggling and the perceived threat of Jacobite infiltration, Parliament, Privy Council and the Treasury took steps to prevent such mischief so detrimental to the economic welfare and the political stability of the Williamite regime.[10] Throughout the 1690s, several Acts of Parliament were passed to restrict the amount of illicit wool export.[11] As the smugglers were also perceived as potential agents of the enemy, the executive was eager to enforce these legislative measures with designated officials. From 1690 onwards, riding officers in service of the Customs were stationed on the coasts of Kent and Sussex, supplementing the earlier establishment of Customs vessels to police the shore by sea.[12] As early as 1690, this effort was also backed by the armed forces. Several of the Wool Acts required the Lords of Admiralty to have war ships cruise the southern coast.[13] In the same vein, detachments of the British Army were posted on coastal stations to supplement the service of the riding officers on land. Already in November 1693, Privy Council ordered the War Office to quarter some of the dragoons stationed in Kent nearer

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[10]See for the Customs service's war against smuggling in this period Paul Monod, 'Dangerous Merchandise: Smuggling, Jacobitism, and Commercial Culture in Southeast England, 1690-1760', *Journal of British Studies* 30 (1991), pp. 150-182; Neville Williams, *Contraband Cargoes: Seven Centuries of Smuggling* (London: Longmans, 1959); Edward Carson, *The Ancient and Rightful Customs: A History of the English Customs Service* (London: Faber and Faber, 1972); Graham Smith, *Something to Declare: 1000 Years of Customs and Excise* (London: Harrap, 1980). William Ashworth, *Customs and Excise: Trade, Production, and Consumption in England 1640-1845* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). The most detailed account remains Elizabeth Hoon, *The Organization of the English Customs System 1696-1786* (Newton Abbot: David&Carles, 1968, first published 1938),

[11]1 William and Mary, c. 32; 7&8 William III, c. 28; 9&10 William III, c.40; 10 William III, c.16; 11 William III, c.13. On the wool legislation see Julian Hoppit, *Britain's Political Economies: Parliament and Economic Life, 1660-1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp. 216-248.

[12]TNA Privy Council (hereafter: PC) 2/77, 190-191; T29/11, 173; T11/14, 41-42.

[13]See for instance 10&11 Will. III, c. 10, 1699. See also the respective orders of Privy Council in 1690, PC2/73, 385, 525. Graham Smith, *King`s Cutters: The Revenue Service and the War against Smuggling* (London: Conway, 1983).

the coast "to prevent the bringing over Prohibited Goods and carrying out of Wooll, and Stop Intelligence between England and France".[14]

Such ad hoc measures were put on a more formal footing towards the end of the decade. In June 1698, two troops of dragoons were stationed at Canterbury and Ashford to complement the service of the Customs officials. From these headquarters, smaller units were quartered in places like Folkestone, Dymchurch or Romney. These detachments, moreover, were frequently moved from station to station and for the encouragement of the soldiers, the dragoons were allowed two pence per day for such service.[15] The stationing of the dragoons was left to the Customs officers. By September 1698, the soldiers had been assigned stations by the supervisor of riding officers, Henry Baker.[16] Thus the coastal duty of these troops – which were in constant service until at least 1702 – was accompanied by administrative decisions regarding their pay and instructions, as well as the chain-of-command between the officers of the dragoons and the Customs officials: The army was to lend assistance to the Customs officers when and if they required it. The army, moreover, was to follow the recommendations of the Customs regarding their stations, seeking their quarters 'in such places as shall be Concerted and thought Convenient from time to time between the Commanding Officer of the said Regiment and Collector of the customs'.[17]

During the first decades of the eighteenth century, the coastal duty of the British Army was concentrated on Kent and Sussex, but it was intermittent service at best. In November 1716, for instance, the Treasury and the Customs appeared confused as to why the service had been abandoned after 1707.[18] Hence it was reactivated in 1716, though again this was restricted to Kent and Sussex.[19] It was under the de facto premiership of Robert Walpole, and particularly from the 1730s onwards, that the army's coastal duty became a more structural feature. It was then, moreover, that the service spread beyond Kent and Sussex. Analysing the marching orders of the War Office, Houlding was able to identify six regions in particular where troops were deployed on coastal duties, namely Cornwall and Devon, Dorset and Hampshire, Sussex, Kent, Essex as well as the Norfolk and Suffolk coastlines.[20] After the Union

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[14]TNA PC2/75, 279. Similar orders were also given in February 1697, see T1/43, no. 27.

[15]TNA PC2/77, 190-192; T1/54, no. 8.

[16]TNA T1/56, no. 29; T1/63, no. 21.

[17]See the marching orders from the War Office, for instance TNA War Office (hereafter: WO) 5/32, 207. See also the report from Henry Baker in 1707, PC1/3/50.

[18]TNA PC1/3/50.

[19]TNA T11/16, pp. 427-431.

[20]Houlding, *Fit for Service*, pp. 79-81.

with Scotland, dragoons were also routinely sent to the assistance of the officials of the Customs of North Britain.[21]

In Norfolk, the first arrival of dragoons was reported in the summer of 1732, though a number of dragoons was stationed in Suffolk earlier.[22] The earliest instance of large detachments of dragoons sent to both counties seems to be in spring and summer 1735 in response to the murder of a dragoon at the hands of smugglers. A company of foot soldiers was sent to Hadleigh, Bildeston, Langham and Boxford to assist the civil magistrates and Customs officials in apprehending these offenders and preventing smuggling in general.[23] In the same vein, a detachment from the 7th Dragoons was sent to Norfolk to assist the revenue from Norwich and nearby stations.[24] A second detachment of dragoons was sent to Norfolk just weeks later, with stations along the Norfolk coast at King's Lynn, Gaywood, Snettisham, Heacham, Dersingham and Burnham Market.[25] Such troops were regularly ordered to exchange places or redeployed to other stations. In the main, however, the military remained a constant presence in both Suffolk and Norfolk during most of the century. In Suffolk, they were stationed in places such as Ipswich, Colchester, Chelmsford, Langham, Bildeston, Boxford and Hadleigh, while in Norfolk stations included Great Yarmouth, Norwich, King's Lynn, Beccles, North Walsham, Cromer, Winterton and Southwold.[26] The dispersal of the army, however, was at times much more widespread. In September 1751, a disposition from the War Office ordered 178 soldiers into 13 towns near Norwich and Great Yarmouth. That same day, altogether 65 soldiers were stationed at six towns near Colchester and Ipswich.[27] Even more striking is a disposition of soldiers from May 1739 which listed 52 individual villages and towns as stations for nearly 300 soldiers along the Norfolk and Suffolk coast.[28] These soldiers were nominally stationed at headquarters in larger towns with smaller detachments then posted to nearby villages.

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[21]TNA T1/102, no. 97; T1/106, no. 70. The case of Aberdeen shows that the military was in as much demand in Scotland as in England, see National Records of Scotland CE87/1/1, 27 February 1730, 1 May 1730, 17 June 1730, 17 November 1730; CE87/1/2, 16 September 1741, 2 March 1744; CE87/1/5, 28 July 1773.
[22]TNA Customs (hereafter: CUST) 97/7, 16 August 1732, 6 September 1732.
[23]TNA WO5/32, pp. 12-14.
[24]TNA WO5/32, pp. 19-20. See also CUST97/75, 17 April 1735.
[25]TNA WO5/32, p. 32.
[26]See the respective marching orders from the 1730s to the 1750s, TNA WO5/32, p. 132, p. 207, p. 212, p. 236, p. 404; WO5/33, pp. 62-63, p. 70, pp. 241-242, p. 284; WO5/40, p. 413; WO5/41, pp. 55-59, pp. 515-516; WO5/42, pp. 169-170. See also the request for more troops from December 1772 in WO1/875, pp. 33-36.
[27]TNA WO5/41, pp. 54-59.
[28]TNA WO5/33, pp. 241-242.

Backed by respective orders from Privy Council, such posting of troops near the coast appears at first glance directed by the War Office. This is also the impression given by Houlding.[29] Looking closer at the pattern of communication between the executive departments involved, however, the Secretary at War rather appears remarkably passive in the process. Marching orders were a reaction to specific requests by the Commissioners of the Customs, who frequently applied for military aid in specific areas, often indicating the proper number of troops and stations in their requests.[30] These were, in turn, guided by the petitions of the inferior officers in the outports (that is all ports outside London), who frequently applied to the Board for military aid.[31] If the War Office retained a degree of agency in the process, it was by leaving requests unanswered. Quite often, intervention by the Treasury or multiple requests by the Customs Board were needed to get the War Office to act. From Great Yarmouth, it was not uncommon for every single officer of the preventive branch to sign a collective petition for military aid after individual petitions had failed.[32] Yet despite minor differences as to when, where and how many soldiers were needed on coastal duty in Norfolk and Suffolk, the impression from the records of the War Office is that this pattern seems to have worked without major frictions.[33]

This is not the impression if one includes the view of other departments and particularly the outport records of the Customs. Here, signs of trouble can be seen from the beginning. During a survey by the supervisor of riding officers of Kent and Sussex, John Saxby, in 1716 for instance, it emerged that the service before 1707 had not been as smooth as the executive assumed. Though the real issue did not surface, it was reasoned that this might be due to "misunderstandings between those soldiers and the officers of the Customs".[34] A better view of these disagreements is contained

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[29]Houlding, *Fit for Service*, pp. 75-90.

[30]See for instance TNA WO1/875, WO1/876, WO1/877 for requests from the Customs Board for military aid from the 1770s onwards. See also TNA CUST29/5, 11 April 1780, 11 November 1780.

[31]See for instance the requests from Great Yarmouth in the 1770s: TNA CUST97/20, 21 August 1769; CUST97/21, 22 June 1772, 7 August 1772, June 1774; CUST97/22, 1 June 1775, 17 March 1777; CUST97/23, 16 May 1778. See also the statement from the Weymouth collector: "Nothing but a military force can support the officers in the due discharge of their dutys." CUST59/1, 4 March 1718.

[32]TNA CUST97/25, 11 June 1784. Similarly WO1/877, 1 August 1782, 20 May 1783, 23 May 1783.

[33]See the statistical account of military aid to the Customs in 1780-83, TNA T64/151. For more background on the wider impact of these domestic duties of the British Army see Houlding, *Fit for Service*, pp. 55-76.

[34]TNA PC1/3/50.

in account of Lieutenant General Henry Hawley, regimental colonel of the 1st Regiment of Dragoons, which was occasionally sent on coastal duties during the 1740s and 1750s including in East Anglia.[35] Hawley's letter to the Treasury was of a general nature and touched on all the major sources of conflict between the military and the Customs. He argued that the reasoning behind the stationing of the soldiers as devised by the Customs was inadequate to their task and needed to be done in a 'more Millitary disposition'. He also complained that the ways of remuneration disadvantaged the soldiers. Perhaps the most critical point of Hawley's attack, however, concerned the chain of command in coastal operations and the hierarchy of Customs men and military officers.[36] Partial though it was, Hawley's outburst is a comprehensive summary of the most prevalent areas of conflict and can thus serve as a convenient starting point to explore these issues further.

The most serious issue raised by Hawley was whose authority was to prevail in coastal matters. Seeing that the Customs officers were corrupt and ineffective, Hawley claimed, the revenue would be better served by having them act as "advanced Spyes" in service of the better organised military personnel. He also wanted the military officers to 'have fuller Powers to make Seizures when they can' and that the 'Customs house people shall have Orders to go with an Officer when he requires it as also to give him intelligence if they please so to do'.[37] Though he did not say so openly, he aimed at a reversal of the hierarchy in coastal operations. According to the instructions of both the Customs officers and the soldiers, it was the former who were empowered to call the military for assistance and not vice versa. It was also the Customs officers who had the authority to seize contraband and in fact the entire logistics of preventive activity was in their hands. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the Board of Customs was quick to dispel such aspirations. 'We humbly Report, We do not apprehend we have authority to give them any further power than they have at present.'[38]

Far-fetched as Hawley's ideas may seem, they do reflect an area of continuous friction between the Customs officers and the military officers on coastal duties. Though the chain of command was never questioned on the level of communications between the War Office and the Customs Board, the lower ranks of both services constantly engaged in petty strife over such matters. Perhaps most common were cases in which the military officers refused to act when called upon by Customs men. In some cases,

[35]TNA WO5/51, 515-516; WO5/42, 171.
[36]TNA PC1/5/111.
[37]Ibid.
[38]Ibid.

officers claimed not to have sufficient orders. Sometimes, this was true.[39] At other times, the situation was less clear. When the 16 Regiment of Light Dragoons quartered at Norwich refused assistance to the Customs in December 1786, it was because the soldiers were currently not 'understood to be employed in that duty'. This was despite their being employed in that duty earlier and also despite the fact that the troops at Norwich had assisted the Customs for decades.[40] Among the commanders of the troops, there was in fact a tendency to interpret orders in the narrowest sense possible. In August 1778, for instance, riding officer Henry Norton complained that troops stationed at Chichester suffered the smugglers 'to pass by the Military': 'The great Gangs boast of their passing without any hindrance from the assistance of the Soldiers and all the Gentlemen are surprised at their not assisting us.' As the only obligation of the troop was to inspect the coastal posts once a day at six in the morning, it could not possibly be an 'obstacle to the Party to go after the Smuglers in the Night.[41]

Even where orders were clear, the soldiers' reluctance to follow calls of the Customs men was obvious. When, between August and December 1786, the riding officer Rowley at Knockholt asked for the assistance of the light dragoons quartered at Maidstone for coastal duties, he was continuously refused. Indeed, Captain Sankey of the detachment at Maidstone engaged in creative foot-dragging, repeatedly claiming a lack of men or horses. Though polite to the end, Sankey continued his excuses until the detachment was sent elsewhere.[42] In a case at Norwich in November 1779, on the other hand, Captain Money of the 9 Regiment of Foot refused to act as he deemed the force of smugglers on the coast too great for him 'to Cope with.[43] Other excuses focused on military procedures, such as the necessity to put the dragoons' horses to grass in the summer. From Aldeborough, Customs men informed the Board in 1775 that 'the Soldiers Horses are generally put to Grass in the Summer, but that the Men being sent here without their Horses will be useless'.[44] Similarly, on the coast of Lincolnshire in 1771, several troops of dragoons had been withdrawn by the military

[39]TNA CUST82/5, 6 February 1745. See also the incident in Norfolk, WO1/877, 2 November 1781: "There is about 19 Dragoons have been quartered at Northwalsham some months. I have applied to the Quarter Master for their Assistance and although they are within 5 Miles of the Sea it could not be complyed with without an order from the War Office".
[40]TNA WO1/827, 17 December 1786. See the similar case at Norwich in WO1/875, 25 February 1774.
[41]TNA WO1/876, 13 August and 15 August 1778.
[42]TNA WO1/827, 25 August, 8 October, 22 October, 26 October, 7 December, 12 December 1786.
[43]TNA WO1/876, 13 November and 16 November 1779
[44]TNA WO1/875, 4 March 1775.

commander to put them to grass, refusing to bring them back without 'a particular order'.[45] The Customs men in Norfolk and Suffolk were thus continuously frustrated by the fact that military commanders were only willing to send foot soldiers to the coast.[46]

All these cases reflect a general opinion among the military commanders, expressed in a memorial sent from the Secretary at War, Sir George Yonge, to several regimental commanders in May 1784, that the coast duty was beneath the higher callings of the military, subjecting the soldiers 'to the calls of the Revenue Officers, on every trivial or false information' which prevented them 'to render effectuall assistance in any real occasion of importance.'[47] In this view, the coast duty was generally detrimental to the 'necessary and essential Discipline' of the regiments.[48] Such negative views were only exacerbated by the fact that Customs men were commonly seen to be flimsy in their requests. There were reports that when military commanders offered assistance to the Customs officers, they met with a general 'reluctance' to cooperate.[49] It also did not help that Customs officer were suspected to be unreliable partners. When a party of riding officers and dragoons was violently attacked near Southwold in August 1783, Gabriel Clifton, the surveyor in charge of the operation, "rode away, and left us to defend ourselves as we thought proper", refusing to send assistance from Southwold.[50] Instances such as these encouraged the military commanders to mistrust the Customs officers and were certainly an important reason to debate and dismiss their authority as routinely as they did.

A second concern in General Hawley's letter was the stationing of the troops along the coast. According to him, the soldiers were not quartered in 'a military disposition' and this exclusively followed the priorities of the Customs. If the task of the military was – alongside the prevention of smuggling – to prevent 'any riseing or Riots in such places', 'a long Chain of Quarters close to the Sea [...] is looked upon as impracticable by way of defence'. Quarters, he argued, needed to be consolidated and 'more within Land, and at proper passes, and Passages of Rivers' as this would also allow intercepting the smugglers more easily.[51] Much like the question of authority, the underlying

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[45]TNA WO1/875, 7 September 1771.
[46]TNA WO1/877, 23 July 1783, 30 August 1783. Foot soldiers were unanimously deemed of "very little use".
[47]TNA WO4/125, 22 May 1784. The memorial was also discussed at the Customs Board, see TNA CUST29/5, 17 April 1784.
[48]TNA WO1/875, 4 January 1771.
[49]TNA WO1/877, 8 December 1781.
[50]TNA WO1/1020, 31 August 1783.
[51]TNA PC1/5/111.

rationales of quartering the troops was a perennial concern in the cooperation between the Customs and the army.

At the time of Hawley's writing in 1746, this was in fact already an old problem that had surfaced as early as 1719 in Kent and Sussex. That year, one Mr. Girling, stationed with the dragoons in Kent, had written to the Board of Customs with proposals to make the coastal watch more efficient as the soldiers and riding officers could at present not discover the 'Fiftieth part' of the smuggling business. The problem, as he perceived it, was mainly the 'inconveniency of Quarters for Men and Horses', as the detachments were thoroughly dispersed over the whole stretch of coast allotted to them. It was thus difficult to bring more than three or four of them together in a speedy manner. Such dispersal, moreover, also inhibited a strict supervision of the soldiers who had 'all the Opportunitys imaginable of caballing' with the smugglers, being 'from under the Eye of their Officers'. Girling proposed to have the dragoons quartered directly on the coast in three conveniently placed stations in large houses under supervision of their officers. From these stations, coastal patrols of riding officers escorted by soldiers would effectually prevent smuggling.[52] The proposal was quickly quashed by the Customs Board who had sent John Saxby, supervisor of riding officers, to evaluate the feasibility of the proposal. Saxby argued that the terrain was too difficult for heavy horses making the proposed patrols 'by no means practicable'. The re-quartering of the troops in central places was also problematic, as houses were 'very scarce' or 'not Large enough'. In all, the proposal was deemed impracticable.[53]

The Board of Customs, in this and other cases, simply deemed the forms of quartering the troops a non-issue. Whenever forces had been sent on coast duty, the Board argued, 'we have directed the Surveyor General of the Customs to Consult the Commanding Officer […], in what manner to Quarter the Soldiers, so as best to answer the purposes they were sent for.'[54] Yet this was only part of the story, as such consultation did not always produce harmonious results. As several cases from East Anglia illustrate, there was often disagreement between different Customs officials as to how the troops were most efficiently quartered. As Hawley's letter indicates, moreover, there was also disagreement between the commanders of the troops and the Customs officials about what constituted the best disposition of the forces on the coast.

Throughout the early 1730s, there was constant strife between the collectors at Great Yarmouth and Ipswich regarding the quartering of the dragoons. When the former asked for military assistance on the Norfolk coast in September 1732, he was aware

[52] TNA T1/224, No. lxxxvi.
[53] TNA T1/224, No. lxxxv.
[54] TNA PC1/5/111.

that dragoons were stationed at Halesworth and Harleston at the time but deemed these places too far from the sea to be of any help and requested a removal to Lowestoft.[55] A few weeks later, this was answered by the collector of Ipswich who agreed to a removal of the dragoons but only part of the troop and not to Lowestoft, but further south to Southwold. The collector of Great Yarmouth promptly protested that such re-quartering would not help secure the Norfolk coast but only 'the parts adjacent to themselves in which we can't blame them but can have no Relation to our Security.' In any case, if they were moved towards the coast, why not move them all, seeing that they would do no good 'in an Inland Country?'[56] These different opinions about the placement of troops not only show that collectors preferred to have them at their own disposal, but also displays different attitudes to where the prevention of smuggling was best achieved – at the seaside or inland.

To what extent there was also disagreement between the Customs officers and the military commanders is best illustrated by the case of Robert Sexton, supervisor of riding officers on the Norfolk coast in the 1770s and 1780s. A busy applicant for military assistance on the coast during these years, he always insisted that such troops needed to be quartered 'by their commanding officer conformable to his [that is Sexton's] recommendation at such places along the Coast, where they can best assist the Officers, and render the most effectual Service to the Revenue'.[57] Troops placed at his 'Disposal' would serve the revenue best.[58] But when troops were sent in March 1773, their commander claimed to have orders to remain at North Walsham where they, according to Sexton, 'can be of Little or no Service to the Revenue'.[59] Though Sexton petitioned for their removal, the soldiers remained at Walsham. The next year, the issue recurred: A troop of soldiers was placed at Walsham with the commander refusing to move elsewhere.[60] Once again, Sexton complained. At Walsham, the soldiers were no use, he argued, as the next Customs officers were between seven and 23 miles distant, making it impossible to get assistance in time. And this was not the only problem, 'as its almost impossible to take a party of soldiers out of Walsham

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[55]TNA CUST97/7, 6 September 1732.
[56]TNA CUST97/, 30 October 1732. The collector of Great Yarmouth ultimately achieved nothing and was still petitioning in May 1733 and July 1734, see CUST97/7, 28 May 1733; CUST97/8, 29 July 1734.
[57]TNA CUST97/21, 7 August 1772. See his other petitions, sometimes in conjunction with others, from 22 June 1772, 25 January 1774, 23 June 1774; CUST97/22, 15 May 1777; CUST97/23, 16 May 1778; WO1/875, 12 March 1773, 27 March 1773, 1 July 1774; WO1/877, 5 November 1781. Petitions from Customs officers in Norfolk also in WO1/876, April to May 1778, pp. 695-715.
[58]TNA CUST97/21, 5 August 1772.
[59]TNA CUST97/21, 20 March 1773, 23 March 1773.
[60]TNA CUST97/21, 25 July 1774.

without being betrayed there being so many of Smuglers and their friends residing in Town'. Again he wanted the soldiers 'placed along the Coast as usual' and again he was disappointed.[61] The same recurred two years later, in 1777.[62] Sexton's frustration was wholly understandable, for orders from the War Office held that all troops should be 'distributed along the Coast as the Revenue Officer shall judge best for the Service'.[63] Such orders notwithstanding, military commanders often refused, claiming to have no 'Power to Remove them without an order from the War Office'.[64] Only very occasionally did Sexton thus obtain a more satisfying quartering of the troops.[65]

Such refusal on the part of the military commanders was often rooted in military thinking. When the collector of Ipswich wanted the soldiers of the 3 Dragoon Guards farther distributed over his district in 1771, the commanding officer refused, preferring to have soldiers concentrated in head-quarters for he reckoned that such dispersal would 'impede the necessary and essential Discipline of the Regiment'.[66] Among the military commanders, there was indeed an understanding that the coast duty did not only comprise anti-smuggling business, but was also meant for the quashing of riots and defence of the country. Such thinking was less common among the Customs officials. Though most collectors were happy to have troops nearby during the 1745 Jacobite rising and most appreciated military assistance in putting down riots and securing captured smugglers, Customs officials predominantly called on the troops for Customs rather than military purposes.[67]

Beyond the clash of different rationales in using the troops, the refusal of military commanders was often also an expression of their deep contempt of Customs officers. When George Eaton, riding officer at Happisburgh, requested re-stationing of the dragoons in Norfolk in 1786 – moving them from Walsham to Happisburgh –, the commanding officer Colonel Robert Lawrence vehemently rejected these plans with reference to Eaton's dubious character. As he had obtained information that one of Eaton's sons was a smuggler, he suspected that such plans were meant to make Eaton appear diligent but were really designed to conceal fraud. If the dragoons were at

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[61]TNA CUST97/21, 23 July 1774.
[62]TNA WO1/876, 24 November 1777.
[63]TNA WO1/875, June 1775, pp. 61-62.
[64]TNA WO1/876, 17 November 1777.
[65]See for instance TNA CUST97/22, 30 May 1775.
[66]TNA WO1/875, 4 January 1771.
[67]See for military request in 1745, TNA CUST82/5, 14 November and 30 November 1745, 29 January 1746. Soldiers were also used to guard prisoners or to prevent riots: WO5/32, 374; CUST97/13, 21 January 1744; CUST97/11, 23 August 1740. For a request for military defence against privateers on the Norfolk coast, see WO1/877, 11 June 1782.

Happisburgh, Eaton could have them 'galloping with him about the Country, as having the appearance of doing his Duty', but they would 'be so easily watched they could not move without its being known'. Under such circumstances, Lawrence preferred the troops at Walsham and to have Eaton send for assistance when needed, 'which would be much more likely to benefit the Revenue than the Plan he proposes, which I do think would not only be useless to it, but hurtful to the Service'.[68] In its answer to this, the Board defended Eaton's reasoning. Soldiers, they argued, 'cannot be too nearly placed to the smuggling operations, for if they did not seize, they would in some degree prevent the operation.' When, however, the soldiers were placed at greater distance, such as Walsham, 'the least Parade of any Military Arrangement' would alarm the smugglers and make them put off their operation until the army had gone.[69] The military rationales behind the quartering of the army on coastal duty was, it seems, forever inconsistent with the service of the revenue.

Disruptive as such conflicts were, perhaps the most pertinent of conflictive issues concerned the question of remuneration. Where smuggling was involved, a fortune could be made by fraud and collusion. The Board of Customs was well aware of this issue and developed its own ways of dealing with it.[70] Between the agents of two executive branches that were not exactly on good terms in the first place, however, collusive behaviour quickly became a common source of mistrust and a common accusation. To prevent such discord and remove incentives for collusive behaviour at the same time, the Board of Customs was keen on providing just and speedy remuneration.[71] Even this, however, proved far from easy. As early as 1706, the military service in Kent and Sussex had revealed a structural dispute in this respect. During the 1716 survey by John Saxby, it appeared that the soldiers 'formerly imployed in the like service, were under great discouragement from the irregular payment of the allowances intended for them'.[72] Indeed, the dragoons stationed in Kent claimed in 1702 that allowances disbursed by the then supervisor of riding officers, Henry Baker, had only been paid until 1700.[73] Baker admitted to this. The problem, as an exchange between the Treasury and the Customs reveals, was not that anyone disputed that the soldiers were entitled to their allowances, but that it was unclear from where such money should come. The Customs Board claimed to have 'no authority for making such Payment'. Baker for his part insisted that such money should be 'constantly paid them by myself out of the forfeitures ariseing by seizures and

[68]TNA CUST97/26, 14 January 1787.

[69]TNA CUST97/26, 2 March 1787. Eaton was later dismissed, but for different reasons, see TNA CUST97/27, 29 October 1788.

[70]Winslow, 'Sussex Smugglers'; Ziegler, 'Preventive Idea', pp. 93-97.

[71]See for instance TNA CUST29/5, 15 February 1783.

[72]TNA PC1/3/50.

[73]TNA T1/79, no. 51.

Convictions'. Allowances for the soldiers, in other words, were to be paid out of contraband successfully condemned in the Exchequer. But these funds were re-directed by the Treasury in 1700. Ultimately, therefore, the Treasury agreed to pay the arrears from the civil list.[74]

Minor as this dispute appears, it did concern the very foundations of the cooperation between the Customs and the army. The Customs Board, upon encountering the problem in 1716, was sufficiently alarmed to strive to eliminate such tensions by putting remuneration on a different mode. Whereas soldiers had received a daily allowance for their service before such time, amounting to two pence, the Board decided that in addition to two pence for stabling their horses, soldiers were to receive a share of each successful seizure in which they assisted personally. Such shares were common for the Customs men, who received three quarters of such seizures, with the remainder going to the crown. From now on, soldiers were to receive half of the king's share and a third of the officer's share for personally assisting in seizures.[75]

Little did the Customs Commissioners anticipate that this was to be a major source of conflict. As General Hawley's letter indicates, seizure rewards were a source of constant strife. Hawley claimed that the Customs officers frequently cheated soldiers out of their shares by making them drunk after successful seizures, buying their shares 'for a little money'. This was why the Customs officers preferred the soldiers dispersed in threes and fours. For if they wanted assistance, the commanding officer would always offer a larger number than the Customs men desired and send an officer along with the party. 'This they dont like', Hawley claimed, the easier to cheat ordinary soldiers or connive with them at defrauding the revenue. By way of remedy, Hawley suggested that the Customs men ought always to take an officer with them and that the seizure rewards were to be divided not amongst the soldiers on actual duty only, but amongst the whole regiment.[76]

Though Hawley's accusations were stark, and no proof of this could be obtained, the Board of Customs was fully aware that 'Frequent Disputes […] about the Division of the Money due to the Officers and Soldiers' did in fact arise.[77] As the efficiency of its service on the ground depended on the due cooperation of the military, however, the Board was keen on devising regulations to ensure that soldiers were actually rewarded. In 1737, when the coastal duty of the army had become quite frequent, it furnished all the ports with instructions for better accounting practices in seizure cases. Among these, it was stated that the 'Nature and manner' as well as the 'True

[74] TNA T1/98, no. 35.
[75] TNA PC1/3/50; T11/16, pp. 427-430.
[76] TNA PC1/5/111.
[77] TNA PC1/5/111.

Circumstances' of military assistance should always be clearly stated, the better to judge their 'pretensions to a Reward'. If any Customs officer was found negligent, the soldiers' reward was to be paid from his share.[78] Only a few months later, the collector of Great Yarmouth was informed that the Board had received complaints that several dragoons on coast duty had not been paid their shares. The collector was to send affidavits by the officers, informing the Board of 'the Circumstances of time place and manner of pursuing finding and seizing the Goods and what Officers Dragoons and Soldiers were present'. To ensure due rewards for the soldiers, Customs officers were also henceforth to state such particulars under oath.[79] The collector of Great Yarmouth followed these orders diligently, requiring officers to provide affidavits about the involvement of soldiers in a seizure, including how many and which.[80] Upon finding that the circumstances of a particular seizure were different than claimed, the Board forced officers to repay their shares to the soldiers.[81]

A second measure taken by the Board speaks more clearly to how dangerous the issue of shares could be for the Revenue. Similarly to what Hawley would observe a decade later, the Board had been informed as early as 1735 that Customs officers, when calling for military assistance, had a tendency to take out too small a number of soldiers 'to Answer the Purposes Expected from them upon such Occasions.' This often resulted in the soldiers being 'repulsed' when confronting the smugglers.[82] In 1735, and again in 1737, Customs officers were reminded to take as many as were actually needed and to consult with the commanding military officer 'what Force may be proper to take out'.[83] For the Board, compliance with this order was vital, for it was not modesty that motivated their officers. As Hawley argued, such reluctance was a result of the Customs men eyeing larger shares for themselves by swindling the soldiers out of theirs or by entering into a fraudulent agreement with them when no commanding officer was present. In addition to stating what assistance had been given by the military, affidavits by Customs officers therefore also required a declaration 'that there was no private or Collusive agreement between them and the Dragoons or Soldiers'.[84]

The military commanders had their own views of seizure rewards. In 1746, General Hawley thought it best to fight such abuses, if the seizure money was not given to the

[78]TNA CUST97/75, 26 March 1737. See also CUST59/71, 26 March 1737.
[79]TNA CUST97/75, 30 March 1738.
[80]TNA WO1/877, 9 February 1782; CUST 97/10, 10 March 1737; CUST97/22, 5 March 1777; CUST97/9, 21 July 1735; 20 October 1735.
[81]TNA CUST97/10, 8 April 1738.
[82]TNA CUST97/75, undated, around July 1735.
[83]TNA CUST97/75, 26 March 1737.
[84]See the following examples from Great Yarmouth: TNA CUST97/75, 30 March 1738; CUST97/9, 21 July 1735; CUST97/10, 10 March 1737; CUST97/26, 2 March 1787.

individual soldiers who assisted the seizure but divided among the regiment. The Board rejected this but was clearly aware of this practice.[85] In February 1785 for instance, the Portsmouth collector reported that the 3 Regiment of Dragoon Guards had entered into an agreement that any seizure money was to be distributed among the whole regiment rather than given to the individual soldiers. Whereas the commander of the regiment felt that this would 'prevent discontent among the Soldiers', the collector thought that it was 'to the disadvantage of the Revenue'. Paying the soldiers who assisted the Customs would prove 'a continual Spur to them to be active and vigilant'. The trifling shares received in the current method were 'but a poor recompense for encountering Hardship, fatigue and oftentimes great danger and makes them appear lukewarm and dissatisfied'. The agreement, therefore, needed to be dissolved and to prevent 'any murmuring amongst the soldiers' they should be frequently exchanged so that everyone had an 'equal chance of Emolument'. By this method, the soldiers would also have less occasion 'to form connections with the Smugglers to the disadvantage of the Service'.[86] A similar case was reported from Dover in 1772 where this arrangement was seen to give 'great Discouragement to the Men who are actually employed in the Service and make them Lukewarm in the Execution of their Duty.' The small shares received by these soldiers were also deemed "a great inducement" of taking bribes.[87]

Though it concerned the activities of even the lowliest of Customs officials and soldiers, the matter of seizure rewards was a struggle between the upper ranks of the executive. The Customs Board aimed at regulations beneficial to the revenue, including strict measures against collusion; the military just as eagerly argued for a prevalence of military thinking. In 1784, the case was settled in favour of the latter when the 15 Light Dragoons stationed in Norfolk was informed that henceforth every detachment of soldiers should be under the command of at least a subaltern officer. All applications by revenue officer, moreover, were to be made to the commanding officer and all parties of soldiers going on anti-smuggling duty needed to consist of at least twelve men and an officer. Any 'Money arising to the Troops from Seizures', finally 'is to be divided […] among the […] Men of the Regiment generally and not to be confined to those only who are personally concerned in making the Seizure.'[88]

It is difficult to assess the overall contribution of the army in anti-smuggling duties. Houlding has argued that the first two lines of defence – the revenue cruisers and the riding officers – were largely ineffective and there are many contemporaries who would have readily agreed. But it is difficult to maintain that it was exclusively the use

[85]TNA PC1/5/111.
[86]TNA CUST58/13, 19 February 1785.
[87]TNA WO1/875, 3 October 1772.
[88]TNA WO4/125, 22 May 1784.

of the military that held smuggling in check. It is true that the Customs officers were often perceived to be negligent and corrupt.[89] But so were the soldiers. They had a tendency of being bribed, 'getting drunk' or being absent from duty;[90] they were repeatedly proven to be colluding with smugglers;[91] and their efficiency in the coast duty was widely doubted. John Saxby, in 1716, argued that many seizures 'would have been made without the Dragoons' and led the Customs Board to conclude 'that the Dragoons have not answered the service at first Intended.'[92] The military, moreover, lacked the knowledge to effectively track the smugglers and was ignorant of the complicated legal procedures in seizure cases. In 1784, the War Office itself admitted that 'the Revenue has not hitherto derived all the benefit that might have been expected from the assistance of the Troops employed on the Coast Duty'.[93] As other administrators realised, however, the coast service – especially from the 1720s onwards – could hardly do without a 'Superior Military Force.'[94] If only to deter the smugglers, a military presence – 'properly and constantly stationed along the Coast' – was for the most part deemed necessary.[95] When prompted regarding the results of their cooperation with the military, the riding officers at Great Yarmouth were in fact able to produce a fairly impressive list of seizures over a five month period in 1774 and 1775.[96] Their work, as the frequent petitions from East Anglia and other parts of the country show, could not be done without the ready availability of the military. Brute force alone, however, was just as unlikely to prevent the smuggling trade.

In view of this, it is understandable that both the Board of Customs and the War Office maintained a rhetoric that unanimously feted the cooperation of their agents on the coast. As this study of coastal operations in East Anglia has shown, however, the actual service was bedevilled by petty strife and open conflict particularly at the lower end of the ranks. Such conflict, moreover, was embedded in a structural clash of two different executive rationales, especially with a view to the stationing and the remuneration of the troops as well as the hierarchy of the different departmental orders. Cooperation, in other words, was an executive ideal – but the reality was different.

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[89]See for instance WO1/875, 20 December 1774.
[90]TNA T1/224, No. lxxxvi.
[91]TNA T1/224, No. lxxxv.
[92]Ibid.
[93]TNA WO4/125, 22 May 1784.
[94]TNA CUST98/1, 29 December 1719.
[95]TNA CUST97/14, 9 January 1747; CUST97/25, 20 October 1783.
[96]TNA CUST97/22, 2 August 1775.

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Bushman or Boer – Australian Identity in a 'White Man's War', 1899–1902

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ABSTRACT
This article considers Australian articulations of identity and representations of Boer soldiers in the South African War. Examining accounts from Australian war correspondents and military personnel, we make three observations. First, that widespread expressions of British Empire loyalty shaped rather than excluded expressions of nascent Australian nationalism. Second, that emergent Australian nationalism, particularly the notion of the 'bushman', was central to positive and negative comparisons to Boer soldiers. Finally, that transnational discourses of settler colonialism and whiteness enabled such comparisons, which simultaneously facilitated claims about Australian martial superiority and deceptive Boer indolence, despite noted similarities between bushman and Boer.

Introduction

'We think of the Boers as semi-savages. [But] We have plenty of people just as rough as they are', declared the radical nationalist Australian poet, Banjo Paterson, in early December 1899 soon after his arrival in Cape Town as the *Sydney Morning Herald*'s war correspondent for the South African (Boer) War (1899–1902).[1] Paterson was not the only Australian writer of the South African War who held the Boers in low opinion, nor who saw their similarities with Australians. According to others, some Boers looked like 'common Australian tramp[s]',[2] others like 'such a crowd as one is

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[1]R.W.F. Droogleever (ed.), *From the Front: A.B. (Banjo) Paterson's Dispatches from the Boer War,* (Sydney: Pan Macmillan, 2000), p. 32.
[2]Cited in Doris V. Roberts, album, Australian War Memorial (hereinafter AWM): PR85/418, p. 14.

apt to see in a far inland shearing shed in Australia',[3] and yet others appeared 'as spare, and lank, and brown as any Queenslander'.[4] The author of this last comment, Corporal J. H. M. Abbott of the First Australian Horse, acknowledged in his 1902 account of the war that the Boers 'may be liars by nature', but they were nonetheless 'much of the same kind as we'.[5]

The bushman of the Australian outback and the Boer of the South African veld shared many similarities in the imagination of Australian writers. Physically, contemporary sources asserted, both were unkempt, rugged and masculine. Temperamentally, they were skilled horsemen and shooters and well-versed in trekking over vast tracts of country. Most conspicuously, of course, they were both white, which along with the tacit agreement between British and Boer parties to minimise the use of soldiers of colour, gave the war its well-known, although inaccurate, moniker, the 'white man's war'.[6]

Contemporary beliefs about race thinking are a crucial departure point for reconsidering the South African War from an Australian perspective. In the last two decades, historians have done much to highlight the ways in which 'whiteness' became a critical mode of subjective identification in Anglo-settler colonies of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[7] As a transnational project, many of the manifestations of Australian whiteness took their inspiration from other parts of the world – notably in the case of the dictation test, from the British colony of Natal in South Africa, which was itself derived from earlier proposals in the United States.[8] Yet historians have largely ignored the significance of Australians' involvement in the South African War – white colonial soldiers, fighting a white enemy, in a 'white man's war'. This gap in the scholarship merely compounds the existing marginal position of the

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[3]A.G. Hales, *Campaign Pictures of the War in South Africa (1899–1900): Letters from the front,* (London: Cassell and Company, Limited, 1900), p. 88.

[4]J.H.M. Abbott, *Tommy Cornstalk: Being some account of the less notable features of the South African War from the point of view of the Australian ranks,* (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1902), p. 242.

[5]Abbott, *Tommy Cornstalk*, p. 251.

[6]See Peter Warwick, *Black People and the South African War, 1899–1902,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 6–27.

[7]Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Colour Line: White men's countries and the question of racial equality,* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2008).

[8]Marilyn Lake, 'From Mississippi to Melbourne via Natal: the invention of the literacy test as a technology of racial exclusion', in Ann Curthoys and Marilyn Lake (eds.), *Connected Worlds: History in Transnational Perspective,* (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2006), pp. 209–29.

South African War in Australia's military historiography, which is typically sidelined by research on the First and Second World Wars.

In this article, we suggest that negotiations of racial identity were just as important an aspect of the South African War as its military and political dimensions. Drawing on extensive use of the records held by the Australian War Memorial, this article begins where past scholarly research has been heaviest, examining how Australians couched their expressions of loyalty within an unequivocally imperial framework, but in ways that were mutually inclusive of nascent Australian nationalism. We then consider the interaction between these expressions of Australian identity and Australian representations of Boers – particularly focusing on the tropes and concepts, such as the rugged bushman, that writers highlighted as sites of similarity between the two groups. Finally, we argue that the axes along which writers considered the similarity and difference between Australian and Boer were inextricable from the context of settler colonialism and transnational whiteness that defined the white colonies. This enabled the lines along which it could be claimed that one type of white settler – the Australian bushman – might prove to be superior to their 'semi-savage' white counterparts on the African veld.

The elusive Boer

Most of the research into British representations of Boers has been conducted by British and South African scholars, with little scholarship on Australian perspectives. Effie Karageorgos is a recent exception to this trend, but her article on the topic makes a number of conceptually dubious claims.[9] Karageorgos contends that Australian soldiers' attitudes towards the Boers changed over time, with complex, ambiguous reactions to Boers. However, her work fails to outline the broader structures within which Boers were often understood, so her claims are unconvincing.[10] For instance, Karageorgos' claim that Australian soldiers demonstrated empathy for Boer soldiers because of their shared rural backgrounds is not only empirically questionable, it also does not acknowledge, as we do in our analysis, how settler colonialism provided the

[9]Effie Karageorgos, '"Educated, tolerant and kindly": Australian attitudes towards British and Boers in South Africa, 1899–1902,' *Historia* 59, no. 2 (2014): pp. 120–35. For an earlier study, see Barbara R. Penny, 'Australia's reactions to the Boer War: a study in colonial imperialism', *Journal of British Studies* 7, no. 1 (November 1967): pp. 97–130.

[10]Karageorgos addresses the broader context more successfully in a later article that examines Australian perceptions of black Africans: see Effie Karageorgos, 'War in a "White Man's Country": Australian perceptions of Blackness on the South African battlefield, 1899–1902,' *History Australia* 15, no. 2 (2018), pp. 323–38.

overarching framework within which rurality was given symbolic meaning and significance.[11]

There is slightly more scholarship on British, as distinct from Australian, perceptions of Boers. Noting that the South African War was, in many respects, a modern 'media war', research has focused on depictions of Boers in British propaganda and popular culture.[12] Simon Popple, for instance, contends that the emphasis of many British depictions was the 'violent and oppressive nature' of Boers as colonial masters, unfit to be the imperial rulers of Southern Africa.[13] This is an instructive example, but not definitive for understanding the approach of Australians, who were situated within a particular context of settler colonialism and emergent nationalism at the time of Federation (1901).

Boer perceptions of the British have also received scholarly attention. Bill Nasson argues that unlike British representations of Boers, Boer representations rarely identified any racial failing on the part of the British, but highlighted instead the unjust nature of the war.[14] More recent research by Fransjohan Pretorius has confirmed this point, adding that Boer propaganda typically sought to boost the morale of Boer

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[11]There is empirical contestation about the extent to which Australian soldiers in the Boer War came from rural backgrounds. See, for example, Luke Trainor, 'Building Nations: Australia and New Zealand', in David Omissi and Andrew S. Thompson (eds.), *The Impact of the South African War,* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 252, 258; Craig Wilcox, *Australia's Boer War: The war in South Africa, 1899–1902* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 327; W.M. Chamberlain, 'The characteristics of Australia's Boer War volunteers', *Australian Historical Studies* 20, no. 78 (1982), p. 48.
[12]See, for example, Stephen Badsey, 'The Boer War as a media war,' in Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey (eds), *The Boer War: Army, nation and empire* (Canberra: Army History Unit, Department of Defence, 2000). Available at: https://www.army.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-11/1999_boer_war_army_nation_and_empire_0.pdf Accessed 2 December 2020; Peter Harrington, 'Pictorial journalism and the Boer War: the London illustrated weeklies', in John Gooch (ed.), The Boer War: Direction, experience, and image, (London: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 241–2; Malvern van Wyk Smith, Drummer Hodge: The poetry of the Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), esp. pp. 236–49; John M. MacKenzie, *Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British public opinion, 1880–1960*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984).
[13]Simon Popple, 'From "brother Boer" to "dirty Boers": colonizing the colonizers through the popular representations of the Boer in the *British Illustrated Journal* 1899–1902,' *Journal of War & Culture Studies* 5, no. 2 (2012), p. 148.
[14]Bill Nasson, *The South African War 1899–1902,* (London: Arnold, 1999), p. 253.

soldiers through the dissemination of manipulated war reports, or the delivery of rousing speeches from charismatic leaders.[15]

The South African War fits uncertainly into conventional Australian military historiography. A major factor for this lies in the non-unified manner of Australian participation in the war. Not only did the six colonies and Australian Commonwealth (following Federation) have different experiences of the war, but even contingents from the same colony had diverse experiences, depending on the specific actions in which they participated, and the phase in the war to which they contributed. With no equivalent to Gallipoli (First World War), Kokoda (Second World War) or Long Tan (Vietnam War), later histories do not identify a single big moment around which to build a compelling narrative of Australian participation in the South African War. One result of this is that when modern historians have made a claim about the significance of the South African War to Australian political or cultural history, they have tended to do so without closely considering the war itself.[16] In this article we hope to open a discussion about the significance of this conflict for Australia through representations of the Boer enemy in sources written by Australians who were at the front, either as military personnel or war correspondents.

The empire, right or wrong?

Edmund Barton, later to become the first Australian prime minister, argued, 'the empire, right or wrong' when he urged the New South Wales parliament to lend military support to Britain in South Africa.[17] Not all colonial parliamentarians shared Barton's ardour, but his phrase was nonetheless an accurate portrayal of Australian attitudes towards the conflict, especially after the disastrous defeats of British forces during 'Black Week' in December 1899.[18] The symbolism of the British Empire and

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[15]Fransjohan Pretorius, 'Boer propaganda during the South African War of 1899–1902,' *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 37, no. 3 (2009), pp. 399–419.

[16]See, for example, Jim Davidson, 'Also under the Southern Cross: Federation Australia and South Africa – the Boer War and other interactions', *Journal of Australian Colonial History* 14 (2012): 183–204; Henry Reynolds, *Unnecessary Wars* (Sydney: NewSouth, 2016). Wilcox is an exception: see for example, Wilcox, *Australia's Boer War*; Craig Wilcox, "Australians in the wars in Sudan and South Africa", in Craig Stockings and John Connor (eds.), *Before the Anzac Dawn: A military history of Australia to 1915,* (Sydney: NewSouth, 2013), pp. 204–29.

[17]Edmund Barton, *New South Wales Hansard, Legislative Assembly*, 19 October 1899, p. 1495, quoted in Gavin Souter, *Lion and Kangaroo: The initiation of Australia,* (Sydney: Pan Macmillan, 1992), p. 64.

[18]See C.N. Connolly, "Manufacturing 'spontaneity': The Australian offers of troops for the Boer War", Australian Historical Studies 18, no. 70 (1978), pp. 106–117; L.M. Field, *The Forgotten War: Australia and the Boer War,* (Melbourne: Melbourne University

the articulation of imperial loyalty suffused expressions of Australian involvement in this conflict.

A poster presented to a departing Australian contingent for the South African War, 'An Australian to Australians' (1900) (Figure 1), epitomised the inextricability of Australia's war involvement and the British Empire at large.

Figure 1 – 'An Australian to Australians'[19]

Labelled a 'British square', after the famous British infantry formation, the image simultaneously centres Australia and the empire as a whole. In the central panel, the phrase 'Advance Australia' is counterbalanced with 'One Empire', which is surrounded on all four sides by the flags of the British Empire – an appeal to the 'Patriotic instincts of all Loyal Britishers all over the wide world'. These symbols are superimposed on a Union Jack, and linked on the edges by a thin red line representing the 'crimson thread of kinship', reifying not only the centrality of British origins, but also the ongoing race connections keeping the empire together. The flags of the United States dotted around

Press, 1979), pp. 1–34; Stephen Clarke, '"Manufacturing spontaneity'? The role of the commandants in the colonial offers of troops to the South African War", in Dennis and Grey (eds.), *The Boer War*. On 'Black Week', see Thomas Pakenham, *The Boer War,* (London: Abacus, 1992 [1979]), p. 249; Wilcox, *Australia's Boer War*, pp. 25–6.
[19]AWM: ART19683.

the outside of the square form an appreciative nod to 'the kindly feeling of our American cousins', and are an example of the racial ideology of Anglo-Saxonism that was ascendant in much of the English-speaking world at the time.[20]

While the British Isles formed the centre of this image, in another artefact from the same period, Queen Victoria provides the central point of reference. Figure 2 is a commemorative cabinet plate that celebrates the federation of the Australian colonies in the context of British Empire loyalty and the South African War. Visually, this connection is represented by metonymic representations of Australia and the Crown – the slouch-hatted soldier (centre-left) and 'father of federation', Henry Parkes (top-right); and the helmeted British soldier (centre-right) and Australia's first governor-general, Lord Hopetoun (top-left). This connection is confirmed by a quote from Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain, which conflates the union of the Australian colonies with British imperial unity, and links federation to military sacrifice in the South African War: 'May the union between the colonies and the mother-land now cemented by their blood be forever maintained'. The artwork on this plate appears to be almost identical to that of the 'Tenterfield Jug' identified by Jim Davidson, suggesting that it was a widespread motif in Australia.[21] As Davidson argues, 'a federated Australia emerged within the Empire, ratified by participation in the Boer War'.[22]

[20]See Lake and Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Colour Line*, pp. 109–113.
[21]Davidson, 'Also under the Southern Cross', pp. 184–6.
[22]Ibid., p. 186.

Figure 2 – Australian Federation commemorative plate[23]

Queen Victoria maintained her central place in the iconographic order of Great Britain when Australian soldiers arrived at the front.[24] Soldiers celebrated her birthday by 'sending up rockets and burning blue lights', and mourned her death by 'play[ing] the Death March and march[ing] past Headquarters'.[25] War correspondent William Reay recalled with particular delight the New Year's chocolates issued by the Queen on a tin bearing her likeness, which he saw Australians proudly refusing to sell, even for the price of five sovereigns.[26] The Tasmanian Captain Richard Lewis wrote that those saddened by the Queen's death were giving 'no mere pretence of loyal regret and

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[23]AWM: ART91509.

[24]See Duncan Bell, *Reordering the World: Essays on Liberalism and Empire,* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), p. 151.

[25]Captain Joseph Dallimore DSO, Victorian Imperial Bushmen, diary, AWM: PR01379, transcript book 1, p. 18; Captain Edwin Tivey DSO, Victorian Imperial Bushmen, diary, AWM: PR 3DRL/3058, p. 3.

[26]W.T. Reay, *Australians in War: With the Australian Regiment from Melbourne to Bloemfontein,* (Melbourne: A.H. Massina & Co., 1900), p. 88.

grieving. The great Queen was regarded by her Army as something more than a noble woman, a venerable figurehead of the state'.[27]

'The rhetoric of empire appears to be everywhere … for it *was* everywhere', Bill Schwarz remarks, but he cautions that 'it cannot always be taken on its own terms'.[28] We must take care not to throw out historians' caution against the overstatement of imperial loyalty in the South African War.[29] Individual experiences of the empire are hard to trace. Some historians have argued that it was likely that among the empire's working classes, empire excited primarily 'indifference' or 'apathy'.[30] National background also played a role. For the Irish in Australia, the war created rifts in opinion. C.N. Connolly found that working-class Irish Catholics and Irish-born commentators tended to be anti-war, while Australian-born middle-class Irish tended to be pro-war.[31] The proliferation of imperial rhetoric may have been truly widespread, but this did not necessarily mean uncomplicated popular support of the empire. The rhetoric of imperial loyalty did, however, shape the articulation of Australian nationalism.

Emerging Australian nationalism

Australians in the South African War regularly deferred to imperial loyalty, but they also often expressed what they saw as distinctly Australian attributes. *Daily Telegraph* correspondent Frank Wilkinson wrote:

> [The Australian soldier] is a tall, raw-boned, good-natured beggar; he can make tea in a period an ordinary man would be striking a match; he can ride horses that tie themselves up into knots and buck with great suddenness and power; he can swear so that I have seen regular Tommies [British soldiers] stand agape in awesome admiration. With a sick comrade he is tender as a child; he is the sort of stuff that heroes are cut from.[32]

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[27]R.C. Lewis, *On the Veldt: A plain narrative of service afield in South Africa,* (Hobart: J Walch and Sons, 1902), p. 136.
[28]Bill Schwarz, *Memories of Empire, Volume I: The white man's world,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 225.
[29]See, for example, Trainor, 'Building Nations: Australia and New Zealand', p. 257.
[30]Wilcox, *Australia's Boer War*, p. 10; C.N. Connolly, 'Class, birthplace, loyalty: Australian attitudes to the Boer War,' *Australian Historical Studies* 18, no. 71 (1978), p. 232.
[31]Connolly, 'Class, birthplace, loyalty', pp. 222–5.
[32]Frank Wilkinson, *Australia at the Front: A colonial view of the Boer War,* (London: John Long, 1901), pp. 278–9.

Portraying the Australian soldier as physically able, a natural soldier, proficient with horses, irreverently uncouth, and loyal to his mates, Wilkinson promulgated many of the aspects which would later form the key image of the 'Australian type'. Wilkinson was not alone in giving voice to these images.

Emphasising the Australian soldier's limited respect for authority, Abbott joked that:

> 'Looting' comes to him naturally, though apparently not quite so naturally as to the Canadian, who is the most accomplished 'looter' in all the world. This is a compliment which is none the less deserved because all looting was sternly forbidden by British authorities.[33]

War correspondent A.G. Hales, highlighting the Australian tendency to always fight for one's mates, wrote:

> every time the coo-ee rang out over the whispering veldt the Australians turned in their saddles, and riding as the men from the South-land can ride, they dashed to the rescue, and did not leave a single man in the hands of the enemy.[34]

These characteristics were inextricable from the imagination of the Australian bush, and the kinds of skills and qualities it was said to have inculcated in Australians:

> It was felt that the men were truly representative and characteristic of the Colonies. They were Australians of the Bush – squatters, boundary-riders, shepherds, shearers, and prospectors, sent out largely by Australian money, and followed by Australian hopes and ambitions.[35]

Many of these characteristics were eventually developed in other contexts, solidifying their place in popular images of Australianness. Australia's First World War official historian Charles Bean, for instance, wrote:

> like colonists of all ages, the Australian came of a race whose tradition was one of independence and enterprise, and, within that race itself, from a stock more adventurous, and for the most part physically more strong, than the general run of men. … the people developed more fully the large frames which seem normal

[33]Abbott, *Tommy Cornstalk*, p. 13.
[34]Hales, *Campaign Pictures*, p. 67.
[35]James Green, *The Story of the Australian Bushmen (being notes of a chaplain)*, (Sydney: William Brooks & Co., 1903), p. 3.

> to Anglo-Saxons living under generous conditions. An active life, as well as the climate, rendered the body wiry and the face lean, easily lined, and thin-lipped.[36]

In his study of the persistent strength of such images, Russel Ward wrote fifty years later in his nationalist classic, *The Australian Legend*:

> According to the myth the 'typical Australian' is a practical man, rough and ready in his manners and quick to decry any appearance of affectation in others. He is a great improviser … He swears hard and consistently … He is a fiercely independent person who hates officiousness and authority, especially when these qualities are embodied in military officers and policemen. Yet he is very hospitable and, above all, will stick to his mates through thick and thin….[37]

The strands of these images flow through clearly: the Australian soldier in the South African War was the quintessence of Australian masculinity. As Bill Nasson remarks, 'for Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, empire military involvement watered the ground for those Dominion myths of masculine war sacrifice and national identity which were to ripen in the Great War'.[38]

Yet many of the tropes that Australians articulated in the South African War were still only proto-nationalistic. Colonial parochialism undermined the expression of Australian nationalism by making expressions of identity either too specific or too generalised. When it was too specific, some soldiers expressed their loyalty not so much to Australia, but to their own colony. Captain Richard Lewis, the commanding officer of the Tasmanian Imperial Bushmen, reflected on a particularly proud moment, marching past Lord Roberts, commander-in-chief of the British forces in South Africa: 'You will understand that this march past was made particularly pleasant to us in several ways. We marched as Tasmanians, and not as Australians merely'.[39] Other soldiers often referenced tensions between different units from the Australian colonies; the Victorian Colonel Tom Price suggested, 'The intercolonial jealousies of Australia no doubt, had a great deal to do with the question of dealing with the Australian troops'.[40] Peter Stanley cites this factor as one reason why the South African War did not become a defining moment for Australian identity. Unlike the First World

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[36]C.E.W. Bean, *The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–1918, volume 1: The story of Anzac,* (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 5th ed., 1936), pp. 4–5.
[37]Russell Ward, *The Australian Legend,* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 1–2.
[38]Nasson, *The South African War 1899–1902*, pp. 7–8.
[39]Lewis, *On the Veldt*, p. 75.
[40]Colonel Tom Price CB, 2nd Victorian Mounted Rifles, papers, AWM: 3DRL/1436, p. 30.

War, in which Australians fought as part of a defined, unified Australia and a cohesive fighting force, Australian soldiers in the South African War were invested in their colonial identities, and indeed, the majority of them fought in colonial contingents.[41]

Yet, Australian proto-nationalism could also be too broadly defined, with many characteristics understood as defining colonials more generally. The iconic image in Figure 3 is from Frank Wilkinson's account of the war, depicting an effete British intelligence officer juxtaposed with his masculine colonial counterpart.[42] Abbott remarked on the 'ruddy, smooth-faced, flaxen Englishmen beside our lantern-jawed, long-limbed, bark-featured Cornstalks' shown in this image, but he also noted that 'you will never have the least difficulty in distinguishing a Colonial from an Englishman of England'.[43] It should not be forgotten that Wilkinson's original caption for the sketch contrasts the imperial intelligence officer with his 'colonial' counterpart – not specifically an Australian.

[41]Peter Stanley, 'With Banjo to Kimberley: Banjo Paterson's South African War verse as history,' in Dennis and Grey (eds.), *The Boer War*.
[42]Wilkinson, *Australia at the Front*, p. 242.
[43]Abbott, *Tommy Cornstalk*, pp. 214–15.

Figure 3 – Two types: imperial and colonial intelligence officer[44]

Abbott – whose book *Tommy Cornstalk* exemplified many of these recognisably Australian traits – also noted that the Australian 'is pretty much, though not quite, of the same species as the Canadian'.[45] Similarly, the surname of his archetypal Australian, Cornstalk, was noted to have specific origins in New South Wales, rather than the

[44]AWM: ART19683.
[45]Ibid., p. 6.

members of the other states, such as the Victorian 'Gum-suckers'.[46] To this extent, the notion of being Australian existed in a liminal space between broader identifications as colonials and narrower ones related to the constitutive colonies of Australia.

Different modes of proto-nationalism were, however, ultimately underpinned by Britishness. In articulating the distinction between two modes of Australian nationalism – Anglo-Australian imperialism against a more independent Australianness – Neville Meaney suggested that their differences were political by nature (such as the status of Australia and its role in determining imperial policy), rather than cultural.[47] Echoing this notion, John Hirst argued that part of the reason for a resurgence in imperial enthusiasm following the Queen's jubilee celebrations was a reduced 'uncertainty about the relationship between nation and Empire', and that wariness of the empire, when it was prevalent, was not driven by a 'determined anti-British stance'.[48] Australia's relationship with the imperial centre was frequently described in the language of family metaphors, suggestive of the 'crimson threads of kinship' so integral to race thinking in this period. Rudyard Kipling, for example, presented Australia as a new martial queen, taking her side next to the old queen of Britain.[49]

These British underpinnings of proto-Australian nationalism permeate contemporary sources. In a poem transcribed by Private Otto Techow, Australian bravery is the continuation of the qualities of the British race, expressed through familial, masculine language:

> And could you think we forget brave sons.
> …
> When to the Boers the courage they displayed
> Proved that Australia's sons upon the field
> Were of the old stock – Never known to yield.
> …
> And they're worthy the name of Britons,
> Of being some of the lion's sons

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[46]Ibid., p. 2.

[47]Neville Meaney, 'Britishness and Australian identity: the problem of nationalism in Australian history and historiography', *Australian Historical Studies*, vol. 32, iss. 116 (2001), pp. 76–90.

[48]John Hirst, 'Empire, state, nation', in Deryck M. Schreuder and Stuart Ward (eds.), *Australia's Empire,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 153.

[49]John Hirst, 'Blooding the nation: the Boer War and Federation', in Dennis and Grey (eds.), *The Boer War*.

Ready, and steady, and willing
When facing the foeman's guns.[50]

Another poem, 'The call to arms', which begins Chaplain James Green's account of travelling to the front with Bushmen contingents, also foregrounds the racial link connecting colonial nationalism with imperial loyalty:

Blood is thicker than water,
and that within our veins,
Is the same that makes the pulses beat
On broad Australian plains;
The same that warms Canadian hearts,
In spite of winter snow;
The same that throbs in many a breast
Where tropic breezes blow.
Kindred in speech and race are we
With the Brothers that came from over the sea.[51]

In these passages, the connection between an emerging Australian nationalism and support for the British Empire are not mutually exclusive. Rather, national achievement on the battlefield in the name of the empire proved the racial lineage and legacy of Britishness. As Techow records, Australians had demonstrated that they were 'of the old stock' and worthy of being considered the lion's (i.e., Britain's) sons. As Green's choice of poem highlights, this sentiment connected white men across the globe – from 'broad Australian plains' to Canadian hearts in the 'winter snow'. As much as Australians liked to define themselves against the stereotypical British soldier in proto-nationalist language, these claims never formed expressions of anti-Britishness, nor repudiated the British foundations of Australian identity.

A Boer savage

Australian images of the Boer were largely consistent with those of British commentators, if not as regularly invoked. Positive representations of Boers, discussed below, often focused on those qualities of rural masculinity that suggested superficial similarities between Australian and Boer. Negative representations of Boers centred on their religiosity, ignorance, laziness and duplicitousness. Short but suggestive comments were often couched in the dichotomous language of 'savage' and 'civilised'.[52]

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[50]Pte Otto Techow, 6th Western Australian Mounted Infantry, diary, AWM: 3DRL/2235, poem entitled 'Brakpan'.

[51]A.F.B. Wright, 'The Call to Arms', quoted in Green, *The Story of the Australian Bushmen*, p. 1.

[52]Nasson, *The South African War 1899–1902*, pp. 242–5.

Abbott referred to South Africa as 'wild, in its half-savage black population, and its almost as half-savage white one'.[53] His suggestion echoed that of Hales, who described the Boers as the 'sons of semi-white savages'.[54] Claude Lenthall, a Sydneysider living in South Africa at the outbreak of war, used the same words to describe Boers in a letter to his brother.[55] Descriptions such as this positioned Boers as a people who had not attained the full level of civilisation which the British Empire was thought to epitomise. The logic of imperial and settler-colonial conquest duly followed: Boer-owned land thus became fair game for the civilising effects of British possession.

Explicit instances of 'civilisational' rhetoric show how this relation was understood by ordinary soldiers. In the early part of the war, Trooper Robert Hayward of the South Australian Bushmen asserted that 'the Boer is dirty and untidy in his habits caring nothing about civilization', and that, much to the Boers' chagrin, they would 'now have to settle side by side with the British and will be able to enjoy the liberty and freedom which British rule gives to all mankind'.[56] At much the same time in the campaign, Trooper Watson Steel of New South Wales commented that the land around Bloemfontein could be far more agriculturally productive 'under a proper system of culture', that is, once British settlers had taken it.[57] Similar attitudes persisted at the conclusion of the war. Hales linked Boer laziness and religiosity with an inefficacy as colonisers. He claimed that a Boer would 'much rather sit down and pray for a beautiful harvest than get up and work for it'.[58]

Some Australian commentators linked the trope of the lazy Boer with combat ineffectiveness. In July 1900, Banjo Paterson claimed that Boers were so lazy, they would not engage in night attacks:

> The fact is they are too lazy; they have never done any unpleasant work – when any hard work presents itself, all their lives they have been accustomed to send a native to do it. So now, when they might cut us up seriously by night attacks, they prefer to go to bed.[59]

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[53] Abbott, *Tommy Cornstalk*, p. 14.
[54] Hales, *Campaign Pictures*, p. 56.
[55] Quoted in R.L. Wallace, *The Australians at the Boer Wa,* (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1976), p. 37.
[56]Trooper Robert Hayward, 3rd South Australian Bushmen, memoir, AWM: PR00996, pp. 5–6.
[57]Trooper Watson Steel, 1st New South Wales Mounted Rifles, manuscript, AWM: 3DRL/2851, p. 64.
[58]Hales, *Campaign Pictures*, p. 13.
[59]Droogleever (ed.), *From the Front*, p. 409.

The belief in a lazy Boer enemy, if indeed widely held, could have disastrous results. At Wilmansrust in June 1901, a year after Paterson's claim was printed, Victorian soldiers at a poorly picketed camp were surprised by a Boer night attack in which eighteen Victorians were killed.[60]

Boers were said to be deceitful too, which was linked to their military abilities. Fundamentally, the charge of deceitfulness was borne of the frustrations of a conventional British force fighting Boer commandos that deployed hit-and-run tactics. Exemplars of this trope often related to Boer abuse of white flags, but there were other, more individualised tales of deception.[61] In December 1899, an Australian cavalryman complained about the difficulty the British had in meeting the Boer on the battlefield: 'They fight when they like and leave off when they like'.[62] Queensland soldier Herbert Conder wrote that, 'the Boers are cunning devils, they go out fighting today, and tomorrow they plant their rifles and do a couple of days farming, then out they go again'.[63] New South Wales military chaplain James Green recounted that captured cities rapidly changed loyalty: 'To-day you can see a portrait of 'Bobs' on a background formed of a draped Union Jack, to-morrow Kruger looks at you … It is this want of honesty which makes it difficult to deal with the Boer'.[64] Boer deceitfulness was also understood to run both ways. In a letter home, Trooper Norman Gavin of New South Wales related that captured Boer combatants would immediately reveal the location of armament caches and supplies. 'They are awful traitors', he concluded.[65]

The contemporary prevalence of these cultural images is also evident in attempts to repudiate them. Paterson remarked that, 'all the talk about Boers being savages is nonsense', and Hales noted, 'We were led by members of this [Intelligence] Department to believe that the Boer was a cowardly kind of veldt pariah, a degenerate offshoot of a fine old parent stock … [but the Boer] is nothing of the kind'.[66] Abbott reflected that 'books, and magazines, and newspapers had almost taught us to believe

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[60]Souter, *Lion and Kangaroo*, pp. 55–71; and see Cameron Ross, 'The Wilmansrust affair', *Wartime* 60 (Spring 2012), pp. 30–31.

[61]See, for example, Abbott, *Tommy Cornstalk*, p. 101; Droogleever (ed.), *From the Front*, p. 53.

[62]'Private Michael Commins', *Daily Telegraph* (Sydney), 9 February 1900, p. 6: http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article237166924. Accessed 3 December 2020.

[63]Trooper Herbert Conder, 3rd Queensland Mounted Infantry, diary, AWM: PR84/131, p. 15.

[64]Green, *The Story of the Australian Bushmen*, p. 132. 'Bobs' refers to Lord Roberts, Commander-in-Chief of British forces in South Africa in 1900.

[65]'At the front', *The Dubbo Liberal and Macquarie Advocate*, 23 November 1901, p. 2: http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article72498173. Accessed 3 December 2020.

[66]Droogleever (ed.), *From the Front*, p. 30; Hales, *Campaign Pictures*, p. 55.

that we should meet in Africa some kind of a sub-tropical Esquimo – a hairy, primitive "loafer'", but that on first seeing Boer prisoners and discovering ordinary men, he was left with 'a curious feeling of having been deceived'.[67] By virtue of requiring repudiation, these sources suggest that representations of the Boers as lazy and deceitful were probably widespread.

Repudiated or otherwise, however, representations of Boers never truly denied their whiteness, but did hold them to a standard of whiteness that they could not always be assumed to meet. As Abbott asserted in a passage exemplary of the rather arbitrary distinctions drawn between bushman and Boer, 'We are certainly no better in most things than we ought to be, but, if only as policy, we *do* deal more with truthfulness than do the Boers'.[68] It is in this sense that Schwarz remarks, 'Boers could occupy a place in the ethnic scheme [only] on the outer edges of whiteness'.[69]

Playing the Boers at their own game

In articulating the colonial rationale for sending the 'Bushmen' contingents, Reverend Green repeated a common belief that the best way for the British to beat the formidable Boer enemy was to send soldiers who most resembled them.[70] Australian Bushmen soldiers, so it was thought, could 'play the Boers at their own game'.[71] Abbott articulated this notion even more cogently, declaring:

> From the history of the Dutch people in South Africa – their hardships and struggles as pioneers in the first place, and their open-air, half-civilised existence nowadays – it was, from the outbreak of hostilities, a matter of universal opinion throughout the Colonies that the Boer should be met by men who resembled him in their ways of living, in their training as horsemen, and, more particularly, in their education as expert rifle shots.[72]

If Australians resembled the Boers in their way of living, then it followed that the Australian existence must also be an 'open-air, half-civilised' one. But although Abbott denied an Australian–Boer connection in terms of vice, the same was not true for representations of Australian skill and virtue. Indeed, in a number of instances, it was

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[67]Abbott, *Tommy Cornstalk*, pp. 237, 240.
[68]Ibid., p. 8.
[69]Schwarz, *Memories of Empire*, p. 229.
[70]See Peter Bakker and Thomas J. Rogers, 'Dismantling a myth of the South African War: Bushmen, Aboriginal trackers, and public debate, 1899–1902', *Journal of Australian Colonial History* 21 (2019), pp. 154–6; 160–61.
[71]Green, *The Story of the Australian Bushmen*, p. 2.
[72]Abbott, *Tommy Cornstalk*, p. 7.

precisely by drawing upon popular images of the Boer on the veld that the extent of Australians' natural martial potential could be articulated.

Horsemanship is perhaps the paradigmatic example, because it linked supposed Australian expertise, disdain for the average British soldier, and images of the Boer soldier. Contending that the horse was a defining characteristic of the Australian experience, Abbott likened the Australian to the Boer:

> As the Boer despises a '*voet-looper*' ['foot-slogger'] so is Tommy Cornstalk ashamed to be seen walking. He is essentially a horseman – and generally a horsey man. His sphere as a soldier lies in mounted work …[73]

Paterson provided a similar analogy, albeit through the words of British officers, who were supposedly in disbelief that the Australians they were assigned did not resemble the Boer so closely as they had imagined:

> [The Australian Bushmen] are a rough lot of diamonds to look at, but the English officers say that 'they are not real bushmen, don't you know'. I fancy their idea of a bushman is much like our old idea of a Boer – a sort of hairy savage who lives on horseback, and they don't think the men they have got are wild enough to be the real thing.[74]

Paterson's claim was closely tied to another popular Australian notion about the inefficacy of the average British soldier. Private Frederick Cawthorn, for example, wrote in dismay that, 'Our horses, the best that have arrived from Australia are likely to carry the next lot of Tommies, who don't know a horse from a bar of soap, to the front'.[75] The significance of horses in Australian South African War writings reflects the empirical reality that this was a war in which horses were indispensable, but also the fact that horses and horsemanship became symbols that were used to navigate expressions of similarity and difference.[76] If the Australians could beat the Boers at their own game, it was not simply because the Australian was a skilled horseman, but because he was as skilled as the Boer.

Settling the question of Bushman or Boer

The blurring of the categories, Australian bushman and Boer soldier, cannot be properly understood without exploring the role of broader conceptual frameworks

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[73]Ibid., p. 10.
[74]Droogleever (ed.), *From the Front*, p. 415.
[75]Private Frederick Cawthorn, 2nd Tasmanian Imperial Bushmen, diary, AWM: PR86/056, transcript p. 13.
[76]See Wilcox, *Australia's Boer War*, pp. 131–41.

dominant in the Anglo settler colonies at the turn of the twentieth century. 'Horsiness', for instance, took on symbolic importance not merely out of empirical necessity, but also in relation to the emerging Australian identity of the bush. In one historian's summary of the minds of nineteenth-century writers, it was 'in the back country that the most profound modification of British stock was occurring, where a distinct and superior national type was forming'.[77] The imagined bush, in turn, was inextricable from the context of settler colonialism and the settler colonist – it was precisely because of the conditions of the Australian colonies that it could be said that Australians were an improvement of the 'Anglo-Saxon stock'.[78]

The context of settler colonialism became explicit in the comparison of the Australian bushman and the Boer soldier. In praising mounted infantry above the more glamorous cavalry, for instance, Wilkinson suggested that, '[the Australians] farm and fight with equal facility, and do both with more thoroughness than their South African prototypes', indicating that it was not only martial aptitude, but the ability to develop land that marked out the Australians particularly for admiration.[79]

By contrast, when comparing the Boers to the English, Captain Joseph Dallimore suggested that it was the Boers who were more praiseworthy, noting:

> The English settlers expect to be spoon fed by the B.S.A. Coy [British South Africa Company] but the Dutchmen look to their own efforts … Melsetter is the most prosperous place in Rhodesia and is wholly a farming place and the population are all Boers. It is no wonder they are a hardy race, the difficulties they have had to contend with would have frightened any other race.[80]

Such comments were, of course, antithetical to the notion of Boers being lazy or reliant on indigenous labour to develop the land. But these contestations in the discursive record were contradictory in detail, not in conceptual structure. Both claims – that the Boers were praiseworthy for their efficient colonisation, and that the Boers were blameworthy for being lazy and indolent – reflected a fundamental colonial assumption about the justifications of settler colonialism: namely, that the legitimacy of indigenous dispossession was contingent upon the act of taming the land and 'civilising' the local people. In this respect, the language of 'savage' and 'civilised', which

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[77]Douglas Cole, '"The crimson thread of kinship": Ethnic ideas in Australia, 1870–1914,' *Australian Historical Studies* 14, no. 56 (1971), p. 520.
[78]Ibid.; Richard White, *Inventing Australia: Images and identity 1688–1980,* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1981); Warwick Anderson, *The Cultivation of Whiteness: Science, health, and racial destiny in Australia,* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2005).
[79]Wilkinson, *Australia at the Front*, p. 49.
[80]Dallimore, diary, transcript book 2, p. 31.

couched many descriptions of the Boers, was not merely a quirky contextual detail, but revealing of some of the foundational concepts being mobilised to conceive of virtue and vice, superiority and inferiority, the bushman and the Boer.

The bush did not have to define the Australian experience in reality, in order for it to be of paramount symbolic importance. Graeme Davison has comprehensively demonstrated the 'urban context' of many of the bush legend's most ardent advocates, and Peter Stanley notes that despite rapidly becoming 'one of the world's most highly urbanised countries, the image of the bushman – and from the South African War the bushman soldier – became one of the dominant impressions of Australians at war'.[81] Banjo Paterson effectively embodied this contradiction when he recounted in his memoir, *Happy Dispatches*, that:

> I realized that they [his English interlocutors] looked upon me as the Wild Colonial Boy, the bronco buster from the Barcoo, and I determined to act up to it … At that time I was a solicitor in practice in Sydney, rarely getting on a horse, but I told them that if I had a horse in Australia that wouldn't carry me a hundred miles in a day, I would give him to a Chinaman to draw a vegetable cart.[82]

Empirical evidence bears out Paterson's point. Despite appearances and even unit names, probably only a minority of Australian soldiers in the war could be considered 'bushmen', that is, coming from a rural labouring background.[83] In this respect, the bush mythology which characterised Australian claims of racial difference (to the British) and similarity (to the Boers), paralleled the notion that this conflict was a 'white man's war' – it reflected rhetorical claims and a normative ideal, not empirical reality, as we discuss below.

From the middle of the nineteenth century, colonial Australian writers, artists, and legislators sought to define the 'coming Australian man', and fretted over whether he would be an improvement on his Anglo-Saxon forebears, or a degeneration.[84] In these debates, colonial masculinities were interconnected with white Britishness.[85] At the

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[81] Graeme Davison, 'Sydney and the bush: an urban context for the Australian legend,' *Australian Historical Studies* 18, no. 71 (1978), pp. 191–209; Stanley, 'With Banjo to Kimberley', p. 162.
[82] Droogleever, *From the Front*, p. 22.
[83] Wilcox, *Australia's Boer War*, p. 327; Chamberlain, 'The characteristics of Australia's Boer War volunteers', p. 48.
[84] White, *Inventing Australia*, pp. 64–7; Cole, '"The crimson thread of kinship"', p. 518.
[85] See, for example, Angela Woollacott, *Gender and Empire,* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 59–80.

same time, emerging scientific discourses of race were married to earlier ideas about civilisation and widely debated.[86] By the time war broke out in 1899, settler Australians had a ready vocabulary with which to assert and elaborate perceived differences between themselves and colonial others.[87] In the British settler colonies, the concept of whiteness was in the ascendant. Whiteness transcended nationalism: ideas about it were repeated, shared and developed in multiple sites across the British Empire and beyond.[88]

The South African War has often been understood as a 'white man's war', a description that was contemporary.[89] The common fear among Boers and Britons was that enlisting black combatants would upset the basis of white supremacy in South Africa. The Natal government feared that engaging black combatants 'would give them a false idea of their own powers and establish a sense of independence among them'.[90] The *Times* historian of the war Leo Amery declared in 1902 that enlisting black soldiers would threaten 'European civilisation in South Africa'.[91] Boer leaders held similar fears. In January 1902, Jan Smuts argued that 'the interests of self-preservation no less than the cause of civilisation in South Africa' demanded that black people not be drawn into the war between self-appointed colonial masters – indeed that this common understanding was 'the cardinal principle in South African politics'.[92]

Against this rhetoric, decades of research have shown conclusively that it was not a white man's war.[93] The British enlisted black, coloured, and Asian auxiliaries and

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[86]See, for example, Ronald L. Meek, *Social Science and the Ignoble Savage,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976); Patrick Wolfe, *Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology: The Politics and Poetics of an Ethnographic Event,* (London: Cassell, 1999), p. 45; Anderson, *The Cultivation of Whiteness*; Adam Kuper, *The Reinvention of Primitive Society: Transformations of a Myth,* (London: Routledge, 2nd ed., 2005), pp. 30–1.
[87]Georgia Ramsay, 'Australians and Black South Africans during the South African War, 1899–1902', Australian War Memorial Summer Scholar paper, 2000, AWM: MSS2071, p. 1; Karageorgos, 'War in a "white man's country"'.
[88]Lake and Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Colour Line*.
[89]Warwick, *Black People and the South African War*, p. 6.
[90]Quoted in ibid., p. 17.
[91]Leo Amery, *The Times History of the War in South Africa, 1899–1902* , vol. 2, (London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co., 1902), p. 138.
[92]Quoted in Warwick, *Black People and the South African War*, p. 18.
[93]See, for example, ibid.; Gooch (ed.), *The Boer War*; Greg Cuthbertson, Albert Grundlingh, and Mary-Lynn Suttie (eds), *Writing a Wider War: Rethinking gender, race, and identity in the South African War, 1899–1902,* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press,

combatants in increasing numbers as the war went on.[94] Despite a fundamental opposition to arming black people, Boer forces also enlisted a small number of black combatants during the war, usually in rear areas or for reconnaissance. The Boers deployed a larger number of black and coloured people as wagon-drivers, mounted attendants (*agterryers*), and labourers.[95]

Conclusion

Pervasive structures of colonial thought were not unique to Australian representations of the Boer. It was, after all, a common imputation in British propaganda that the Boers were undeserving colonists because of their overly cruel treatment of indigenous African peoples, as opposed to the putatively free and just regime of the British.[96] In locating the Australian representation of the Boer within this broader framework of settler colonialism, we have attempted to push scholarship on the South African War into some of the transnational considerations which are indispensable for understanding national histories.

Underpinning the categories of bushman or Boer were broader considerations about race and civilisation that were weaponised and developed in a context that extended far beyond Australia's borders. Thinking about the South African War in this way opens up new lines of scholarly enquiry for Australian historians, not only in relation to under- or unexplored dimensions of the war, but also in relation to Australian society. The 1890s and 1900s were politically and culturally foundational for modern Australia. A greater understanding of the impact of the South African War on Australia promises to yield further insights into these foundational conditions, and thereby illuminate our understanding of Australian society today.

2002); André Wessels, *The Anglo-Boer War 1899–1902: White man's war, black man's war, traumatic war,* (Bloemfontein: Sun Press, 2011).

[94]Wessels, *The Anglo-Boer War 1899–1902*, p. 102.

[95]Ibid., pp. 105–7.

[96]See, for example, Trainor, 'Building Nations: Australia and New Zealand', p. 255.

What's in a name? Identifying military engagements in Egypt and the Levant, 1915-1918

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ABSTRACT
This article examines the official names listed in the 'Egypt and Palestine' section of the 1922 report by the British Army's Battles Nomenclature Committee and compares them with descriptions of military engagements in the Official History to establish if they clearly identify the events. The Committee's application of their own definitions and guidelines during the process of naming these conflicts is evaluated together with examples of more recent usages in selected secondary sources. The articles concludes that the Committee's failure to accurately identify the events of this campaign have had a negative impacted on subsequent historiography.

Introduction

While the perennial rose would still smell the same if called a lily, any discussion of military engagements relies on accurate and generally agreed on enduring names, so historians, veterans, and the wider community, can talk with some degree of confidence about particular events, and they can be meaningfully written into history. The Battles Nomenclature Committee identified World War I conflicts engaged in by British Empire forces, and codified them in their report, which was approved by the Army Council, presented to the British Parliament and published in 1922.[1]

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DOI: 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v7i1.1469
[1]Battles Nomenclature Committee (Great Britain) and John Headlam, *The Official Names of the Battles and other Engagements fought by the Military Forces of the British Empire during the Great War, 1914–19, and the Third Afghan War, 1919: Report of the Battles Nomenclature Committee as approved by the Army Council. Presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office (HMSO), 1922), (hereafter cited in text as BNC *Report*).

This article examines the official names given to military engagements in the 'Egypt and Palestine' section of the report, the Committee's application of their definitions and guidelines during that process, and considers their efficacy when compared with descriptions of these events provided in the Official History of the region.[2] This publication is particularly apposite as it raises questions and discusses technical issues about the names listed in the report, and is based on information contained in official documents including 'the war diaries of every staff and unit engaged, special reports of actions, messages received and sent, both those passing between the War Office and the command in Egypt and those between commanders and their troops', and enemy documents, and provides three maps included below. Prior to publication it was 'read by a number of commanders, staff officers and regimental officers who took part in the events described', and '[c]hapters in draft have been circulated to over five hundred officers who took part in the campaign'.[3] Among them would have been Brigadier General A. P. Wavell, who acknowledged in his campaign history, checking 'all facts, and especially the figures of strengths, casualties, etc., with the Official History', which he considered to be, 'by far the most complete and authoritative work'.[4]

Selected secondary sources indicate how the events named in this section of the report have been identified more recently, although in most cases they are treated as rubrics, often without discussing their technical qualities.[5] Also included are four maps which reflect views of the campaigns found in many publications.

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[2]George MacMunn and Cyril Falls, *History of the Great War based on Official Documents by Direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence, Military Operations Egypt & Palestine: Volume 1 From the outbreak of war with Germany to June 1917,* (London: HMSO, 1928); Cyril Falls and A. F. Becke, *History of the Great War based on Official Documents by Direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence, Military Operations Egypt & Palestine: Volume 2 From June 1917 to the end of the War,* (London: HMSO, 1930).

[3]MacMunn and Falls, *Official History Vol. 1*, p. vi; Falls and Becke, *Official History Vol. 2*, p. viii.

[4]A. P. Wavell, *The Palestine campaigns* (London: Constable & Co., 1928) (Google books, cited in 'original pages' format not the Contents' pagination), pp. 4, 302.

[5]The literature is dominated by Wavell's popular, wry, and extremely influential *The Palestine Campaigns*. Key works include Edward J. Erickson, *Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War* (Westport Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2001), and *Ottoman Army Effectiveness in World War I: A Comparative Study* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), with Matthew Hughes, *Allenby and British Strategy in the Middle East 1917–1919* (London: Frank Cass, 1999) and (ed) *Allenby in Palestine: The Middle East Correspondence of Field Marshal Viscount Allenby June 1917–October 1919* (Stroud: Sutton Publishing Ltd, 2004). Recent histories include Jean Bou, *Light Horse: A History*

Service on the Committee

The Battles Nomenclature Committee was appointed in August 1919 by the Army Council and began naming operations fought during the Great War 1914–1919 and the Third Afghan War of 1919 on 18 August 1919. Their report was signed on 9 July 1920 by the Committee President Major General Sir John Headlam, the Secretary Captain H. Fitz M. Stacke, and eight of the longest serving Permanent Members. They were a Lieutenant Colonel from the General Staff and another from Canada who both served for 11 months, a Captain from New Zealand served for 10 months, a Lieutenant Colonel from South Africa and a Major from Canada both served for 8 months, two Lieutenant Colonels from Australia served for 5 months and for two stints of one and a half months respectively, and the eighth signatory a Colonel also from Australia served for 3 months. The remaining eight permanent members served only briefly – six for less than a week. Among them, an Australian, a Canadian and a New Zealander served for three day, another Australian for five days, and another New Zealander for just one day. The seventh non-signatory permanent member, a General Staff representative served for nine days, and the eighth a South African served for two months.[6]

Two Temporary Members were 'specially selected for their local knowledge' of each of seven theatres of the war and appointed by the General Staff to assist permanent members for unknown periods. Representing 'Egypt and Palestine' were 'Lieut.-Colonel A. E. M. Sinclair Thompson, DSO, Essex Regiment', and 'Major J. A. H. Gammell, DSO, MC, Royal Artillery'.[7] Sinclair Thompson probably served in one of the Essex Regiments in the 54th Division's 161st Infantry Brigade, and Gammell appears to have served on the General Staff in Egypt from December 1915 until mid-1918, and from October at the War Office.[8]

The Committee claimed in their preamble, to 'have carefully examined all the Despatches and Reports, ... received valuable assistance from the Headquarters of the

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of Australia's Mounted Arm (Port Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Anthony Bruce, *The Last Crusade: The Palestine Campaign in the First World War* (London: John Murray, 2002); John D. Grainger, *The Battle for Palestine 1917* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2006); Terry Kinloch, *Devils on Horses in the words of the Anzacs in the Middle East 1916–19* (Auckland: Exisle Publishing, 2007); David R. Woodward, *Hell in the Holy Land: World War I in the Middle East* (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2006).

[6]BNC *Report*, pp. 3, 4, 9.

[7]BNC *Report*, p. 4.

[8]MacMunn and Falls, *Official History Vol. 1*, Appendix 2 Order of Battle p. 383; *Lieutenant General Sir James Andrew Harcourt Gammell 1892–1975*, https://www.gammell.net/james-a-h-gammell-1892-1975.html. Accessed 18 May 2020.

different Dominion Forces ... and many accounts published unofficially ... In all matters of doubt the War Diaries have been freely consulted'. They were assisted by officers of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence 'who acted as their secretaries', and by 'a large number of officers specially qualified to speak on the subject'. Given the enormous scope of their task, the extremely short terms served by many, and their claim to 'have carefully considered each case in all its aspects and they believe that their recommendations do substantial justice', it is difficult to see how they could have completed their work in just 11 months without a very great deal of help.[9]

They also claimed in the preamble that members 'have themselves had very varied experiences during the war', but no one from India appears to have served on the Committee despite its forces' substantial involvement in the war. The report records permanent members serving in the Grenadier Guards, the Devonshire, the Auckland, and the Otago Regiments, in the Australian Imperial Force, and the Canadian, New Zealand, and South African Military Forces.[10] Although the Official History notes Devonshire, Auckland, and Otago battalions and a South African unit served in the region under consideration at one time, service records are not available to support or deny the contention that all the permanent members may have served on the western front, except that all five Australians certainly did.[11] If preliminary conclusions regarding war service prove correct, that most fought in the largely static, relatively compact, and mechanised war in Europe, they may have had difficulty grasping the mobile and dynamic Egypt and Levant campaigns which relied on camel- and horse-power, and where infantry moved on foot at about 3 miles an hour, not in lorries.

Terms of Reference, Definitions, and Layout

The Committee's Terms of Reference were:

> a) To tabulate the actions fought in this war.
> b) To classify these actions with a definite system of nomenclature which will denote their relative importance …
> c) To define the geographical and chronological limits of each action.[12]

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[9]BNC *Report*, pp. 4, 5, 9.
[10]BNC *Report*, pp. 3, 9.
[11]MacMunn and Falls, *Official History Vol. 1*, pp. 441–5; Falls and Becke, *Official History Vol. 2,* pp. 737–48; Charles Bean, *Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–1918: Volume V The Australian Imperial Force in France during the Main German Offensive, 1918* (1941) Dowse p. 787, Jess p. 799, Plant p. 810, Somerville p. 815, and Whitham p. 824, https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C1416531. Accessed 20 April 2019.
[12]BNC *Report*, p. 3.

The system of nomenclature used to maintain consistency in naming and classifying engagements is set out in the preamble. Concerning the scale of events, the Committee decided:

> The only names in the military terminology which convey any real indication of proportion are "battle," "action," and "affair," ... the rank of "battle" has been confined as a general rule to engagements of primary importance fought out between forces not smaller than the corps. The title "action" has been employed for the next class, the limit in this case being taken as the division; lesser engagements have been styled "affairs." [13]

And they agreed to employ,

> … *descriptive* terms, such as "capture," "occupation," "attack," "defence," &c., …"Capture" has been reserved for operations where the primary object was the capture of a definite locality, and where this was only accomplished by actual fighting of some importance; where this latter condition was absent "occupation" has been used, and the same distinction has been drawn between "passage" and "crossing." Again the term "attack" has been confined to unsuccessful offensive operations, and "defence" to successful defences of definite localities.[14]

The Committee presented their report as a table on landscape orientated pages. 'By an arrangement in several columns, by the use of different terms and of varieties of type, the Committee have endeavoured to indicate the relative importance of events'. Columns are headed on verso pages: 'Operations'; 'Battles' with sub-columns 'Name' and 'Tactical Incidents Included'; 'Actions, &c.'; 'Miscellaneous Incidents'; and 'Limits' with sub-columns 'Chronological' and 'Geographical' (see Figure 2).[15]

However, the first two pages of the 'Egypt and Palestine' section of the report do not indicate 'the relative importance of events'. This section starts with minor fighting in the 'Sudan' from 1 March to 31 December 1916, described in the Official History as involving three battalions of Sudanese and Arab infantry, followed by fighting on the 'Western Frontier' against the Senussi from 23 November 1915 to 8 February 1917, which the Official History documents being fought by two and a half brigades, three regiments and four units, a camel corps, and light armoured and light cars. Not until the following page does the report finally name the relatively much more important and arguably strategically vital, 'Eastern Frontier and Palestine. I.–The Defence of

[13]BNC *Report*, p. 7.
[14]BNC *Report*, p. 7.
[15]BNC *Report*, pp. 8, 30, 32.

Egypt' and fighting for the Suez Canal from 3 February 1915.[16] The Official History's versions of the report replicated this organisation, while Wavell rearranged his version to show relative importance and chronological order. He began with the 'Eastern Frontier and Palestine', 'I The Defence of Egypt', 'Defence of the Suez Canal', and 'Operations in the Sinai Peninsula', followed by 'II Western Frontier' with 'Operations against the Senussi', and finally 'Sudan' and 'Operations against the Sultan of Darfur'.[17]

Analysis of the 'Egypt and Palestine' section of the report

Operations in the region began with the Ottoman advance across the Egyptian Sinai to attack the Suez Canal in early 1915, followed by the Senussi insurgency in the Western Desert from late 1915 to 1917, and fighting in the Sudan in 1916. Northern Sinai became contested ground from April 1916, the second Ottoman advance across the desert was stopped at Romani in August, and the Sinai cleared by Christmas. Invasion of Ottoman territory began with the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) victory at Rafah in January 1917 but two defeats at Gaza in March and April were followed by stalemate. This lasted until the October to December offensive pushed the Gaza to Beersheba line north to Jaffa and Jerusalem, when the Judean Hills became contested ground. The EEF won Jericho and occupied part of the Jordan Valley in February 1918, before attacks were launched against Es Salt and Amman in March and April and in the Judean Hills, and September brought the spectacular offensive which culminated in the captures of Amman, Damascus, and Aleppo, and Armistice on 31 October.

<u>Fighting for the Suez Canal and Sinai</u>

The report identified the 'Defence of the Suez Canal (26th January 1915–12th August 1916)' in the 'Operations' column, 'Actions on the Suez Canal' in the 'Actions, &c.' column, and '3rd–4th February 1915' in the 'Chronological' column.[18] According to the Official History this was not an 'action' fought by a division. Instead it describes a 'battle' fought by corps-sized forces after the Ottoman VIII Corps advanced across the Sinai desert to launch a series of major attacks against the Suez Canal, successfully defended by the 10th India Division, parts of the 11th India Division and the New Zealand Infantry Brigade, with the Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade, the Bikanir Camel

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[16]BNC *Report*, pp. 30–1; MacMunn and Falls, *Official History Vol. 1*, p. 375.

[17]MacMunn and Falls, *Official History Vol. 1*, pp. 374–9; Wavell, *Palestine campaigns,* pp. 297–8. Annotated and edited versions of the Report appear in the Official History as Appendix I in both volumes with added 'Forces engaged' columns: MacMunn and Falls, *Official History Vol. 1*, pp. 374–9; Falls and Becke, *Official History Vol. 2,* pp. 650–59, and Wavell includes his edited version as Appendix I: Wavell, *Palestine campaigns,* pp. 296–300.

[18]BNC *Report*, p. 31. The chronological limits are combined with the names, below.

Corps and a squadron and two regiments of Yeomanry.[19] Lieutenant General Sir J. Maxwell, Commander-in-Chief of the Force in Egypt recalled a minor event, 'no great effort [was required] on our part to throw those who reached the Canal back in confusion', reflecting the downgrading of the event in the report. More recently, Edward Erickson also diminished the fighting when he described the attackers as 'almost completely untrained in water crossing operations', and as virtually ineffective; '[t]he carefully prepared attack plan disintegrated'.[20] However, as described in the Official History, this fighting between corps-sized forces fully conforms to the Committee's definition of 'battle', being 'of primary importance [and] fought out between forces not smaller than the corps'. David Woodward confirmed the primary importance of the Suez Canal, when he recognised it as 'the Empire's lifeline', and crucial to the Allies ability to conduct the war, yet this important and pivotal battle continues to be diminished in the secondary sources.[21]

While troops continued to hold Canal defences the Committee extended the chronological limits of the 'Defence of the Suez Canal' to 12 August 1916, but according to the Official History, from late February the strategic focus had shifted to 'The Advance into Sinai'. Raids conducted into the Peninsula including to Jifjafa in mid-April 1916, provoked enemy responses which the report recognised as the 'Affair of Qatia' and 'Battle of Romani', while fighting for Bir el Abd, Bir el Mazar, and the Maghara Hills during the advance of about 90 miles across northern Sinai, was overlooked. It was not until just before the EEF reoccupied 'El Arish only 27 miles from the frontier at Rafah', that the Committee finally named 'Operations in the Sinai Peninsula', and the 'Affair of Magdhaba 23rd December 1916'. For the Official History this was no 'affair' but an 'action' by Major General Sir H. G. Chauvel's Anzac Mounted Division with the Camel Brigade, who fought and captured the Ottoman garrison. It fully accords with the Committee's own definition, that '"action" has been employed for the next class, the limit in this case being taken as the division'. This action resulted in the evacuation of Ottoman garrisons at Maghara Hills, Nekhl, and Bir el Hassana.[22] The confusion over these events can be seen to this day with Figure 1, the United States Military Academy's map of the Egypt and Palestine campaign up to March 1917, showing Qatia, El Arish, and Bir el Hassana but overlooking all military operations across the Sinai. Uncertainty about this fighting will continue until there is a published

[19]MacMunn and Falls, *Official History Vol. 1*, pp. 37–52, 377.

[20]General Maxwell quoted in C. Guy Powles and A. Wilkie, *The New Zealanders in Sinai and Palestine, Vol. III Official history of New Zealand's effort in the Great War* (Auckland: Whitcombe & Tombs Ltd, 1922) p. x; Erickson, *Ordered to Die*, p. 71.

[21]BNC *Report*, p. 7; Woodward, *Hell in the Holy Land*, p. 15.

[22]BNC *Report*, pp. 7, 31; MacMunn and Falls, *Official History Vol. 1*, pp. 159–204, 242–6, 251–8.

campaign history. Jeffrey Grey confirms: 'The campaign to clear Sinai in 1916 remains the "orphan" in the historical literature'.[23]



Figure 1: Egypt and Palestine, 1914; Canal Defences and First Battle of Gaza 26 March 1917 (Map courtesy of the United States Military Academy Department of History).

The Second Offensive

Following the 'Action of Rafah 9th January, 1917', the third page of this section of the report is headed 'II – The Invasion of Palestine', and lists in the 'Operations' column, 'The First Offensive (24th March–19th April)' against Gaza and 'The Second Offensive (27th October–16th November)' with the 'Third Battle of Gaza' in the 'Name' subcolumn of 'Battles', and the 'Capture of Beersheba', and the 'Capture of the Sheria Position' named in the 'Tactical Incidents Included' subcolumn of 'Battles', as if they were somehow part of, but lesser than the Gaza fighting. Next the 'Affair of Huj 8th November' and the 'Action of El Mughar 13th November' appear in the 'Actions, &c.'

[23]Jeffrey Grey, *The Centenary History of Australia and the Great War Volume 2 The War with the Ottoman Empire* (South Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 191.

column, and '*with subsequent* Occupation of Junction Station 14th November' is in the 'Miscellaneous Incidents' column (see Figure 2).[24]

EGYPT AND PALESTINE—*continued.*

OPERATIONS.	BATTLES.		ACTIONS, &c.	MISCELLANEOUS INCIDENTS.	LIMITS.	
	NAME.	TACTICAL INCIDENTS INCLUDED.			CHRONOLOGICAL.	GEOGRAPHICAL.
II.—The Invasion of Palestine.						
The First Offensive ... ... (24th March–19th April, 1917.)	FIRST BATTLE OF GAZA	...	...	...	26th–27th March	North of the line Beersheba—Bela'.
	SECOND BATTLE OF GAZA	...	...	...	17th–19th April	
The Second Offensive ... ... (27th October – 16th November, 1917.)	THIRD BATTLE OF GAZA	Capture of Beersheba Capture of the Sheria Position	...	...	27th October – 7th November	North of the Wadi Ghuzze.
			Affair of Huj	...	8th November	North of the line Beersheba—Gaza and west of the Beersheba—Jerusalem road.
			Action of El Mughar	...	13th November	
				—*with subsequent* Occupation of Junction Station	14th November	
Jerusalem Operations ... ... (17th November–30th December, 1917.)	BATTLE OF NEBI SAMWIL	...	...	...	17th–24th November	North and east of the line Hebron— Junction Station.
			Capture of Jerusalem	...	7th–9th December	
	DEFENCE OF JERUSALEM	...	...	...	26th–30th December	
	—*with subsidiary* BATTLE OF JAFFA	...	...	...	21st–22nd December	Between the Tul Keram—Junction Station—Jaffa railway and the sea.
Operations in and beyond the Jordan Valley. (19th February–4th May, 1918.)	... ...	...	Capture of Jericho	...	19th–21st February	Between the Bethlehem—Nablus road and the Jordan, north of the line Jerusalem— Dead Sea.
			Passage of the Jordan	...	21st–23rd March	East of the Jordan.
			First Action of Es Salt	...	24th–25th March	
			First Attack on Amman	...	27th–30th March	
			Turkish Attack on the Jordan Bridgeheads	...	11th April	
			Second Action of Es Salt	...	30th April–4th May	
—*with subsidiary Arab Operations in the Mountains of Moab.* (*March and April, 1918.*)	... ...	...	...	...	March and April	
Local Operations. 1918	... ...	...	Actions of Tel Asur	...	8th–12th March	West of the Jordan, and north of the line Jericho—Ram Allah—Jaffa.
			Affair of Abu Telul	...	14th July	
The Final Offensive... ... ... (18th September–31st October, 1918.)	THE BATTLES OF MEGIDDO	...	...	...	19th–25th September.	
	(i.) BATTLE OF SHARON	...	...	...	19th–25th September	Between the Hejaz Railway and the sea, north of the line Dhaba Station—mouth of Jordan—Arsuf.
	(ii.) BATTLE OF NABLUS	...	...	...		
			Actions beyond Jordan	...	23rd–30th September	
			Capture of Amman	...	25th September	
			Capture of Dera'a†	...	27th September	
—*including The Pursuit through Syria* ... (*26th September–31st October.*)	... ...	...	Capture of Damascus	...	1st October	North of the Haifa—Dera'a railway.
			Affair of Haritan	...	26th October	
				—*with subsequent* Occupation of Aleppo	26th October	

† Arab forces.

Figure 2: The layout of the Battles Nomenclature Committee's report at one opening, shows verso page 32 with column headings, and 'The First Offensive', 'The Second Offensive', and 'Jerusalem Operations', and recto page 33 'Operations in and beyond

[24]BNC *Report*, p. 32.

the Jordan Valley', '*–with subsidiary Arab Operations in the Mountains of Moab*', 'Local Operations. 1918', and 'The Final Offensive' '*–including The Pursuit through Syria'*.

Numerous discrepancies between these names and the Official History's descriptions of the events are examined below, which indicate major misunderstandings by the Committee of the scale of and distances between the sites of these conflicts, concluding with examples of the confusion which continues in the literature.

Figure 3: 'Third Battle of Gaza. Situation at 6 pm 6th Nov. 1917', shows Ottoman forces holding Gaza to Sheria, EEF flank deployments against Sheria, and fighting around Khuweilfe north of Beersheba (Falls and Becke, *Official History Vol. 2*, Sketch 6).

For the Official History, the Second Offensive began on 31 October with a day-long pitched battle for Beersheba, by the EEF's XX Corps and Desert Mounted Corps against the Ottoman III Corps defending the town, which was won at dusk by reserve units.[25] This victory as described in the Official History was no mere 'capture' with 'actual fighting of some importance'. It fully conforms to the Committee's two criteria for 'battle'; being fought by corps-sized forces and of 'primary importance', as it opened the road via Hebron to Jerusalem to assault and captured the eastern end of the Gaza–Beersheba line shown on Figure 3. The Committee diminished this conflict by placing it in the 'Tactical Incident Included' subcolumn of 'Battles' indicating that it was somehow part of the fighting at Gaza and substantially misunderstood the battle was fought at least 25 miles away; about six hours for infantry on foot and three hours for trotting horses. This led to their contravention of their 'general principle' of including 'in a battle area only what might fairly be regarded as the actual 'battlefield'.[26] The event continues to be diminished in the secondary sources. For Erickson, 'Beersheba was a battle lost from the onset ... an almost unavoidable defeat', and Matthew Hughes thought it unnecessary: 'Counterfactual history suggests that an attack at Gaza would have routed the Turks and secured all of Palestine', and that General Sir E. H. H. 'Allenby [Commander-in-Chief of the EEF] overestimated the Turkish defences ... [He] and the War Cabinet misread Turkish capabilities and intentions ... [and] adopted an unsuitable plan for battle that involved attacking Beersheba'.[27]

Conversely, the fighting at Gaza was inflated by the Committee when they named the 'Third Battle of Gaza 27th October–7th November', recognised in the Official History as subsidiary; '[t]he date of the assault on the Gaza defences was not fixed until the results of the fighting at Beersheba were known'.[28] The Official History named the '[Attack on Gaza Defences] 1st–3rd Nov.', and described assaults on 1 November by the 3rd Gurkhas (233rd Brigade, 75th Division), 7th Scottish Rifles, a company of the 8th Scottish Rifles with two tanks, on 2 November by the Royal Scots (156th Brigade, 52nd Division) with the 161st, 162nd, and 163rd Brigades (54th Division) and four tanks, and on 3 November by the 4th Essex (161st Brigade), which 'had not reached all its objectives'.[29] Woodward acknowledged: 'To reduce casualties in a frontal assault against fortress Gaza, the high command planned a night attack on a narrow front'.

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[25]Falls and Becke, *Official History Vol. 2*, pp. 48–51, 55–60, 651.
[26]BNC *Report*, pp. 5, 7, 32. For times see *Mounted Service Manual for Mounted Troops of the Australian Commonwealth: Mounted Service Manual for Australian Light Horse and Mounted Infantry, & c.* (Sydney: F. Cunninghame & Co., 1902) p. 272.
[27]Erickson, *Ottoman Army Effectiveness*, p. 121; Hughes, *Allenby and British Strategy*, pp. 46, 56.
[28]BNC, *Report*, p. 32; Falls and Becke, *Official History Vol. 2*, p. 63.
[29]Falls and Becke, *Official History Vol. 2*, pp. 66–74, 651, 664–5.

Erickson confirmed fighting was launched against 'the first line of Turkish trenches', and that, '[t]he Turkish official history noted that Gaza never fell to a direct assault but was deliberately evacuated' (see Figures 3 and 5).[30] Despite these clear acknowledgements of the scale of fighting, this so-called 'battle' continues to warp understanding of the overall offensive (see below). In addition, the chronological limits assigned to this event by the Committee include four days of bombardment in contravention of their own decision that, 'the length of the preparatory action … should not be included', and four days of consolidation which were to be included, but according to the Official History was accomplished during pauses in fighting. Further, the geographic limits of 'North of the Wadi Ghuzze' take in the whole of the Levant but fail to identify 'the actual "battlefield"' as required by the guidelines. As described by the Official History, Woodward, and Erickson, this fighting between 1 and 3 November was quite separate from fighting for Beersheba, and fully conforms to the Committee's descriptive term of 'attack' used to identify 'unsuccessful offensive operations'.[31] Yet it is the name in the report that continues to echo through the historiography.

Fighting for Khuweilfe which began on 1 November was completely overlooked in the report. The Official History described the major conflict for the strategically important 'only metalled road running northwards … from Beersheba to Jerusalem through Hebron up the spine of the Judaean Hills' (Figure 5). The EEF's 53rd Division with the Imperial Camel Brigade attached, units of the Anzac Mounted Division, the 1st Light Car Patrol, and the 11th Light Armoured Motor Battery, attacked the Ottoman 12th Depot Regiment, the 3rd Cavalry Division, and from 2 November the 24th Division and the Beersheba Group's 27th Division, reinforced by the 19th Division on 3 November.[32] For A. J. Hill, 'an unexpected battle was developing around Khuweilfe', while Woodward assessed, '[t]he fighting around Khuweilfe ... was an important sideshow to the collapse of the entire Turkish front from Gaza to Beersheba'.[33] For the Official History: '[t]he fighting in the hills from the 1st to the 5th November had resulted tactically in a drawn battle', but, 'strategically the British … had established themselves in a position of vantage from which to roll up the enemy's flank', pulled in their reserves, and stopped them 'withdrawing a man or a gun from the hills to support the cracking front at Tell esh Sheria'.[34] By overlooking this strategically important

[30]Woodward, *Hell in the Holy Land*, p. 111; Erickson, *Ottoman Army Effectiveness*, pp. 123–4.

[31]BNC, *Report*, pp. 5, 7; Falls and Becke, *Official History Vol. 2*, pp. 70, 71, 73.

[32]Falls and Becke, *Official History Vol. 2*, pp. 19, 78–92.

[33]A. J. Hill, *Chauvel of the Light Horse: A Biography of General Sir Harry Chauvel, GCMG, KCB* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1978), p. 129; Woodward, *Hell in the Holy Land*, p. 120.

[34]Falls and Becke, *Official History Vol. 2*, pp. 91–2, 101–6.

conflict, the Committee obscured the shape of the offensive, the strength of the enemy's defences, and the fierceness of the continuing fighting in the region.

The Committee named the 'Capture of the Sheria Position' in the 'Tactical Incidents Included' subcolumn of 'Battles', as if it was part of fighting at Gaza. The Official History described a pitched battle beginning on 6 November, when the EEF's XX Corps launched flank assaults (made possible by the fighting for Khuweilfe pushing the enemy north towards Hebron) against the Ottoman XX Corps defending the eastern end of trenches impregnable from the south, guarding the Wadi and the Tell esh Sheria and Hureira (see Figure 3). Next day the 60th Division with units of Desert Mounted Corps fought for the Wadi esh Sheria, held by the Zuheilika Group and part of the 16th Division.[35] This conflict finally ruptured the old Gaza to Beersheba defensive line and compelled the Gaza garrison to retreat overnight 6/7 November. As described by the Official History it was no mere 'capture' but fully conforms to the Committee's criteria for battle; being fought by corps-sized forces and of primary importance.[36] When the Committee named this quite separate battle for Sheria, they disguised and diminished the scale and location of fighting, while bolstering Gaza as the main conflict. Erickson noted: 'on November 6 Allenby shifted his forces and attacked in the centre' and that, 'Falkenhayn ordered the Eighth and the Seventh Armies to conduct a fighting withdrawal to a new defensive line about ten kilometres to their rear'. The resulting fighting for the Wadi el Hesi during 7 and 8 November, described in the Official History, was also overlooked in the report.[37]

Following the EEF's capture of the Gaza to Beersheba line, Allenby was beginning to move north when he wrote on 8 November, '[t]he battle is in full swing. ... My army is all over the place, now; on a front of 35 miles'.[38] During the next days he reorganised his forces and prepared to launch a pitched battle on the maritime plain against Junction Station. The Official History described the first day's combat which was completely overlooked in the report:

> On the 12th November, a minor but still important operation ... [was launched] by the 52nd Division in preparation for the general advance upon Junction Station. It was to drive the enemy from his position north of the Nahr Suqreir between the villages of Burqa and Yazur ... the Yeomanry Mounted Division ... cover[ing] the infantry's left flank ... [t]he Australian Mounted Division ... on the right.[39]

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[35]BNC, *Report*, p. 32; Falls and Becke, *Official History Vol. 2*, pp. 93–101, 106–16, 651.
[36]BNC, *Report*, p. 7; Falls and Becke, *Official History Vol. 2*, p. 75.
[37]Erickson, *Ordered to Die*, p. 173; Falls and Becke, *Official History Vol. 2*, pp. 129–41.
[38]Allenby quoted in Hughes (ed), *Allenby Middle East Correspondence*, p. 80.
[39]Falls and Becke, *Official History Vol. 2*, pp. 148–9.

On the right, the Australian Mounted Division fought about 5,000 Ottoman soldiers from the 26th, 53rd, and 54th Divisions for Summeil, while the 52nd Division successfully assaulted the Ottoman 7th Division at Burqa and Brown Hill (see Figure 4 insert).[40] Field Marshall Lord Carver noted the '52nd Division had a successful but costly clash ... which opened the way for a direct advance towards Junction Station'. Wavell confirmed: 'The Australian Mounted Division ... were heavily counter-attacked by four divisions and driven back a little distance'.[41] As the Official History recognised, 'Sir Edmund Allenby had now effected his concentration in the plain. He was prepared to launch on the morrow the general attack which resulted in the capture of Junction Station'.[42]

For the Official History, 'The main attack of the 13th November was to be carried out by the XXI Corps, the right flank ... protected by the Australian Mounted Division, while the remainder of the Desert Mounted Corps [including the Anzac Mounted Division] operated on the left' of the infantry. The 52nd Division fought for Maghar, Qatra, Beshshit, Mansura and the railway and the 75th Division advanced up the Gaza to Junction Station road, both divisions opposed by the Ottoman XXII Corps' 3rd, and 7th Divisions and part of the Ottoman XX Corps' 26th, 53rd, and 54th Divisions.[43] E. G. Keogh and Joan Graham recognised the battle: 'The outstanding feature of the battle for Junction Station, is of course, the magnificent charge of the Yeomanry at El Mughar'.[44] They celebrated the Committee's official name; the 'Action of El Mughar 13th November *with subsequent* Occupation of Junction Station', as if fought by a division, and as if Junction Station was occupied without 'actual fighting of some importance', to obscure the battle. As described by the Official History, this was no 'action', nor passive 'occupation', but a 'capture' resulting from a fierce two-day pitched battle for the maritime plain which won the enemy's strategically important junction on the Jaffa to Jerusalem railway and extensive enemy territory on the plain (see Figures 3 and 4), and fully conformed to both of the Committee's criteria for battle; being between corps-sized forces and of primary importance.[45] Gaza was now miles in the rear, but because the report failed to recognise and name fighting between corps-sized forces, the historiography has misunderstood this battle, treating it as just

[40]Falls and Becke, *Official History Vol. 2*, pp. 149–154, Map 9 Insert.
[41]Field Marshall Lord Carver, *The National Army Museum Book of The Turkish Front 1914–1918: The Campaigns at Gallipoli, in Mesopotamia and in Palestine,* (London: Pan Macmillan, 2003), p. 219; Wavell, *Palestine campaigns*, p. 185.
[42]Falls and Becke, *Official History Vol. 2*, p. 154.
[43]Falls and Becke, *Official History Vol. 2*, pp. 158–74, 653.
[44]E. G. Keogh and Joan Graham, *Suez to Aleppo,* (Melbourne: Wilkie & Co., 1955), p. 188.
[45]BNC, *Report*, pp. 7, 32.

an 'action' by a division at El Mughar. The shape and scale of this major offensive, and the strength and determination of enemy fighting to stop the onslaught, have been written out by the Committee's failure to accurately identify and name these events.



Figure 4: 'Capture of Junction Station, 13th–14th November 1917' with insert 'The Turkish Counter-attack 12th November 1917', shows the two day battle on the maritime plain for Junction Station (Falls and Becke, *Official History*, Vol. 2, Map 9).

The Official History's descriptions of the Second Offensive conclude with fierce fighting on 14 November by the Auckland and Wellington Mounted Rifles Regiments of the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade (Anzac Mounted Division) against 'the bulk of the much-depleted 3rd Division' for Ayun Kara (shown as Rishon le Ziyon on Figure 4), which was completley overlooked by the Committee.[46] John Grainger noted, 'In the north the New Zealand Brigade ... met a determined resistance from the Turkish 3rd Division, by now no more than 1,500 strong. They fought the New Zealanders for most of the day'.[47] This victory by New Zealanders led to them to occupy Jaffa unopposed on 16 November while the Ottoman Eighth Army withdrew up the coast and the Seventh Army withdrew back in the Judean Hills towards Jerusalem. The Eighth Army was pursued by the 1st Light Horse Brigade which 'entered Ramle ... caught up a retreating Turkish column … and captured nearly three hundred prisoners ... [and] Lydda'.[48] The failure to identify this 'affair', further distorted the shape of the EEF's offensive, and understanding of the scale of fighting.



Figure 5: 'Palestine 1917, the Battle of Gaza and the Capture of Jerusalem' shows the EEF's front line during the stalemate, two forces moving up the coast, but overlooks fighting for Junction Station and the maritime plain (Map courtesy of the United States Military Academy Department of History).

[46]Falls and Becke, *Official History Vol. 2*, pp. 177–8.
[47]Grainger, *Battle for Palestine*, pp. 172–3.
[48]Falls and Becke, *Official History Vol. 2*, pp. 181–2, 184.

The Committee's failure to accurately name all the military operations involved in this second offensive has impacted the ability of military historians to meaningfully write this fighting into history. Anthony Bruce claimed these 'defensive movements [of the Seventh and Eighth Armies] marked the end of the ten-day pursuit (7–16 November) following the third Battle of Gaza'.[49] Hughes also claimed: 'Allenby's preparations … allowed the Turks during the third battle of Gaza to make an orderly retreat to new defensive positions just north of Jerusalem'.[50] These instances reflect the report; that the Gaza fighting denoted the whole of the Second Offensive. Further investigation, including into the 'Gaza School' of military historians who advocated against attacking Beersheba and for a strong third attack against Gaza discussed by Hughes and the Official History, may help explain why the report continues to dominate understanding of these operations more than 100 years later.[51]

Fighting for the Nahr el Auja

The report continued with the remaining conflicts of 1917; 'Jerusalem Operations (17th November–30th December)' in the 'Operations' column, the 'Battle of Nabi Samweil 17th–24th November', the 'Defence of Jerusalem 26th–30th December – *with subsidiary* Battle of Jaffa 21st–22nd December', in the 'Name' subcolumn of 'Battles', and the 'Capture of Jerusalem 7th–9th December' in the 'Actions, &c.' column (see Figure 2).[52] According to the Official History the campaign in the Judean Hills began with fighting for Abu Shushe and Amwas by the EEF's XXI Corps (later relieved by the XX Corps) against the Ottoman Seventh Army which developed towards Bire north of Jerusalem on the road to Nablus. In addition, the Official History also identified the 'Turkish Counter-Attacks in Defence of Jerusalem' between 27 November and 3 December which were repulsed, and the occupations of Hebron on 1 December and Bethlehem on 9 December, all of which were overlooked in the report.[53]

During this period, the Official History described an attempt to push the front line across the Nahr el Auja on the Mediterranean coast by the 161st Brigade (54th Division) and the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade (Anzac Mounted Division) on 24 November. They were forced to withdraw next day by parts of the Ottoman 3rd and 7th Divisions, leaving 45 prisoners from the '4/Essex'.[54] The Committee

[49]Bruce, *The Last Crusade*, p. 152.
[50]Hughes, *Allenby and British Strategy*, p. 46.
[51]Hughes, *Allenby and British Strategy*, p. 56; Falls and Becke, *Official History Vol. 2*, pp. 32–3.
[52]BNC, *Report*, p. 32.
[53]Falls and Becke, *Official History Vol. 2*, pp. 178–80, 184–212, 218n1, 218–36, 238–59, 652–3.
[54]Falls and Becke, *Official History Vol. 2*, pp. 213–17.

overlooked this fighting even though one of their temporary members had served in an Essex Regiment, and could have been involved or known about it.

Instead, the Committee chose to inflate the second crossing of the Nahr el Auja by naming it the '*subsidiary* Battle of Jaffa 21st–22nd December', which comprehensively mistakes the location, the scale and the importance of the conflict, and overlooked the fact that Jaffa was occupied by New Zealanders on 16 November.[55] Further, this second crossing could not have been 'subsidiary' as it began five days before the 'Defence of Jerusalem', and occurred well outside the geographic limits at the other end of the front line, at least 10 hours and 30 miles away (see Figure 5 for distances), in contravention of the Committee's own decision, 'that any [subsidiary actions] which took place outside the geographical limits ... for the main battle, should be considered on their merits as separate engagements'.[56] The Official History described an 'action' by a division and noted: 'The Passage of the Nahr el Auja by the 52nd Division is the main incident of this battle and that title might well have been given to it'.[57]

Wavell described the first passage 'to secure a bridgehead over the River Auja' and with Woodward talked about the second as the 'crossing of the River Auja', while Grainger made a strong case against 'battle' and primary importance: 'Yet there is something lacking in this "Battle of Jaffa", as it is rather pretentiously called. Highly competent though it was, the object was no more than minor and local, an adjustment of the line, not a serious attempt at conquest'.[58] As described in the Official History and by Grainger, this event does not conform with either of the Committee's two criteria for battle, but fully conforms with their definition of 'passage' which 'was only accomplished by actual fighting of some importance'.[59] Yet it is the so-called battle at Jaffa, which disguises and obscures the extent of the EEF's maritime plain offensive and fighting for Ayun Kara, that is focused on in the literature.

Jordan and Transjordan

The last page of the 'Egypt and Palestine' section of the report covering conflict in 1918 is dominated by a misleading list in the 'Actions, &c.' column. At first glance readers could have assumed not much happened during the year. The Committee named 'Operations in and beyond the Jordan Valley (19th February–4th May)', the 'Capture of Jericho 19th–21st February', the 'Passage of the Jordan 21st–23rd March', the 'First Action of Es Salt 24th–25th March', the 'First Attack on Amman 27th–30th

[55]BNC *Report*, p. 32.
[56]BNC *Report*, p. 6.
[57]Falls and Becke, *Official History Vol. 2*, pp. 265–75, 654–5n1.
[58]Wavell, *Palestine campaigns*, pp. 197, 205–6, Woodward, *Hell in the Holy Land*, p. 156; Grainger, *Battle for Palestine*, pp. 220–21.
[59]BNC, *Report*, p. 7.

March', the 'Turkish Attack on the Jordan Bridgeheads 11th April', and the 'Second Action of Es Salt 30th April–4th May' all in the 'Actions, &c.' column (see Figure 2).[60] In most cases these names and the scales of combat they indicate are misleading, disguising and/or diminishing events as they were described in the Official History.

Instead of a 'capture' of Jericho, the Official History described a battle by the EEF's 60th Division and the Anzac Mounted Division against the Ottoman 53rd Division 'and other troops armed with a total of 3,000 rifles' between 19 and 21 February. While the infantry fought their way across the wilderness to the edge of the escarpment, the mounted troops forced their way down into the Jordan Valley to capture Jericho (see Figure 6).[61] Hill noted 'the opening phase of the battle on 19 February' and Erickson stated 'Allenby attacked the town of Jericho. In a two-day battle, the British pushed the Seventh Army behind the Jordan River'.[62] This victory, as described by the Official History, fully conforms with the Committee's criteria for 'battle' being fought by a corps-sized force and of primary importance. Wavell confirmed; it 'effectually removed any threat to Jerusalem from the east' and led to the occupation of the southwest portion of the Jordan Valley which became an important base for Transjordan operations. Had the Committee recognised a battle of the wilderness in the 'Name' subcolumn of 'Battles', they could have added the capture of Jericho in the 'Tactical Incidents Included' subcolumn, and clearly identify the full extent of fighting.[63]

The next three seemingly separate minor events; the 'Passage of the Jordan 21st–23rd March', the 'First Action of Es Salt 24th–25th March', and the 'First Attack on Amman 27th–30th March' continued the report's list in the 'Actions, &c.' column.[64] Collectively these events are recognised in the Official History as the 'First Trans-Jordan Raid', by Major General J. S. M. Shea's Force consisting of the 60th Division, the Anzac Mounted Division and the Imperial Camel Brigade. They crossed the Jordan River on 22–23 March opposed by about 1,500 rifles between them and Amman. They then occupied Es Salt unopposed on 25 March while troops stretch from the Jordan Valley to defend their northern flank. The remainder of the Anzac Mounted Division with the Imperial Camel Brigade and reinforced by the 180th and 181st Brigades, continued on to launch three strong attacks against Amman (see Figure 6). By 27 March 'about 2,150 rifles, 70 machine guns, and 10 guns' protected the town, the Headquarters of the Ottoman Fourth Army arrived next day, and about 2,000 reinforcements before 30 March.[65] Allenby recorded: 'On the evening of the 30th, I ordered a withdrawal ... Prisoners,

[60] BNC, *Report*, p. 33.
[61] Falls and Becke, *Official History Vol. 2*, pp. 302–9, 655, Sketch 22.
[62] Hill, *Chauvel of the Light Horse*, p. 142; Erickson, *Ottoman Army Effectiveness*, p. 130.
[63] BNC, *Report*, p. 7; Wavell, *Palestine campaigns*, p. 215.
[64] BNC *Report*, p. 33.
[65] Falls and Becke, *Official History Vol. 2*, pp. 328–49, 654, Sketch 24.

to the number of 986, were brought back ... I had intended this raid to be a preliminary step to an advance on the W. of Jordan to the line Nablus–Tulkeram' (sites of the Seventh and Eighth Armies' Headquarters in the Judean Hills).[66] The Committee's recognition of three separate events contravened their own requirement, 'that battles fought under a single plan on a continuous front should not be broken up.' As described by the Official History and Allenby, this fighting fully conforms to both of the Committee's criteria for battle; being by corps-sized forces and of primary importance to future operations in the Transjordan and the Judean Hills.[67]



Figure 6: 'Theatre of Operations in Trans-Jordan', shows the valley of the Jordan River, Jericho, Shunnet Nimrin and Jisr ed Damieh, with Es Salt and Amman in the high country to the east, and the roads to Nablus and Jerusalem, (Falls and Becke, *Official History Vol. 2*, Sketch 24 pp. 326–7).

Fighting against enemy defences on Shunet Nimrin on 18 April by the Anzac Mounted Division was described in the Official History but overlooked by the Committee.

[66]Allenby's 5 May Report in Hughes, *Allenby Middle East Correspondence*, pp. 150–1.
[67]BNC *Report*, p. 7.

Instead they continued their dubious list in the 'Actions, &c.' column with the 'Second Action of Es Salt 30th April–4th May', recognised by the Official History as the 'Second Raid into Trans-Jordan', when the 60th Division, the Anzac Mounted Division and the Australian Mounted Division launched assaults on multiple fronts against the Ottoman Fourth Army. In the Jordan Valley the EEF attacked Shunet Nimrin again, and the Jisr ed Damieh, while in the hills they captured and defended Es Salt on three sides. The attackers were eventually compelled to withdraw to their Jordan bridgeheads by the Ottoman 3rd Cavalry Division, the Storm Battalion, and the 2nd, 32nd, 50th, and 58th Regiments.[68] As described by the Official History this fighting was no mere 'action' by a division, but fully conforms to the Committee's criteria for battle being by corps-sized forces and of primary importance to operations planned for September.[69] The report continued with '*–with subsidiary Arab Operations in the Mountains of Moab (March and April, 1918)*' in the 'Operations' column, without identifying any conflicts. According to the Official History these were extremely minor; 'two large bodies of friendly Arabs' had some slight involvement to the north and south of Amman in March, while promised 'help of the Beni Sakr' during fighting for Es Salt in April did not materialise.[70]

The Committee's identification of two major battles fought in the Transjordan as minor events in the 'Actions, &c.' column, obscured, disguised and diminished these operations while at the same time they promoted almost non-existent 'Arab Operations', to create a false understand of the operations and lasting confusion in the secondary sources. These fiercely fought and extremely difficult battles, by soldiers from Australia, New Zealand and India and British Yeomanry in a British Empire force, against equally diverse Ottoman Empire forces drawn from the regions, fought on Arabian and/or Bedouin lands deserve full recognition of the scale and location of the conflicts.

Instead of naming Judean Hills operations, the report identified 'Local Operations. 1918' in the 'Operations' column and 'Actions of Tel Asur 8th–12th March' in the misleading list of 'Actions, &c.'. The Official History described a battle fought by the EEF's XX and XXI Corps against the Seventh Army which captured a 'favourable' line in the Judean Hills including the Abu Tellul salient after pushing the enemy back five miles on a wide front which satisfies both of the Committee's criteria for 'battle'. Further fighting in the Judean Hills from 9 to 11 April was named and described by the Official History as the 'Action of Berukin' by the EEF's 54th and 75th Divisions against the Ottoman 16th and 46th Divisions, but completely overlooked by the Committee.[71]

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[68]BNC *Report*, p. 33; Falls and Becke, *Official History Vol. 2*, pp. 361–2, 367–89, 392–3.
[69]BNC *Report*, p. 7.
[70]BNC *Report*, p. 33; Falls and Becke, *Official History Vol. 2*, pp. 343, 364-5.
[71]BNC *Report*, p. 33; Falls and Becke, *Official History Vol. 2*, pp. 310–326, 350–7, 656–7.

The list in the 'Actions, &c.' column continued with the 'Affair of Abu Telul 14th July', accurately reflecting the Official History's description of this successful defence by the 1st Light Horse Brigade (Anzac Mounted Division), but the Committee overlooked another Ottoman attack the same day against the El Hinu crossing of the Jordan, which was also repulsed (see Figure 6).[72]

The Final Offensive (18th September–31st October, 1918)

The Committee identified 'The Battles of Megiddo 19th–25th September', '(i) Battle of Sharon' and '(ii) Battle of Nablus' all in the 'Name' subcolumn of 'Battles' with the same chronological limits (see Figure 2) making them the only conflicts not listed in the 'Actions, &c.' column on the page. The Official History described four divisions of the XXI Corps fighting the primary battle between 19 and 21 September and recorded, by 'the 21st September ... [t]he XXI Corps had thus completed one of the most overwhelmingly successful operations of the war ... The captures were about 12,000 prisoners, 149 guns'.[73] On their right, the Official History described the subsidiary battle by the XX Corps' two divisions, beginning 15 hours later. By 21 September they had occupied Balata and Nablus (Seventh Army Headquarters) and captured '6,851 prisoners, 140 guns'.[74] The Committee clearly identified this second battle by the name of the main place captured but failed to name the primary battle for its main objective, recognised by the Official History as Tul Karm and the Eighth Army Headquarters. Instead, they named it for the place of concentration on the Plain of Sharon, where one division of the XXI Corps strengthened by a creeping barrage broke the enemy's line. In doing so, they obscured and diminished the subsequent 'overwhelmingly successful' flank assaults by all four divisions of the XXI Corps into the Judean Hills, against Tul Karm, Tabsor, Et Tire, Jaljulye and Qalqilye, some of which could have been listed as 'Tactical Incidents Included'.[75]

The misleading list in the 'Actions, &c.' column continued with 'Actions beyond Jordan 23rd–30th September' and the 'Capture of Amman 25th September', disguising another battle described in the Official History. Between 20 and 25 September, Major General E. W. C. Chaytor's Force consisting of the Anzac Mounted Division, the 20th India Brigade, two battalions of the British West Indies Regiment, and two battalions of Royal Fusiliers defeated remnants of the Ottoman Seventh Army at Jisr ed Damieh and captured 786 prisoners with 6 guns, advanced east against units of the Ottoman Fourth Army to capture Es Salt with about 669 prisoners and 3 guns, and launched a successful assault against Amman, capturing 2,563 prisoners with 10 guns. A further 4,602 Fourth Army prisoners were captured south of Amman at Ziza, and another

[72]BNC *Report*, p. 33; Falls and Becke, *Official History Vol. 2*, pp. 429–38.
[73]BNC *Report*, p. 33; Falls and Becke, *Official History Vol. 2*, pp. 470–88, 504–10.
[74]Falls and Becke, *Official History Vol. 2*, pp. 471, 490–94, 496–503.
[75]Falls and Becke, *Official History Vol. 2*, pp. 468, 470–88, 504–10.

hundred with a gun to the north (see Figures 6 and 7).[76] The Committee's identification of this combat as two separate actions obscures a battle 'fought under a single plan on a continuous front' and assigned it the same general geographic limits as the two Meggido battles fought 15 to 40 miles away. In doing so, they again ignored their 'general principle' of including 'in a battle area only what might fairly be regarded as the actual 'battlefield' and added to the confusion in secondary sources.[77] This fighting as described in the Official History fulfils the two criteria for 'battle' being by a corps-sized force and of primary importance, as large areas of enemy territory and many prisoners were captured, and the right flank of the EEF in the Judean Hills and on the Esdraelon Plain was secured.

The Committee completely overlooked fighting for the Esdraelon Plain by Chauvel's Desert Mounted Corps' 4th and 5th Cavalry and the Australian Mounted Divisions to the north of the Judean Hills and west of the Jordan River between 20 to 25 September described in the Official History. After riding north along the Plain of Sharon and across the hills, they fought and captured enemy forces at the site of Armageddon/Megiddo, at Lejjun, at Nazareth (General Headquarters of Field Marshal Liman von Sanders), at Jenin with about 8,000 prisoners, at Haifa and Acre. They occupied Beisan, captured the Jordan crossings to complete the encirclement of what remained of two Ottoman armies in the Judean Hills, and on 25 September won Samakh and Tiberias to effectively end the battles of Megiddo.[78] This fighting as described in the Official History fully conforms with the Committee's two criteria for battle; being fought by corps-sized forces and of primary importance, as they stopped enemy escaping north or east from the Judean Hills, captured a wide region of Ottoman territory including a supply base and lines of communication and many prisoners, and opened the way for the pursuit to Damascus and advance to Aleppo.

Finally, the Committee conflated two simultaneous fighting pursuits with an advance, when they named '*–including The Pursuit through Syria (26th September–31st October)*' in the 'Operations' column, with the 'Capture of Dera'a 27th September' by 'Arab forces', the 'Capture of Damascus 1st October' and the 'Affair of Haritan 26th October', '*–with subsequent* Occupation of Aleppo 26th October' as a 'Miscellaneous Incident', to finally end the misleading list in the 'Actions, &c.' column and the page.[79] The Official History described two simultaneous Desert Mounted Corps pursuits to Damascus between 27 and 30 September; to the west of the Sea of Galilee and the Jordan, and to the east of the Jordan and west of the railway with Sherifial units; and the quite separate 190 mile advance from Damascus to Aleppo, conducted three

[76]BNC *Report*, p. 33; Falls and Becke, *Official History Vol. 2*, pp. 547–59, 673.
[77]BNC *Report*, pp. 5, 7.
[78]Falls and Becke, *Official History Vol. 2*, pp. 513–46.
[79]BNC *Report*, p. 33.

weeks later. Then 'the strongest column of light armoured motor batteries and light car patrols yet employed in the theatre' with the Jodhpore and Mysore Lancers of the 15th (Imperial Service) Cavalry Brigade and 1,500 Sherifial Army troops captured Aleppo and conducted the Affair of Haritan. The Australian Mounted Division rode out of Damascus on 27 October to reinforce Aleppo but were stopped south of Homs after the Ottoman Empire agreed an Armistice on 31 October.[80]



Figure 7: 'Palestine 1917, Battle of Megiddo, Disposition and Order of Battle 19 September and Situation 19 - 25 September 1918 with Pursuit to Damascus', shows Nablus but not Tul Karm, and overlooks the advance to Aleppo (Maps courtesy of the United States Military Academy Department of History).

Conclusion

What's in a name? It would seem, in many of the preceding instances, not that much. In their 'Egypt and Palestine' section the Committee failed to follow their own definitions and guidelines to clearly name conflicts based on scale, location, and chronology when they reduced a battle for the Suez Canal to actions, a battle for the

[80] Falls and Becke, *Official History Vol. 2*, pp. 567–90, 610–21, Sketches 35, 38, and 41.

wilderness to a capture, a battle for the maritime plain to an action, and an action at Magdhaba to an affair, inflated an attack at Gaza and a passage across the el Auja river to battles, failed to identify fighting for Gaza and Nablus as subsidiary, disguised battles for the maritime plain and the Judean Hills behind the obscure names of El Mughar and Nabi Samweil. They also created a misleading list of seemly minor events in the 'Actions, &c.' column and completely overlooked numerous large and small conflicts described in the Official History. The shape of offensives has been obscured and disguised by the names and geographic limits assigned by the Committee and major operations have been overlooked entirely while the scale of others has been diminished. Despite these failings the report continues to reverberate in the literature. Only the 'Affair of Qatia', 'Battle of Romani', 'Action of Rafah', 'First Battle of Gaza', 'Second Battle of Gaza', 'Affair of Huj', 'Defence of Jerusalem', 'Turkish Attack on the Jordan Bridgeheads', and the 'Affair of Haritan', reflect the Committee's definitions and guidelines.[81]

Further research is needed to prove or disprove systematic obfuscation and to establish if this section of the report is or is not indicative of other sections. If this section proves to be exceptional, then it may be useful to investigate the selection of the Committee membership by the Army's High Command, the extremely short terms of many of the 'permanent' members, and the lack of representatives from India or the cavalry. Study of the 'many accounts published unofficially' which the Committee claimed to have consulted may also be informative along with consideration of any influence of wartime propaganda on the many questionable applications of the Committee's definitions and guidelines. The reasons for the apparent concealment or diminution of successful operations, as described in the Official History, are not clear but are themselves of great interest. Finally, it may be pertinent to establish if Basil Liddell Hart's tart phrase the official histories may be 'official but not history', played a part in discrediting these campaigns.[82]

In any case, an unfortunate consequence of the Committee's work has been to obscure many of the achievements of those involved in the Sinai and the Levant during the First World War. Grey described the historiography, as 'partial and uneven in both quality and quantity, not least because it is rarely conceived of in holistic terms'.[83] To clarify the naming and relative scale of all the events of the fighting in Egypt and the

[81]BNC *Report*, pp. 31–33.

[82]Quoted in Rodney Lowe, "*Official history*" *Making History: The changing face of the profession in Britain* (University of London: The Institute of Historical Research, School of Advanced Study, 2008) https://archives.history.ac.uk/makinghistory/resources/articles/official_history.html. Accessed 16 November 2019.

[83]Grey, *War with the Ottoman Empire*, p. 191.

Levant during the First World War would be a major step toward providing the holistic treatment and substantial justice these campaigns deserve.

Perceptions and realities of the Mediterranean East: French soldiers and the Macedonian Campaign of the First World War

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ABSTRACT
The historiography investigating the fate of the 300,000 French and colonial soldiers who served in Macedonia during the First World War remains incomplete. This article offers an analysis focusing on the cultural discovery of the 'Mediterranean East' by the French soldiers who served in Macedonia. It utilises the literature produced by the French personnel to define the differences between their imagined representations of the East, and the reality they encountered once they landed in Salonica. It also highlights the Orientalist influence exerted over the minds of many Frenchmen who sailed to an East that remained profoundly unknown.

Introduction

On 14 November 1916, at 2 pm, during the joint-Franco-Serb offensive, which re-captured the Bulgarian-held city of Monastir, a 21-year-old sergeant of the 175 *Régiment d'Infanterie* (RI) named Jean Leymonnerie, fell severely wounded in no-man's-land between the Bulgarian and French lines.[1] Leymonnerie was hit in the knee by the

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[1]Until the First Balkan War, the Ottomans controlled Monastir (today Bitola) which was captured by the Serbian First Army on 19 November 1912. Richard C. Hall, *The Balkan Wars, 1912-1913. Prelude to the First World War* (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 48-52. During World War I, Bulgaro-German forces occupied Monastir on 5 December 1915. *Les armées françaises dans la Grande Guerre* (AFGG), tome 8, Vol. 1, appendix 909, telegram of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the East General Maurice Sarrail, Salonica, 11 December 1915 (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1927), p. 150. The Bulgarians occupied the city for less than a year, when it was reconquered by Franco-Serbian troops on 19 November 1916. Gérard Fassy, *Le commandement français en Orient: (octobre 1915 - novembre 1918)* (Paris: Economica, 2003), p. 99.

fragment of a Bulgarian 150 mm shell. Forgotten on the battlefield, he spent the next two days feverish, thirsty, and scared of dying far from his native Périgord. During the next two days, Bulgarian soldiers robbed Leymonnerie of his jacket, money, and his watch. Despite his rapidly deteriorating medical condition, the *Boulgres* did not finish him off and let him live to die another day.[2] It was only on 16 November 1916, at 10 am, that four *Tirailleurs sénégalais* of the 56 *Régiment d'infanterie coloniale* (RIC) finally rescued Leymonnerie. These African soldiers fighting for the *Mère Patrie* carried Leymonnerie on a blanket, across the mountainous terrain of the Kenali Salient, back to the safety of French lines. On 18 November, Leymonnerie endured an operation at the evacuation hospital of Excissou, which resulted in the amputation, below the knee, of his left leg. From Excissou, Leymonnerie was then transported to Salonica, where he had previously arrived from France on 3 October 1916. Aboard the hospital ship *Le Sphinx*, Leymonnerie sailed across the Aegean and Mediterranean seas, to arrive finally in Toulon on 12 December. A few days later, he was sent in convalescence to the American Hospital at Nice. For Leymonnerie, the First World War was over, and despite (as he humorously professed) 'leaving one leg in the Orient,' he lived a good life. He married, had four children, and peacefully passed away in 1963 at the age of 68.[3] Leymonnerie was one of the 4,266,000 French soldiers who were wounded in the First World War and whose bodies were maimed by the violence of that unprecedented conflict. He was also one of 300,000 French and Colonial soldiers of the First World War who served in the Balkans, 50,000 of whom never returned to France or its colonies. Their individual experiences in the Mediterranean East in general, and Macedonia in particular, constitute the focal point of this study.

Leymonnerie's service, in 1915 in the Dardanelles, then in 1916 in Macedonia, provides a useful vantage point of the militarised encounters that occurred during the First World War. Moreover, the encounters that took place during the Macedonian Campaign epitomised a continuation of the French soldiery's collective memory and negotiation of the Mediterranean world where they fought for the glory of the *Tricolore*.[4] From the Revolutionary Wars and Napoleon Bonaparte's Expedition to

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[2]French soldiers fighting in Macedonia referred to their Bulgarian foes as *Boulgres* or *Bulg*.

[3]Information for this paragraph stems from chapter 7 of the memoir of Jean Leymonnerie, *Journal d'un Poilu sur le Front d'Orient,* ed. Yves Pourcher (Paris: Flammarion, 2003), pp. 228-257.

[4]The historiography of the Macedonian Campaign starts with *Les armées françaises dans la Grande Guerre* (AFGG), 107 Vols., tome 8, (3 vols.) *La campagne d'Orient: Dardanelles et Salonique* (Paris: Imprimeries nationales, 1927-34); Also, the British Official History of the Great War in the Balkans: Cyril Falls, *Military operations. Macedonia*, 2 vols., (London: H.M.S.O., 1933-1935); As well, Alan Palmer, *The Gardeners of Salonika: The*

Egypt in 1798, to the First World War and the *Armée d'Orient* which (under the command of General Maurice Sarrail) faced the Central Powers in Macedonia, these French soldiers encountered distinctive cultures, landscapes, and people, which they invariably compared to what they knew at home in the *Métropole*.[5] The soldiers, who carried the arms of the French Third Republic in the Mediterranean, observed these "foreign" societies with the eyes of Frenchmen, who principally viewed themselves as 'the potent symbol of European civilization, and culture'.

Figure 1: Monastir during the First World War, (where Jean Leymonnerie was wounded during heavy fighting with the Bulgarians) – now Bitola in Macedonia.[6]

Macedonian Campaign 1915-1918 (London: André Deutsch, 1965); Also, Pierre Miquel, *Les Poilus d'Orient* (Paris: Fayard, 1998); Max Schiavon, *Le Front d'Orient. Du désastre des Dardanelles à la victoire finale 1915-1918* (Paris: Tallandier, 2014); Jean-Yves Le Naour (ed.), *Front d'Orient: 1914-1919, les soldats oubliés* (Marseille: Éditions Gaussen, 2016).

[5]General Maurice Sarrail was a divisive figure within the French Army high command, whose personality remained controversial during and after the war. See his memoirs, Maurice Sarrail, *Mon commandement en Orient (1916-1918)* (Paris: Flammarion, 1920). For a favorable biography, see Jan Karl Tanenbaum, *General Maurice Sarrail, 1856-1929: The French Army and Left-Wing Politics* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1974).

[6]http://www.histoire-passy-montblanc.fr/histoire-de-passy/de-la-prehistoire-au-xxie-s/la-guerre-de-1914-1918/les-soldats-de-passy-en-1917/les-passerands-de-larmee-dorient-en-1917/ . Accessed 10 September 2019.

Figure 2: Transportation of wounded French soldiers, (on this occasion the men were placed on a precarious horseback stretcher) Monastir, 19 November 1916.[7]

This article offers a continuation of the works recently produced by Justin Fantauzzo and John Horne. It will explicitly investigate the gap between soldiers' perceptions of the Mediterranean East and the realities they faced while fighting in Macedonia between 1915 and 1918.[8] This article will first describe the origins of the French colonial mindset and recall previous military encounters where this ethos was formed. It will then study the cultural and geographic environment where the *Armée d'Orient* was deployed and will utilise a cultural lens to describe Macedonia as a European borderland. Finally, it will focus on the descriptions (replete with Colonial and Orientalist influences) of Salonica and Macedonia produced by French military personnel. In so doing, it suggests that there were three primary trends of conveying French cultural superiority. First, these Frenchmen held wildly conflicting opinions about Salonica, which indicates that there was no uniform pre-war French discourse about the area. Second, soldiers conveyed a pervasive sentiment of disillusionment toward cities, particularly regarding the filth and poverty they noted. Third, some Frenchmen exhibited a confident colonial outlook toward a region in which they saw the potential to implement the *mission civilisatrice* of France. These themes have been

[7]http://www.histoire-passy-montblanc.fr/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/7-cpa_monastir-transport-blesses.jpg . Accessed 10 September 2019.

[8]Justin Fantauzzo, 'Rise Phoenix-Like: British Soldiers, Civilization and the First World War in Greek Macedonia, 1915–1918', in John Horne and Joseph Clarke, (eds.), *Militarized Cultural Encounters in the Long Nineteenth Century. Making War, Mapping Europe* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), pp. 125-147; John Horne, 'A 'Civilizing Work'?: The French Army in Macedonia, 1915–1918', in Horne and Clarke, (eds.), *Militarized Cultural Encounters,* pp. 319-349.

displayed in iconographic documents, soldiers' diaries, periodicals, and memoirs of French veterans of the Macedonian Campaign.

Origins of the French Colonial Mindset in Macedonia

French soldiers of the First World War who served in Macedonia followed in the footsteps of their Napoleonic War predecessors. Men like Antoine Bonnefons, Charles François, or Jean-Claude Vaxelaire, participated in the famous Expedition to Egypt (led by an ambitious General Bonaparte) and left multiple accounts of their "Eastern" journeys.[9] Of the Egyptian Expedition, it is noteworthy that during the Cairo revolt of 21 October 1798, French forces employed a high level of violence and repression against the insurgents who opposed them.[10] This systemic use of force was applied again during the conquest of Algeria in 1830, the 'pacification' of Morocco in the early 1900s, and finally during the Great Syrian Revolt between the two World Wars.[11]

Throughout the long nineteenth century, the French Army waged war abroad and contributed to a cultural renaissance of the French Empire. Between 1830 and 1911, successive French governments acquired new territories across the world, which in size, ran second only to the British Empire. To conquer and administer such an enormous empire, French military power reached as far as Algeria, West Africa,

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[9]For the experience of French soldiers during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, Fergus Robson, 'French Soldiers and the Revolutionary Origins of the Colonial Mind', in Horne and Clarke, (eds.), *Militarized Cultural Encounters,* pp. 25-47.

[10]Regarding the violence employed by the Republican armies both in France and abroad, see Fergus Robson, 'Insurgent Identities, Destructive Discourse and Militarized Massacre: French Armies on the Warpath Against Insurgents in the Vendée, Italy and Egypt', in Brian Hughes and Fergus Robson (eds.), *Unconventional Warfare from Antiquity to the Present Day* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), pp. 133-154.

[11]For the French 'takeover' of Morocco in the early 1900s, see William A. Hoisington Jr., *Lyautey and the French Conquest of Morocco* (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1995); Daniel Rivet, *Lyautey et l'institution du protectorat Français au Maroc, 1912 – 1925* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1996); About the French military, socio-political, and cultural efforts to control the new French Mandate of Syria, Michael Provence, *The Great Syrian Revolt and the Rise of Arab Nationalism* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2005); Daniel Neep, *Occupying Syria under the French Mandate: Insurgency, Space and State Formation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Idir Ouahes, *Syria and Lebanon Under the French Mandate. Cultural Imperialism and the Workings of Empire* (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2018).

Madagascar, and Indochina.[12] This onslaught of 'French Republican Imperialism' was marked by military conquests and forms of violence exerted against both regular and unconventional armed forces that attempted to resist French control; as well as against civilian populations. Algeria, from the early phase of the French conquest, (including the massacre of Dahra on 17 June 1845) to its bloody war of independence remained a primary example of French military violence perpetrated in colonial spaces.[13]

The First World War and its aftermath marked the zenith of French imperial aggrandisement.[14] Following the Paris Peace Treaty of 1919, France received Mandates in Africa and the Near East that were awarded by the newly established League of Nations. However, these new imperial domains (such as Lebanon and Syria) remained under French rule for a mere twenty-five years.[15] Like their precursors in previous centuries who had crossed the expanses of the Mediterranean and sailed to Egypt, Algeria, and Crimea, French soldiers of the First World War also served abroad and waged war in Africa, Italy, the Balkans, Southern Russia, and the Middle East. The global nature of the French war effort must be analysed within a distinct imperial dimension. Historians including but certainly not limited to Hew Strachan and John H. Morrow have demonstrated that the First World War was a global conflict that fitted within

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[12]For the *mission civilisatrice*, see Alice L. Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895-1930* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997).

[13]For the violence employed by French arms in the early conquest of Algeria, see William Gallois, 'Dahra and the History of Violence in Early Colonial Algeria', in Martin Thomas (ed.), *The French Colonial Mind*, Vol. 2, *Violence, Military Encounters and Colonialism* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2011), pp. 3-25; Chapter 3 of Bruce Vandervort, *Wars of Imperial Conquest* (London: Routledge, 1998); For the brutal end of French rule in Algeria, Martin Evans, *Algeria: France's Undeclared War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Martin S. Alexander, Martin Evans and John F. Keiger (eds.), *The Algerian War and the French Army, 1954-62: Experiences, Images, Testimonies* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).

[14]For French Imperialism in the First World War era, Christopher M. Andrew and Alexander Sydney Kanya-Forstner, *France Overseas: The Great War and the Climax of French Imperial Expansion* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1981).

[15]For the British and French mandates see, Andrew J. Crozier, 'The Establishment of the Mandates System 1919-25: Some Problems Created by the Paris Peace Conference', *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol.14, Iss.3 (1979), pp. 483-513; For the French acquisition of the German Colonies in Africa see, Brian Digre, 'French Colonial Expansion at the Paris Peace Conference: The Partition of Togo and Cameroon', *Proceedings of the Meeting of the French Colonial Historical Society*, 13/14 (1990), pp. 219-229; For the Mandates in the Middle East see, Nadine Méouchy and Peter Sluglett (eds.), *The British and French Mandates in Comparative Perspectives* (Leiden: Brill, 2004).

the context of imperialism.[16] In the *War to End All Wars*, the French Third Republic mobilized hundreds of thousands of men who came from both Metropolitan France and its vast empire.[17] This unprecedented mobilisation fitted in a conflict in which all belligerents fully committed to the war to achieve their expansionist objectives.[18] During the First World War, the French Army fought on multiple fronts. It dispatched large forces such as the *Corps Expéditionnaire d'Orient* (CEO), which in 1915 saw action in the Dardanelles alongside British and Dominion troops.[19] Before the French withdrawal from the Dardanelles (on 3-8 January 1916), the first troops of the 2nd *Division d'infanterie* (DI) of the CEO under the command of General Maurice Bailloud disembarked in Salonica on 5 October 1915.[20] Those French soldiers, just like their Allied counterparts and German opponents, found themselves fighting in a distant land, away from the decisive Western Front. Moreover, those Western European soldiers were quartered among populations that they did not understand, nor genuinely

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[16]Hew Strachan, 'The First World War as a Global War', *First World War Studies*, 1, 1 (2010), pp. 3–14; John H. Morrow Jr., *The Great War: An Imperial History* (London: Routledge, 2003).

[17]During World War I, the French Colonies produced an enormous effort to support the *Métropole*, see Marc Michel, *Les Africains et la Grande Guerre: l'appel à l'Afrique (1914-1918)* (Paris: Éditions Karthala, 2003); Mohamed Bekraoui, "Le Maroc et la Première Guerre mondiale: 1914-1920," PhD diss., (Université de Provence, 1987); Jacques Frémeaux, *Les colonies dans la Grande Guerre: combats et épreuves des peuples d'outre-mer* (Saint-Cloud: 14-18 Éditions, 2006); Kimloan Hill confirmed that 'Between 1915 and 1919, 48,922 Vietnamese soldiers and 48,254 Vietnamese workers were recruited to serve in France. Some recruits were sent to Africa, the Balkans and the Middle East, but the majority went to France'. Kimloan Hill, 'Sacrifices, Sex, Race: Vietnamese Experiences in the First World War', in Santanu Das (ed.), *Race, Empire and First World War Writing* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 53.

[18]For the effort provided by the French colonies, see Richard S. Fogarty, 'The French Empire', in Robert Gewarth and Erez Manela (eds.), *Empires at War, 1911-1923* (Oxford: University Press, 2014), pp. 109-129.

[19]About the French Expeditionary Corps in Gallipoli, George H. Cassar, *The French and the Dardanelles: A Study of Failure in the Conduct of War* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1971); John Horne, 'A Colonial Expedition? French Soldiers' Experience at the Dardanelles', *War & Society*, 38, 4 (2019), pp. 286-304.

[20]General Maurice Bailloud commanded the *Corps Expéditionnaire d'Orient* (CEO) in the Dardanelles between 1 July and 4 October 1915, when the first French troops landed in Salonica. He was then replaced by Sarrail who became the new commander-in-chief of the *Armée d'Orient*. Bailloud's military record is held at the *Château de Vincennes* by the *Service historique de la Défense* (SHD), SHD 9 Yd 336. For the arrival of the first French troops in Salonica, see Fassy, *Le commandement français en Orient*, p. 18; Horne, 'A Colonial Expedition,' p. 17.

appreciate, in a region, the Balkans, whose physical environment proved to be as harsh and unforgiving as the Western Front.



Figure 3 : General Maurice Sarrail looks at his soldiers walking through the streets of Salonica. Salonique, le général Sarrail regarde défiler ses Poilus. ©) Collection particulière.[21]

Macedonia as a European borderland

On 12 October 1915, when General Maurice Sarrail disembarked at Salonica with the 114 *Brigade d'infanterie* (BI), he quickly found himself in a precarious situation. Sarrail was the commander of an army that existed only on paper. His mission orders were vague, and merely instructed him to rescue the Serbian Army, which had been forced to retreat by the vast concentric offensive conducted by Austro-German and Bulgarian forces.[22] In his mission orders, Sarrail was tasked mainly with covering the Vardar railroad which ensured communications with Serbia, and 'to give a helping hand to the Serbs'.[23] However, he was forbidden from taking the offensive against Bulgaria or participating in the combat operations then underway in Northern Serbia. In an article published shortly after the war, Sarrail wrote that he arrived 'Without any information,

[21]Léna Korma, 'Se mobiliser pendant la Grande Guerre. Trois aspects de l'espionnage dans l'Armée d'Orient, 1915-1918', *14-18 Mission centenaire*, 23 June 2016 https://www.centenaire.org/fr/espace-scientifique/societe/se-mobiliser-pendant-la-grande-guerre-trois-aspects-de-lespionnage-dans. Accessed 20 April 2020.

[22]For the Central Powers joint offensive against Serbia see, Charles Fryer, *The Destruction of Serbia in 1915* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1997); and more recently, Richard L. DiNardo, *Invasion: The Conquest of Serbia, 1915* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2015).

[23]General Sarrail's mission orders can be found in the French Army archives, SHD 7N 2168, ordre de mission n° 5776 – 9/11, 3 October 1915.

without any official strategic direction, not knowing anything of the country, nothing of the people, nothing of the events that occurred since the beginning of the war'.[24]

If the commander-in-chief of the *Armées alliées d'Orient* was baffled by the lack of clarity of the orders he received from the *Grand Quartier Géneral* (GQG), one could forgive the lowest French private for not knowing much about Macedonia in general or Salonica in particular. The officially sanctioned designation of the *Armées alliées d'Orient* finds its origins in the name *Armée d'Orient* (Army of the East), which was given to the French Expeditionary Corps bound for the Balkans. As he accepted his command, Sarrail specifically insisted on this title. The reason can be traced back to two previous French Expeditionary Corps that fought in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. General Bonaparte created the first 'Army of the Orient' during the Egyptian Expedition of 1798-1799, the second 'Army of the Orient' represented the French forces sent to the Crimean War of 1853-1856.[25]

Lastly, and as stated by Justin Fantauzzo and Robert L. Nelson, 'the specter of orientalism' was always present in the minds of Allied servicemen, German soldiers, as well as Frenchmen.[26] This 'orientalist state of mind' penetrated the consciousness of the French military personnel, the Allied contingents, as well as their German foes fighting on the other side of the wire with their Bulgarian allies.[27] French soldiers who

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[24]Maurice Sarrail, 'La Grèce vénizeliste. Souvenirs vécus', *Revue de Paris*, 26, 6 (1919), p. 685.

[25]Fassy, *Le commandement français en Orient,* 7; About the French participation in the Crimean War, see Alain Gouttman, *La guerre de Crimée, 1853-1856. La première guerre moderne* (Paris: SPM, 1995); Orlando Figes, *The Crimean War: A History* (New York, NY: Metropolitan Books, 2010).

[26]Justin Fantauzzo and Robert L. Nelson, 'Expeditionary Forces in the Shatterzone: German, British and French Soldiers on the Macedonian Front, 1915–1918 in Alan Beyerchen and Emre Sencer (eds.), *Expeditionary Forces in the First World War* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 149-176 & p. 150.

[27]For the British memory of the First World War in the Balkans see, Alan Wakefield and Simon Moody, *Under the Devil's Eye: The British Military Experience in Macedonia, 1915-18* (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2011); for the Irish experience of the First World War in Southeast Europe, the 10 (Irish) Division was the only unit from Ireland to serve in Macedonia, the Dardanelles and the Middle East. Stephen Sandford, *Neither Unionist nor Nationalist: The 10th (Irish) Division in the Great War* (Sallins, Co. Kildare: Irish Academic Press, 2015); For the German soldier's experience in the Balkans see, the previously mentioned chapter by Fantauzzo and Nelson; also, Oliver Stein, ''Wer das nicht mitgemacht hat, glaubt es nicht.' Erfahrungen Deutscher Offiziere mit den Bulgarischen Vebündeten 1915-1918', in Jürgen Angelow (ed.), *Der Erste Weltkrieg auf*

set foot in Salonica, and Macedonia, characterised the region as 'on the fringes of Europe', a cultural and geographic space of which they possessed only minimal knowledge. Numerous British, Frenchmen, Germans, Irish, or Italians stationed in Albania, Greece, or Macedonia, widely accepted that 'the Balkans are the Ottoman legacy' in Continental Europe.[28] This connection to a declining empire made it a naturally inferior and impoverished section of the continent in their minds. As Maria Todorova argues, 'The Balkans are also a bridge between stages of growth, and this invokes labels such as semideveloped, semicolonial, semicivilized, semioriental'.[29] Moreover, the French representations of Macedonia and the Balkans fit within an even more significant cultural and geographic construct: Eastern Europe. In *Inventing Eastern Europe*, Larry Wolff contended that 'Eastern Europe' was indeed a recent creation of the intellectuals of the *siècle des lumières*. Wolff wrote:

> Voltaire's perspective on Europe from eighteenth-century Paris was altogether geographically different from that of Machiavelli in sixteenth-century Florence. It was Voltaire who led the way as the philosophes of the Enlightenment articulated and elaborated their own perspective on the continent, gazing from west to east, instead of from south to north. In doing so, they perpetrated a conceptual reorientation of Europe, which they bequeathed to us so that we now see Europe as they did.[30]

The Balkans were an integral part of this larger Eastern Europe, mainly within travellers' literature. Pre-war authors often depicted the region as possessing an aura of elemental barbarity and an inescapable 'Oriental' aspect. In 1908, in *Fighting the Turk in the Balkans*, which depicted the actions of Macedonian revolutionaries against Ottoman forces, American novelist Arthur D. Howden Smith wrote, 'The struggle of the Macedonian Bulgars, for liberty, was interesting, I think, because of its quaint setting, and its mingling of the barbaric colour of the East with the more sober tones of the West. Macedonia is the shadow of the Orient'.[31] Smith's lively prose might have contributed to improving the knowledge of an informed American readership, but in the early twentieth century, even for well-cultured British diplomats, serving in an

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dem Balkan. Perspektiven der Forschnung (Berlin: be.bra wissenschaft verlag, 2011), pp. 271-287.

[28]Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 12. For a detailed discussion of the foundations of a certain Western European conception of the Balkans, see Todorova's introduction.

[29]Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans,* p. 16.

[30]Larry Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), p. 5.

[31]Arthur D. Howden Smith, *Fighting the Turk in the Balkans. An American's Adventures with the Macedonian Revolutionists* (New York, NY: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1908), p. v.

embassy in southeast Europe (whether Belgrade or Sofia) seemed to be the purgatory of their careers. Mary Edith Durham, an experienced British anthropologist who toured Albania, Bulgaria, and Serbia, professed:

> A Balkan legation is to an Englishman a spot which he hopes soon to quit for a more congenial atmosphere in another part of Europe. As for a Consul, he often found it wiser not to learn the local language, lest a knowledge of it should cause him to be kept for a lengthy period in some intolerable hole.[32]



Figure 4: This picture illustrates the ethnic diversity of the Allied contingent in Salonica. The Macedonian Campaign, 1915-1918 -, 'Historical Group of Allied Comrades in Arms.'.[33]

[32]Mary Edith Durham, *The Serajevo Crime* (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1925), p. 10; About Miss Durham and her fascinating voyages in the Balkans, Marcus Tanner, *Albania's Mountain Queen: Edith Durham and the Balkans* (London: Tauris, 2014).
[33]© IWM (Q 67857). Imperial War Museum, London, UK.
https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205315079 . Accessed 10 September 2019.

Conflicting opinions of Salonica

During the First World War, Durham's opinion was echoed by analogous comments from French personnel that served in Macedonia. On 4 October 1916 in a letter addressed to his parents, Jean Leymonnerie acknowledged:

> Salonica is a rather curious city. We can see pretty much everything. The latest modern innovations mingle with the most primitive levels of civilization. The Turk runs alongside the Greek, the Annamite, the Negro or the European, and everybody seems to get on well. There are some cafés that have nothing to envy to the most comfortable ones that we have back home; but on the other hand, in the indigenous quarter, there are some shady bars where the population swarms, grows, and lives in disgusting filth.[34]

Like many of his compatriots, Leymonnerie was intrigued by the buoyant mix of cultures, races, religions, and languages that he witnessed, in a city which, for more than four centuries, belonged to the Ottoman Empire. Salonica possessed a cultural and racial diversity to which the French Army itself contributed a great deal with its diverse contingent of Colonial troops. In the last twenty years, historians have examined the multiple accounts left by the men who served in Macedonia and presented a more nuanced perspective of the sometimes-conflicting opinions that the *Poilus d'Orient* held toward the region where they served.[35]

It was only after the Balkan Wars, and the Treaty of Bucharest of August 1913, that Salonica was formally attached to Greece. When the first Allied troops disembarked, the city had not yet been completely 'Hellenised.' On 14 May 1913, in the aftermath of the Greek annexation, an Athenian officer, Hippocrates Papavasileiou, wrote to his wife the disgust that Salonica inspired in him: 'I am totally fed-up. I'd prefer a thousand times to be under canvas on some mountain than here in this gaudy city with all the tribes of Israel. I swear there is no less agreeable spot'.[36] On 19 May, he added, 'How can one like a city with this cosmopolitan society, nine-tenths of it [sic] Jews. It has

[34]Leymonnerie, *Journal d'un Poilu sur le Front d'Orient*, p. 185.

[35]For works focusing on the experience of the *Poilus d'Orient*, see Francine Roussane – Saint Ramond, 'L'armée d'Orient dans la Grande Guerre: Une mémoire occultée?', *Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains*,192 (1998), pp. 25-43; François Cochet, 'L'armée d'Orient, des expériences combattantes loin de Verdun', *Cahiers de la Méditerranée*, 81 (2010), pp. 91-103.

[36]Lyntia Tricha, *Hēmerologia kai grammata apo to metōpo: Valkanikoi polemoi, 1912-1913* (Athens: Hetaireia Hellēnikou Logotechnikou kai Historikou Archeiou, 1993), pp. 307-310, quoted in Mark Mazower, *Salonica, City of Ghosts: Christians, Muslims and Jews, 1430-1950* (London: HarperCollins, 2004), p. 277.

nothing Greek about it, nor European. It has nothing at all'.[37] Papavasileiou's tirade confirms not only his anti-semitism, but the fact that at the turn of the century, Salonica was largely a Jewish city. After their departure from Spain and Portugal in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, the Sephardic community had profoundly transformed Salonica and made it one of the largest centres of Jewish life in Europe. Mark Mazower explains that 'In the experience of the Sephardi, we see the astonishing capacity of refugees to make an unfamiliar city theirs. Through religious devotion and study, they turned Salonica into a 'new Jerusalem'.[38]

If Salonica's evident lack of Hellenic identity discomforted a Greek officer, it is not surprising that between 1915 and 1918, many French troops shared comparable xenophobic views, especially as following *l'affaire Dreyfus,* antisemitism in France was rampant. Papavasileiou's reaction highlights the ethnic make-up of the city after the Balkan Wars: 38% of Salonica's population was Jewish. Mazower states that 'That in the 1913 census, the overall population came to 157,889, of whom just under 40,000 were listed as Greeks, 45,867 as "Ottomans," in other words Muslims, and 61,439 as Jews'.[39] By comparison, in 1928, after the wholesale destruction caused by the Great Fire of 1917, a massive exchange of populations forced by the Greek-Turkish War of 1919-1922, and a vigorous campaign of Hellenization, the Greek community, then amounted to 75% of the 236,000 inhabitants of Salonica.[40]The French personnel in Salonica encountered a city that not only possessed a large Jewish population but also symbolised their Orientalist vision of the East.[41] Moreover, by the late nineteenth century, the French servicemen's cultural perception of the East had been shaped by the prominent stereotypes of Orientalist painters, as well as by the writings of Pierre Loti. These artistic and literary works generated lasting orientalist imagery of the Mediterranean world.[42]

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[37]Tricha, *Hēmerologia kai grammata apo to metōpo,* pp. 307-310.
[38]Mazower, *Salonica, City of Ghosts*, p. 50.
[39]Ibid., p. 285.
[40]Ibid., p. 310; For the Great Fire of August 1917, see Alexandra Yerolympos, 'L'incendie de Salonique en août 1917. Fait divers ou "dégât collatéral?', in Yannis Mourelos (ed.), *The Salonica Theatre of Operations and the Outcome of the Great War* (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 2005), pp. 251-260; Kiki Kafkoula and Alexandra Yerolympos, 'Influences françaises dans la formation de l'urbanisme moderne en Grèce, 1914-1923', in Yannis Mourelos (ed.), *La France et la Grèce dans la Grande Guerre* (Thessaloniki: University of Thessaloniki, 1992), pp. 207-227.
[41]Regarding Orientalism, Said's work remains an inescapable reference, Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1978).
[42]Among the artists who forged an orientalist vista: Horace Vernet, *The Arab Tale-Teller* (1833); Jean-Auguste-Dominique Ingres, *L'Odalisque à l'esclave* (1839), *Le Bain Turc* (1862); Eugène Delacroix, *Femmes d'Alger dans leur appartement* (1833); Edouard

The following French soldiers' depictions reflected comparable tropes of discovering the Mediterranean East for the first time. Generally, the initial impressions of arriving in the Salonica Bay were positive, and many Frenchmen were impressed. On 5 October 1915, Ernest-Albert Stocanne who was a Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) with the 17th *Régiment d'artillerie de campagne* (RAC) wrote,

> At sunrise on 5 October 1915, we are arriving within sight of Salonica. The city grows the closest we come…The city is there spreading like an amphitheatre alongside the bay, and under the sun shows us its buildings with soft and varied colours, partially hidden by the greenery of the trees. Numerous white minarets are emerging. We remark a white tower on the quay, and in the old town, toward the hill, we notice the ramparts.[43]

An Engineer of the 1st *Régiment du génie* (RG) Gaston-Louis Giguel also remarked:

> What a luxury! How many pleasures one can get in this town! *La Canebière* is eclipsed! Here are only cafés, ice-cream parlors popping from everywhere, and which are crowded by officers of all nations, of very chic women, of Navy officers, dressed all in white, of aviators, and automobile drivers in very elegant garb. A promenade on the quays leads to the *Tour Blanche* which is the most exquisite rendezvous place of all Salonicians, of Greeks, Turks, and Israelites. All of them are competing in eleganceIn this city, one can get any type of pleasures, all the luxury of the Orient.[44]

Not all soldiers were as excited. Captain Constantin-Weyer, who first discovered Salonica on a rainy day, declared, "The minarets looked disorientated under the drizzle."[45] For the soldiers walking across the city to reach the Allied Camp of Zeitenlick, the march was an opportunity to observe Salonica more closely. Many of

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Debat-Ponsan, *Le Massage. Scène de hammam* (1883); Jean-Léon Gérôme, *Le Marché d'esclaves* (1866); For the writings that reinforced orientalism, see Pierre Loti, *Aziyade* ́ (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1877).

[43]Born in 1894 in Gentilly, Stocanne received the *Croix de Guerre* and the *Légion d'Honneur*, he fought in the Dardanelles and Macedonia. He was the last *Poilu d'Orient* and died in 1999, at the age of 105 years. Ernest-Albert Stocanne, *Souvenirs de guerre et de vie militaire*, in Association Nationale pour le Souvenir des Dardanelles et Fronts d'Orient, *Dardanelles, Orient, Levant, 1915-1921. Ce que les combattants ont écrit* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2005), p. 91.

[44]Gaston-Louis Giguel, *Dardanelles, Orient, Levant, 1915-1921*, p. 128.

[45]Maurice Constantin-Weyer, *P.C. de compagnie* (Paris: Les Éditions Rieder, 1930), pp. 38-39.

these witnesses distinguished two sides. One side appeared, 'As a European city, with its high buildings, its streetcar lines, with the cluttering of the street where we can find the military element outside … A population, most of it, dressed in a European fashion'.[46] However, the other side was truly the 'Oriental half', that displeased the soldiers:

> What a bewilderment when we touched the ground! The quays swarm with peoples of many races; all the languages can be heard. Opulence mixes with sordidness...We are crossing the neighborhood of refugees hosted in small Greek barracks. This is an appalling picture. In these filthy interiors, families are sleeping, higgledy-piggledy on these mean pallets. We can only see some sick faces ravaged by jaundice and smallpox. They are covered with disgusting rags and stay all day under the sun.[47]

For many French officers, the "Orient" that they enjoyed the most was the one which offered entirely Europeanised social and economic standards, comparable to those they knew in France. In many accounts, French soldiers voiced a recurrent feeling about Salonica, their disgust toward the squalid conditions of many neighbourhoods of the city, conditions which fell far below the French public hygiene standards to which they were accustomed. Altogether, these comments reveal the wide gap existing between their perceptions of what the "East" ought to be, and the realities that they uncovered once in Macedonia.

A Sentiment of Delusion

Numerous French witnesses who recorded their impressions about Salonica were often urban dwellers who unmistakably took for reference the French cities they knew as their model of Western urbanism. They then compared Salonica to these French cities, and unsurprisingly, their descriptions of Salonica were mostly condescending. According to Pol Roussel, a seasoned veteran told him that 'Salonica is a leprous agglomeration of hovels and tight cabins close to a putrid gulf, an unhealthy ghetto; in sum, a cesspit bathed in light'.[48] Another soldier, Pierre Beau endorsed this sentiment when he acknowledged:

> This city makes much more of an impression from the bay than from up close. When I saw it from the *Colbert*, it charmed me with its aspect of a wholly

[46]Alcide Ramette, *Au secours de la Serbie. Le retour d'un blessé* (Paris: Plon, 1917), p. 54.
[47]Omer Potard, *Dardanelles, Orient, Levant, 1915-1921,* pp. 111-112.
[48]Pol Roussel, *Impressions d'Orient au temps de la Grande Guerre : Salonique au temps de la campagne d'Orient* (Paris : Chiron, 1925), p. 92, quoted in Francine Saint-Ramond, *Les désorientés. Expériences des soldats français aux Dardanelles et en Macédoine, 1915-1918* (Paris: Presses de l'Inalco, 2019), p. 159.

> Oriental city. But when one penetrates in the interior of the city, all you can see is some dirty alleys which open on the souks of many Jewish merchants, or onto some other neighbourhoods with the miserable and abject houses of the Turks or the Czechs.[49]

The descriptions of Salonica were usually disdainful, but notably, French officers targeted the Turkish district. Captain Ferdinand Deygas saw it as the expression of a genuinely backward world. He declared, 'Everywhere, we find the trace of Islam, laziness, carelessness, indifference, filth. The Turk enslaved, befooled all the races that his courage and his bravery had bent under his yoke'.[50] René Dufour de La Thuillerie, a high-ranking naval officer, reinforced Deygas' disdain for the Turk when he too commented that 'Salonica, an ancient city, very Oriental by its colorful aspect as well as by its decay, is a permanent demonstration of the incurable and unbelievable laziness and the indifference of the Turk.'[51] The fact that the Ottoman Empire was a French foe might explain the stinging nature of some of the latter observations. Nevertheless, these statements further demonstrate a persistent and narrow-minded view of non-Western European populations. Many of the French personnel who previously served in North Africa would have been already acquainted with Islamic culture, even more so as large numbers of French colonial forces were also of Muslim confession. Overall, considering this French colonial mindset, the harsh criticism directed against the Turk does not seem surprising, nor unexpected.

As French soldiers marched from the harbour to Zeitenlick, they passed through the outlying districts of the city, and again their descriptions were unforgiving for the degraded conditions of Salonica's urban environment. Jean-José Frappa, declared, 'People are dirty, rubbish is all over the sidewalk, sickening smells go up in flushes from the primitive sewers'.[52] Georges de Lacoste said, 'The streets badly cobbled are dirty, full of peelings and household refuse. The houses of the inner suburbs that we pass by are some pathetic shacks without solidity, without regularity, without

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[49]Pierre Beau, 'Journal du soldat Pierre Beau, 175e, 176e puis 287e Régiment d'infanterie (10 octobre 1916 - 11 novembre 1918)', http://www.chtimiste.com/carnets/beau.htm. Accessed 16 October 2019.

[50]Ferdinand Deygas, *L'Armée d'Orient dans la guerre mondiale (1915-1919). (Dardanelles, Grèce, Macédoine, Albanie, Serbie, Bulgarie, Constantinople, Danube, Hongrie, Roumanie, Russie)* (Paris: Payot, 1932), p. 179.

[51]René Dufour de La Thuillerie, *De Salonique à Constantinople. Souvenirs de la Division navale d'Orient, 1916-1919* (Paris: J. de Gigord, 1921), p. 5.

[52]Jean-José Frappa, *Makédonia souvenirs d'un officier de liaison en Orient* (Paris, Flammarion, 1921), p. 38.

symmetry...Foodstuffs exposed in the air must collect lots of microbes.'[53] Many French soldiers noticed the hopeless poverty of the city, especially when groups of children in rags rushed to Zeitenlick, imploring them for food, selling cigarettes, matches, or newspapers. These bands of children also roamed the city streets begging for money, shining shoes, or directing Allied soldiers to the countless brothels of the shady Vardar district. Marcel Brochard complained angrily, 'The *loustro* assails you with his yelling, takes hold of your big shoes, manages to make them shine, wriggling like a little grimacing monkey. After being paid, he cynically indicates the house of his sister'.[54] Brochard's statement corroborates the misery that prevailed in the popular neighbourhoods of Salonica, where before World War I, thousands of refugees had fled the violence of the Balkan Wars.

Another feature of Salonica which several Frenchmen grumbled about were the countless peddlers who came prowling the quays and harassed them continually to buy their knick-knacks. The French military ordinarily did not hold in high esteem such *mercantis*, often mentioning their greed and filth.[55] For Captain of the Zouaves Riciotto Canudo, 'The teeming of these grasshoppers is intolerable'.[56] Military chaplain Henri du P, wrote, 'There are some *mercantis* of race and uncertain origins, Greeks, Maltese, Spaniards, Italians, who all join in the universal exploitation of the foreigner'.[57]

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[53]Georges de Lacoste, *Scènes et images de la campagne d'Orient* (Paris: Payot, 1923), p. 34.

[54]Marcel Brochard, *Quatorze, dix-huit* (Nantes: L'Amicale des anciens combattants du 157e Régiment d'infanterie alpine, 1953), p. 105. The 'loustro' was the shifty Salonica's street youth who shined shoes for a few coins.

[55]Ramette, *Au secours de la Serbie,* pp. 52-53; Henri Libermann, *Face aux Bulgares. La campagne française en Macédoine serbe. Récits vécus d'un officier de Chasseurs à pied, octobre 1915-janvier 1916* (Paris: Librairie Militaire Berger-Levrault, 1917), p. 51.

[56]Ricciotto Canudo, *Combats d'Orient. Dardanelles-Salonique (1915-1916)* (Paris: Hachette, 1917), p. 77. Riciotto Canudo, was an Italian novelist, born in Bari, who lived in Paris at the beginning of the war. Canudo was also a close friend of Blaise Cendrars. The two of them, like the American poet Alan Seeger with 'almost eighty-eight thousand foreigners' volunteered to fight for France, a country they viewed as their second motherland. Nicolas Beaupré, 'Construction and Deconstruction of the Idea of French 'War Enthusiasm' in 1914', in Lothar Kettenacker and Torsten Riotte (eds.), *The Legacies of Two World Wars: European Societies in the Twentieth Century* (New York, NY: Berghahn Books, 2011), p. 49. Biographical details consulted on 'Notice de personne, Canudo, Ricciotto (1877-1923)', *Catalogue général de la Bibliothèque Nationale de France* (BNF), 24 May 2017 https://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb12778191f . Accessed 14 October 2019.

[57]Henri du P, 'Lettres d'Orient, octobre 1915 – mai 1916', in Léonce de Grandmaison, (ed.), *Impressions de guerre de prêtres soldats*, vol. 2 (Paris: Plon, 1917), p. 373.

Many French soldiers were infuriated by the Oriental custom of bargaining for everything, Sergeant Julien Arène raged, 'The fixed-price is unknown here. The French spirit becomes exasperated by this haggling, and I know more than one *Poilu*, who in one vengeful kick threw the whole stall of the *mercanti* in the air'.[58] These hostile remarks expressed the evident sense of superiority that the French felt towards the locals; they also reinforced the belief that the Frenchmen saw themselves as representing the pinnacle of a civilized Europe.

A Definite Colonial Outlook

The cosmopolitan nature of Salonica is a characteristic that marked the memories of the French contingent stationed there during the First World War. For Major Bernard de Ligonnès, Salonica was a multicultural hodgepodge, he recognized that 'You can meet all the races, except the ones from the Central Powers; you can hear all languages.'[59] Frédéric Rousseau argued, 'For different witnesses, we can note the extreme variation in the use of the word race; sometimes equivalent to people, or nation, sometimes a racial epithet in all its contemporary racist dimension'.[60] The commonly used word 'race' among the French contingent undeniably betrayed the imperial dimension of the Macedonian Campaign. Several soldiers and officers who served in the Balkans came from the colonial forces posted in North Africa or Asia. Before World War I, many of the French officers who had previously served abroad were familiar with the indigenous peoples of the Maghreb or West Africa. As such, they applied in Macedonia what I call a 'definite colonial outlook' to the local population that they regarded more as Easterners than Europeans. This outlook was primarily based on an ethnocentric sense of superiority, and on the premise that French civilization, culture, and language needed to be exported for the apparent benefit of backward societies such as the ones the French Army encountered in the Balkans.

Through many accounts written by the French personnel posted in Salonica, this 'definite colonial outlook' emerges. When they faced the Macedonian population, many French officers employed a vocabulary, surprisingly like the one adopted by their counterparts in Algeria, Indochina, Morocco, or Senegal. For numerous Frenchmen, this colonial vision had been immortalised in prevalent displays of imperial power such as the colonial exhibitions of Lyon in 1894, Marseille in 1906, and the Paris universal

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[58]Julien Arène, *En Macédoine, Carnet de route d'un sergent de l'Armée d'Orient* (Paris: George Crès, 1916), p. 44.

[59]Yves Pourcher, (ed.), *Un commandant bleu horizon : souvenirs de guerre de Bernard de Ligonnès, 1914-1917*, (Paris: Editions de Paris, 1998), p. 114.

[60]Frédéric Rousseau, 'Entre découverte de l'altérité et définition de soi. L'"Orient méditerranéen" de soldats français de la Grande Guerre (1915-1918)', *Cahiers de la Méditerranée* 81 (2010), p. 111.

exhibition of 1900. These various exhibits presented the unstoppable march of an empire which spread French culture and civilization to the four corners of the world. Predictably, French officers' writings of Macedonia, reveal their undeniable sense of dominance toward the local populace. Lieutenant Ramette reported that one of his subalterns believed that service in Macedonia was the perfect preparation for the young Frenchmen who, after the war, would follow their colonial destinies and embrace a bright future overseas. He asserted:

> It is probable that those who had lived these war years, who had made the trip to Serbia or Gallipoli will be less frightened at the idea of faraway colonization. I hope that after the war, the French will decide to leave their homes. The greatness of a country is abroad. The English and the Germans have shown it to us enough.[61]

The writings published in the *Revue Franco-Macédonienne* reinforced these allusions to colonisation.[62] In 1917, the issues of the previous year were collected and published as a monograph. In its preface written on 18 December 1916, Edouard Herriot, Senator-Mayor of Lyon, expressed his opinion concerning the future of Macedonia. For him, the goal in the Balkans was to prolong the enterprise of French colonisation. He cited the names of Faidherbe, Galliéni, and Lyautey, the illustrious officers who had contributed to the renaissance of the French Empire in the nineteenth century. Herriot had a clear-cut understanding of what France could and should undertake in Macedonia. He declared, 'This war is a war of merchants. It carries in it all the economic future of the world. Unless we consent in advance to an irremediable imbalance, we cannot renounce to a policy of commercial penetration and influence whose center is in Salonica, not anywhere else.'[63] In the *Revue Franco-Macédonienne,* another article sang to the same tune. Captain Destrée opined:

> The small farm holder of Algeria, Tunisia or Morocco, his comrade the small businessman or the young industrialist, who are for the moment dressed in Zouave's large pants and its colorful *chechia*, feel that they could very well after the war, have as happy a life here [in Macedonia] than the one they had over there [in French-dominated North Africa]. They have already appreciated all that they could draw from these unused lands, without causing any harm to the native people…And already many of our *Poilus* of Africa promised themselves

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[61]Ramette, *Au secours de la Serbie*, p. 55.

[62]The *Revue Franco-Macédonienne* published twelve volumes between April 1916 and December 1917. After December 1917, the *Revue* changed its name to the *Cahiers d'Orient* and published four additional volumes between July and October 1918.

[63]Edouard Herriot, Preface to *La France en Macédoine* (Paris: Georges Crès, 1917), pp. ix-x.

> to come back and erect their tents…even after the signature of peace. This French colony will be born from the war and will spread in all the East.[64]

The colonial spirit on display in the declarations of Herriot and Destrée confirms the leitmotiv that during World War I in the Balkans, many Frenchmen looked at Macedonia as a strategic outlet where French cultural power and commercial influence could be implemented durably. They imagined that Macedonia could be transformed into a new French colony like Algeria.

Figure 5: Vietnamese French Colonial troops occupying Koritza early 1917 (today Korçë in Albania). Occupation de la ville de Koritza (24 -27 janvier 1917). Indochinois dans une rue de Koritza.[65]

[64]Capitaine D., 'Les troupes d'Afrique en Orient', *Revue Franco-Macédonienne*, I (1916), pp. 39-40.
[65]© Médiathèque de l'Architecture et du Patrimoine. Ministère de la Culture, Charenton-le-Pont, France.

Figure 6: African French Colonial troops in Albania, early 1917. On the road from Sarandë to Korçë (today in Albania). Sur la route de Santi Quaranta à Koritza, entre Liaskovik et Izvor (7-8 février 1917).[66]

Conclusion

For the French troops posted to the Balkans, the experience of the Macedonian Campaign was strikingly similar to 'colonial' experiences in other sections of the French Empire. This sizeable French military deployment to Southeast Europe facilitated an encounter with the various populations from Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia, and Serbia. This encounter was a crucial moment of mutual discovery. It was marked by an unmistakably colonial and racialised view of the populations they met. The French military personnel of Macedonia, fighting in this faraway corner of the continent, was haunted by a sentiment of abandonment caused both by the distance to France, and the lack of interest of French public opinion. Furthermore, the men who served in the Balkans left far fewer accounts than their counterparts of the Western Front. Frédéric Rousseau stated that within Jean Norton Cru's remarkable book, *Témoins*, the number of testimonies produced by soldiers and officers who served in Macedonia, barely surpasses two percent of the entire corpus.[67] This fact further contributed to the lack of remembrance of the men who underwent long years of war in the Macedonian mountains, where they endured frigid winters and sizzling summers. The scornful opinion that the French public held about them further

[66]Ibid.

[67]Rousseau, 'Entre découverte de l'altérité et définition de soi', pp. 105-106.

compounded their physical misery, homesickness, and resentment. French domestic opinion erroneously viewed the men sent to Salonica as merely *planqués* (holed-up) or *embusqués* (shirkers).[68] Finally, the bitterness of the French servicemen who fought in the Balkans was aggravated by the ever-lasting moniker of Clemenceau, who ridiculed them as 'The gardeners of Salonica.' In toto, many French servicemen held unrealistic perceptions of the East; however, during the Macedonian Campaign, their opinions were replaced by the exacting reality that they encountered. The reality of war that the *Poilus d'Orient* painfully discovered in the Macedonian mountains was undoubtedly different to the Western Front. Still, just like the Tommy or Feldgrau, who also served in this remote area of Southeast Europe, it was equally as painful and traumatic.

[68]About the so-called *planqués*, see Francine Saint-Ramond Roussanne, "Les planqués du Front d'Orient," in *The Salonica Theatre of Operations and the Outcome of the Great War*, pp. 185-194.

Repetition *versus* Revision: Narratives in the BBC's Great War Centenary

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Abstract

The BBC's[1] plans for the First World War Centenary were of significant magnitude. Through 2,500 hours of programming, it sought to broaden knowledge of the conflict across its various media. Yet this objective was occasionally diminished by the resounding presence of popularised tropes about the war. With consideration of two key anniversaries and flagship programmes, this article reflects upon the balance between familiar ideas and new developments, the disconnect between television programming and developing historiography and the use of modern techniques in conveying a new narrative.

Introduction

'History repeats itself' is a commonly expressed idiom. Less publicly considered is the extent to which we repeat history, and the impact this repetition has on our understanding of history itself. Public understanding and representation of history - more succinctly interpreted as a 'cultural memory' of the past — has received increased academic attention in recent decades. For the Great War, cultural memory has been expressed through various means, including remembrance rituals, memorials, and television programmes. The 2014-2018 centenary was a key anniversary in the cultural memory of the conflict. Anniversaries are the milestones of memory. Aside from their status as fixed moments for remembrance, their purpose as milestones works in two ways: the public experience anniversaries as markers of the increasing temporal distance of an event, and academics use them to explore how cultural memory has (or has not) evolved over time. Paradoxically, anniversaries also transform historical events into current events, with media playing a key role in this by emphasising the importance of remembrance.[2] Outside of these major milestones,

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DOI: 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v7i1.1471
[1]The British Broadcasting Corporation – hereinafter BBC.
[2]Tobias Ebbrecht, 'History, Public Memory and Media Event: Codes and Conventions of Historical Event-Television in Germany', *Media History*, 13, 2 (2007), p. 223; T.G.

Remembrance Day has been the backbone of remembrance, and a focal point for the British Broadcasting Corporation's (BBC) commemorative practices for over 90 years. Yet cultural memory is not fixed; it has been remoulded over time to suit the mood and atmosphere at the time. The BBC's plans for the centenary were a blend of familiarity and convergence with the reshaping of the commemorative landscape in the 21 Century. Particular consideration of two key anniversaries within the centenary — the Somme and the Armistice — highlights that while the BBC intended to improve public knowledge of the Great War, the overall narrative struggled to reach beyond the tones of the 1960s, in particular with references to futility, statistics and the use of familiar imagery. Repetition is a fundamental feature of television, as the reuse of images and terminology creates a recognisable continuity for the viewer. This article explores the evident clash between the BBC's longstanding grand narrative of a futile war, and the implementation of programming reflective of its objective to improve public knowledge about the conflict. The media sources will primarily focus on programmes broadcast for the Somme and the Armistice, as these were focal points in commemoration for both the BBC and the government. While a range of commemorative programmes were broadcast on other channels (and are worthy of further research), the BBC remains the focus here, to specifically locate the centenary within the corporation's commemorative history of the war. Through a comparative consideration of media and historiography, it offers a contribution to the three burgeoning fields of military history, media history and memory studies.

Commemoration and the BBC

The centenary was undoubtedly the last major commemoration of the Great War, and as such represented a crucial opportunity to increase public knowledge about the conflict.[3] One of the earliest concerns raised, however, was that the front-loading of events in the government's plans would result in 'centenary fatigue' within the first year.[4] As the BBC's commemorations were partially structured around government events (mostly in relation to broadcasting them), there were similar balancing issues, although the corporation signalled an awareness of this by allocating 'a planned pause

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Ashplant, Graham Dawson and Michael Roper, 'The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration: Contexts, Structures and Dynamics', in T.G. Ashplant, Graham Dawson and Michael Roper (eds.) *The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration,* (London: Routledge, 2015), p. 4.

[3]A view expressed by numerous historians. See Stephen Badsey, 'A Muddy Vision of the Great War', *History Today*, 65, 5 (2015), p. 46; Gary Sheffield, 'A Once in a Century Opportunity? Some Personal Reflections on the Centenary of the First World War', *British Journal for Military History*, 1, 1 (2014), p. 2.

[4]Ibid., p. 9; Keith Jeffery, 'Commemoration in the United Kingdom: A Multitude of Memories', *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 50, 3 (2015), p. 566.

in the coverage in 2015'.[5] This arguably had the regrettable consequence of distorting public comprehension of wartime chronology, as it implied that nothing of note occurred in 1915. As a publicly funded institution, it is unsurprising that much of the BBC's output was centred around the government's commemorative events. Had the BBC considered the centenary independently, the fluctuations in programming intensity may have been less pronounced. If we assume that the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) set the 'rhythm' for the centenary, then the BBC amplified it. This imbalance was not consistent across the BBC's platforms though, as commemorative programming on radio remained reasonably steady across all four years (See Figure A). This may be symptomatic of the differences between the audiences - someone can listen to the radio while carrying on with other tasks, whereas the visual stimulus of television requires focus to properly digest the material. It was therefore possible for the BBC to commence its centenary season on Radio 3 with a remarkable 65 hours of material in January 2015 alone; to put this in context, the combined total of centenary programming across all BBC television channels in 2014 was 76 hours.



Figure A: Hours of Original Broadcasting[6]

Broadcasting hours dwindled over the next few years, and the complete schedule was reminiscent of a runner who started a marathon with an overzealous sprint, then ran out of energy for most of the race before finding a second wind towards the end. The intensity of the start of the centenary in comparison to what followed was reflected in the number of people who recalled having recently seen something about the centenary on television. This figure dropped from 48% in 2014 to 38% in 2018.[7] There was, however, a benefit to the explosion of activity on the BBC in 2014; the Heritage Lottery Fund (HLF) indicated that the 'flood of Centenary broadcasting' in 2014 was a probable factor in the 'surge in public interest' in the same year, and thus was also

[5]Jane Ellison, 'World War One on the BBC', *Cultural Trends*, 27, 2 (2018), p. 129.
[6]Excludes repeats and re-runs under the BBC's First World Schedule.
[7]Lucy Buckerfield and Steve Ballinger, *The People's Centenary: Tracking Public Attitudes to the First World War Centenary 2013–2018* (London: British Future, 2019), p. 29.

partly responsible for the unprecedented number of requests the HLF received for funding.[8] The role of the BBC within the promotion of anniversaries, and the impact of this further afield, is therefore clear.

Public adherence to remembrance rituals is manifested in the consistent commemoration of the Armistice. The BBC has had a longstanding relationship with this event, beginning with the first radio broadcast of the service at the Cenotaph in 1928. This was a noteworthy decision for a medium with aural output, yet 'the crucial element in broadcasting the Silence was that it was not silence that was being broadcast, but rather the absence of deliberate noise'.[9] By broadcasting the event into people's homes, the BBC expanded the sombre atmosphere of the Silence across the nation. In this manner, whether in public or in private, 'silence remains an essential part of our landscape of memory'.[10] Armistice Day has remained a key component in the BBC's annual schedule. Throughout the centenary, broadcasts of *The Royal British Legion Festival of Remembrance* on BBC1 consistently achieved an audience of over five million viewers, peaking in 2018 at over seven million.[11] Thus the BBC broadened the 'landscape of memory' into peoples' homes, and maintained the recognition of key anniversaries of the war.

Television served another role in the centenary by generating 'our obsession with commemoration and anniversaries, through its repetition and continual re-narrativisation of grand historical narratives'.[12] The BBC has consistently promoted anniversaries to the public, originating with the development of a working relationship with the Imperial War Museum (IWM) in 1923, wherein it regularly dispatched a list of anniversaries it intended to mention and enquired if the museum held any relevant exhibits.[13] The repetition aspect is significant regarding the use of familiar images and

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[8]Karen Brookfield, 'The People's Centenary: A Perspective from the Heritage Lottery Fund', *Cultural Trends*, 27, 2 (2018), p. 120.

[9]Adrian Gregory, *The Silence of Memory: Armistice Day 1919–1946,* (Oxford: Berg, 1994), p. 135.

[10]Jay Winter, *War Beyond Words: Languages of Remembrance from the Great War to the Present,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), p. 202.

[11]'Weekly Top 30', Broadcasters' Audience Research Board, http://www.barb.co.uk/viewing-data/four-screen-dashboard/. Accessed 17 June 2020. This peak is somewhat diminished by the fact that the figures indicate over 4 million people changed channel once *Strictly Come Dancing* had finished.

[12]Amy Holdsworth, *Television, Memory and Nostalgia* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 1.

[13]Imperial War Museum, London, EN1/1/BRO/001, 'Correspondence regarding suggestions for programmes or features, including anniversaries of significant dates, and a talk by Sir Martin Conway about the IWM, broadcast on 12 November 1924'.

footage which serve as 'stereotyped symbols of past events'.[14] They form the foundation for a visual understanding of the war by providing a 'lexicon of images' from which an understanding of conflict and remembrance is formed.[15] This visual cache of wartime imagery has been built up across decades of BBC broadcasting, originating with the opening montage of images for *The Great War* (1964), with which the public formed a strong connection.[16] These images, such as footage of the explosion of a mine on Hawthorn Ridge, were recycled during the BBC's centenary to present a familiar imagery of war to the public. The perpetuation of audio-visual material is a key element in the endurance of cultural memory.[17]

Television and Other Technologies

Owing to its extant large audience, television was a well-placed medium to undertake the commemorative and educational objectives of the centenary. To improve knowledge of the conflict, producers needed to amend the narrative of Great War programming to reflect more recent historiography, in order to move on from the popular narratives of previous decades (particularly the 'futility' narrative of the 1960s).[18] As recently as the 1990s, television was failing to keep pace with historiographical developments, partially due to an unwillingness from documentary editors to present content which might be deemed controversial.[19] It is possible, of course, that the rationale behind this narrative stagnation was purely pragmatic. Throughout previous decades, 'a complex network of narrative patterns, personal experiences, testimonies, [and] images' has been produced.[20] The development of these patterns is likely connected to audience reception; where a particular narrative

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[14]Ebbrecht, 'History, Public Memory and Media Event', p. 222.

[15]Maggie Andrews, 'Poppies, Tommies and Remembrance', *Soundings*, 58 (2014), p. 106.

[16]Emma Hanna, *The Great War on the Small Screen: Representing the First World War in Contemporary Britain,* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), p. 39; Dan Todman, *The Great War: Myth and Memory,* (London: Bloomsbury, 2007), pp. 29-35.

[17]Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan, 'Setting the Framework', in Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan (eds.), *War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 31.

[18]A narrative commonly attributed to the critical views of the wartime generals espoused in Alan Clark's *The Donkeys*, (London: Hutchinson, 1961) that sees the First World War as futile, fought about nothing and solving nothing, and composed of nothing but mud, blood and incompetence.

[19]Badsey, 'A Muddy Vision', p. 47; Roger Smither, 'Why is so much Television History about War?', in David Cannadine (ed.), *History and the Media,* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 51. It should be noted that there have been exceptions to this, such as *The Great War and the Shaping of the 20th Century* (BBC, 1996).

[20]Ebbrecht, 'History, Public Memory and Media Event', p. 232.

proves popular, producers will be unwilling to risk their ratings by veering from the established format.[21] Nevertheless, keeping in step with established tropes would not change anything; if the BBC truly wished to take up the mantle of transforming popular knowledge, a new approach was required.

With the increasing range of technology available in the digital era, there were numerous possibilities for change. The BBC utilised a range of different mediums, a prime example being 'Nothing to be Written', an interactive 360° video of the trenches intended for viewing using a virtual reality (VR) headset.[22] The use of a relatively new technology was a promising indicator of the BBC's adoption of new platforms, and potentially an attempt to engage with younger generations. As VR technology continues to be developed (and if the BBC VR Hub remains active), it may be a more prominent feature of the centenary for the Second World War. There was a recognised need to combine the expertise available with the technological opportunities presented by television. Jane Ellison, former Head of Creative Partnerships at the BBC, claimed that the centenary was 'built on world class academic excellence, curatorial expertise and artistic integrity — a unique combination that with new technology [has shaped] another chapter in the history of Commemoration [*sic*]'.[23] This highlights the importance of technology in modern commemoration, and connects with Jay Winter's observations of the relationship between technological developments and the evolution of 'memory booms'.[24]

Television, in tandem with the Internet, demonstrated its role in producing a digital archive for the future which could preserve this period in the history of commemoration. The BBC also utilised the Internet as a source for supplementary information to television broadcasts. The 'World War One' website provides additional articles on topics covered during the centenary.[25] Yet the permanence of this archive is uncertain; while the main website was active at the time of writing, the 'Somme 100' website (which provided further information about the battle) has been replaced with a reduced version. The disappearance of websites has diminished the

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[21]BBC History magazine editor Rob Attar reflected on the appeal of 'traditional stories' in Catriona Pennell, *Bringing the Marginal into the Mainstream: 'Hidden Histories', Public Engagement and Lessons Learned from the Centenary of the First World War*, http://teachlearnwar.exeter.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/2018-HUMS-041-Hidden-Histories-Report-FINAL.pdf. Accessed 8 September 2020,

[22]'Nothing to be Written', BBC, http://canvas-story.bbcrewind.co.uk/sites/virtual-reality-prom. Accessed 18 June 2019,

[23]Ellison, 'World War One on the BBC', p. 129.

[24]Winter, *War Beyond Words*, pp. 203–205.

[25]'World War One', *BBC*, http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p01nb93y. Accessed 18 June 2019.

expected digital legacy of the centenary. Having rendered the Great War as 'the most digitally documented period in history, [...] it is not clear that this material will be discoverable or useable in 5, let alone 50 or 100, years' time'.[26] Even when websites are collected by the British Library Web Archive, access for many websites is only possible on their premises, so the availability of such sources will be no different to the traditional archives primarily inhabited by professional historians and research enthusiasts.

The heyday that television has enjoyed since the fiftieth anniversary of the war is becoming increasingly tenuous, as alternative technologies encroach on its cultural dominance. Alongside the competition faced by the BBC on television, online streaming services such as Netflix and Amazon Prime have been rapidly increasing their audience share. While television viewing has remained the primary method for watching programmes, the gap between live television and on-demand viewing is narrowing.[27] Furthermore, subscription numbers for streaming services have been rapidly outstripping prominent cable companies.[28] While the BBC maintained its prominence in centenary awareness, a different scenario for the centenary of the Second World War is possible. Whereas Netflix has, at the time of writing, less than ten programmes and series related to the First World War, they have over 40 related to the Second World War.[29] It is therefore possible that the centenary for the Second World War may find its foundations in less traditional media outlets.

Popular Tropes

Narrative was an important factor in the BBC's attempt to improve public knowledge during the centenary, yet it was hampered by a lack of chronological consistency. By providing extensive coverage around the outbreak of the war and then broadcasting little until the anniversary of the Somme in 2016, the BBC re-emphasised the prominence of the battle in public understanding of the war. The Somme has long served as a keystone in the futility narrative of the war; a failure to develop on this

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[26]Brookfield, 'The People's Centenary', p. 122.

[27]'Catch-up and Live TV Compared', Broadcasters' Audience Research Board, http://www.barb.co.uk/viewing-data/catch-up-and-live-tv-compared. Accessed 18 June 2019,

[28]'Netflix to Overtake Sky's Satellite TV Subscriptions by End of Year', *The Guardian*, 23 December 2018, http://www.theguardian.com/media/2018/dec/23/netflix-to-overtake-sky-satelite-tv-subscriptions-by-end-of-year.

[29]For the First World War, see, http://www.netflix.com/search?q=World%20War%20I&suggestionId=108261_collection. Accessed 19 June 2019; For the Second World War, see http://www.netflix.com/search?q=World%20War%20I&suggestionId=108262_collection. Accessed 19 June 2019.

epitomising approach would not improve public understanding. It is therefore pertinent to consider whether tropes associated with the futility narrative, such as 'lions led by donkeys', endured during the BBC's centenary programming. Other narrative aspects will also be considered: the recycling of previously popular narratives borrowed from *The Great War*; the reliance on statistics to inform and drive the narrative; the involvement of historians in lending expertise to the BBC's coverage; and finally two case studies which demonstrated the presentation of a 'new' narrative in a familiar format, and the presentation of a familiar narrative in a 'new' format.

'Lions Led by Donkeys'?

This phrase has served as a sound-bite criticism of the failure of Great War generals to adequately lead and protect their brave soldiers. Initially popularised by Alan Clark's eponymous work *The Donkeys* (1961), it became the title for a programme on Channel 4 in 1985, which was the first programme to be openly critical of British High Command.[30] The idiom shares a strong association with the Somme, for which the death toll of the first day has often been conveyed as a catastrophic failure by British generals. When discussing the battle before the ceremony at Thiepval, Dan Snow stated of the men that 'their generals had sent them in with the wrong tactics'.[31] He did not offer any input on why the objectives were initially unsuccessful, or indeed on what the 'right' tactics might have been.

In countenance to this, some academics have argued that the battle was a single part of a long learning process.[32] This 'learning' motif was echoed in centenary broadcasts. During further BBC coverage of commemorations for the battle, David Olusoga described the Somme as 'an awful and tragic stepping stone in a long process of learning'.[33] When Margaret Macmillan appeared on the BBC's coverage of the Armistice ceremony, she argued that the 'donkeys' analogy was unfair as the generals were learning.[34] There is no consensus among historians about the learning process during the war - despite the prevalence of the 'learning curve' interpretation in historiographical discourse, it is not universally accepted.[35] Even alternatives to the learning curve, such as the 'staircase' posited by Gordon Corrigan,[36] do not allow for

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[30]Hanna, *The Great War on the Small Screen*, p. 22.

[31]*The Centenary of the Battle of the Somme: Thiepval,* BBC1 London, 1 July 2016.

[32]See Gary Sheffield, *Forgotten Victory: The First World War: Myths and Realities,* (London: Sharpe, 2nd edn 2018).

[33]*Battle of the Somme: Thiepval.*

[34]*World War One Remembered: The Cenotaph,* BBC1 London, 11 November 2018.

[35]Heather Jones, 'As the Centenary Approaches: The Regeneration of First World War Historiography', *Historical Journal*, 56, 3 (2013), p. 862.

[36]Gordan Corrigan, *Mud, Blood and Poppycock: Britain and the First World War,* (London: Cassell, 2nd edn 2004), p. 284.

any setbacks in progress of warfare strategy. Perhaps, on balance, it could be argued that wartime strategic developments undulated as much as the terrain they fought on.

Echoes of The Great War

The BBC's landmark series from the fiftieth anniversary of the conflict, *The Great War* (1964), is rooted in the bedrock of the Corporation's institutional memory of the war. It was thus unsurprising that it also served as an inspiration for plans around centenary programming. Speaking at the launch event for the centenary, Director-General Tony Hall began by recalling the series as one of his 'vivid' childhood memories, which represented 'the BBC at its best'.[37] One of its defining features was that it gave a voice to low-ranking veterans, an aspect which was maintained through recycled footage and recordings of them during the centenary. This is also part of an ongoing trend in the personalisation of historical television, in which witnesses of historical events serve as 'protagonists' in related programming.[38] Indeed, the flurry of activity around them when it became clear there was little time left to collect their stories resulted in a 'moment of reinvigoration' of Great War memorialisation 'which preceded, perhaps perforce, the anniversary marked by 2014'.[39] The passing of the veterans meant no further recordings of them could be obtained. In this regard, it is their echoes, and those recorded for previous documentaries, which will endure in cultural memory through their repetition on the BBC. The reverent status of *The Great War* is particularly remarkable as the BBC must delve past more recent programming (for example, its 1996 programme, *The Great War and the Shaping of the 20th Century*) to reuse its content. This strongly indicates a preference for the older series, and for the reassertion of its narrative. The Corporation commenced the centenary with another major documentary, namely *Britain's Great War* (BBC, 2014). Presented by Jeremy Paxman, it utilised the familiar blend of archive footage and pieces to camera to consider the war both chronologically and thematically over four episodes. This is notably shorter than the 1996 and 1964 documentaries, though this might be due in part to its function as an accompaniment to Paxman's book of the same title. It was critically well-received, albeit with some criticism for Paxman's reference to conscientious objectors as 'cranks'.[40] Nevertheless, it demonstrates the key role of documentaries in commemoration on the BBC.

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[37]Tony Hall at the BBC World War One Comms Launch on 16 October 2013. The script for this event was kindly provided to the author by Robert Seatter at the BBC.

[38]Ebbrecht, 'History, Public Memory and Media Event', p. 225.

[39]Nick Webber and Paul Long, 'The Last Post: British Press Representations of Veterans of the Great War', *Media, War & Conflict*, 7, 3 (2014), p. 274.

[40]Occurs in 'The War Machine', *Britain's Great War*, BBC1 London, 3 February 2014. For further details on these criticisms, see 'Jeremy Paxman Brands Conscientious Objectors of WW1 'Cranks' – Twitter Reacts', *Huffington Post*, 4 February 2014,

Commemorating by Numbers

A regular feature throughout the centenary was the habitual deployment of statistics. Undoubtedly intended to provide short, clear facts about the conflict, their use was hampered by two issues: they were often incorrect or misleading, and they offered nothing towards a deepened understanding of the war. Their inaccurate use did not go unnoticed; Stephen Badsey noted that Stephen Knight, the writer for *Peaky Blinders*, claimed in an interview that 60,000 men died each day – if this had been the case, the total death toll for the war would have been over double the population of the UK.[41] The misleading use of statistics is particularly prevalent in relation to the Somme. Viewers would have struggled to watch any coverage of the Somme commemorations without encountering the ubiquitous figure of 60,000 in relation to first-day casualties.[42] The relationship between such statistics and futility narratives of the war is reflected by the fact the figure was often quoted near the start of the programme, reaffirming extant notions before any in-depth discussion took place. A further issue here is that casualty figures were often presented as fact, with no allusion to them as estimates, nor any indication of their inclusion or exclusion of civilians. This should be redressed, particularly as there have been recent efforts to demonstrate the difficult of relaying figures for the war.[43] If casualty figures were the main takeaway for the public from the BBC's centenary programming, then public understanding of the war was arguably not improved by the programmes. Statistics do not explain how battles unfolded, or how the war progressed, or even the lives lived by the men they impersonally refer to; they provide no representation of the complexity and nuance of wartime experiences.

Historians and the BBC

At the BBC's centenary launch event, the then-World War One Centenary Controller Adrian Van Klaveren explicitly outlined the use of 'today's most eminent historians […] to take a fresh look at the war itself and how it shaped the world in which we

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http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2014/02/04/jeremy-paxman-britains-great-war-cranks_n_4721895.html, Accessed 28 November 2020.

[41]Badsey, 'A Muddy Vision', p. 47. The interview he indirectly refers to can be found in: 'Who Were the Real Peaky Blinders?', Radio Times, 7 June 2019, https://www.radiotimes.com/news/2019-06-07/who-were-the-peaky-blinders.

[42]Mentioned on *The Centenary of the Battle of the Somme: The Vigil,* BBC2 England, 30 June 2016; *The Centenary of the Battle of the Somme: Zero Hour,* BBC1 London, 1 July 2016; *Battle of the Somme: Thiepval*; 'Somme Centenary Service', *BBC News Special*, BBC News 24, 1 July 2016; 'The Battle of the Somme', *The People Remember*, BBC1 London, 8 November 2016.

[43]Antoine Prost, 'The Dead', in Jay Winter et al (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the First World War* vol. III, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), pp. 563-567.

now live'.[44] There were also initiatives for involving historians in the broader centenary. As part of the 'World War One at Home' project, which sought to describe the impact of the war in the UK and Ireland, the BBC partnered with the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) and the IWM, and selected a group of historians as researchers for each of the BBC Nations (i.e. BBC Scotland, BBC Wales and BBC Northern Ireland). The project has produced an archive of information available online (at present),[45] demonstrating the importance of historians in the educational legacy produced by the BBC during the centenary.

The BBC often featured historians during coverage of live events. Panels included historians from the BBC's usual cache alongside guest historians. Heather Jones appeared on one such panel during coverage of the commemoration of the Somme, which she described as 'a touchstone for all the carnage of the First World War'.[46] Her cultural knowledge of the war was usefully manifested in noting the experiences of surviving soldiers and their families, as well as understanding the contemporary cultural impetus behind enlistment. Sophie De Schaepdrijver participated in the panel for the Passchendaele commemorations. Despite presenter Kirsty Young's consistent appeals for her input 'as a Belgian', De Schaepdrijver noted the importance of an awareness of transnational suffering in commemoration and highlighted a public 'disconnect coupled with an intense desire to understand'.[47] There is further evidence of tensions between the BBC and professional historians. The BBC adopted 'World War One' for its centenary coverage, whereas some historians prefer terms such as 'the Great War' or 'First World War'. Thus, while recording a video for the BBC website, one historian undertook numerous takes due to their automatic use of the term 'First World War' in contrast to the BBC's preferred term.[48] The BBC thus appeared out of step with the experts it sought out.

The relationship between history and television is not a settled one either. This might partly be due to clashes between history as practice and history as television. As Stephen Badsey has noted, 'what makes good history may not make good TV'.[49] Producers face the unenviable task of simultaneously appeasing historians with rigorous analysis and entertaining the public enough to keep them tuned in. An ever-

[44]Adrian Van Klaveren, World War One Comms Launch, 16 October 2013.
[45]Available at 'World War One at Home', https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p01nhwgx. Accessed 12 July 2019,
[46]*Battle of the Somme: Thiepval.*
[47]'For the Fallen', *World War One Remembered: Passchendaele*, BBC2 England, 30 July 2017.
[48]Tweet by Gary Sheffield, Twitter, @ProfGSheffield, 4 June 2019, http://twitter.com/ProfGSheffield/status/1135855920221630464.
[49]Badsey, 'A Muddy Vision', p. 46.

growing plethora of channels makes maintaining an audience far more difficult now than it was in the early years of the BBC. Thus, 'as producers chase discerning, discriminating, elusive and fickle audiences with their fingers on the remote control button, remembrance television has had to become more televisual, hybridizing remembrance and entertainment'.[50] In 1924, BBC Director R.F. Palmer highlighted this disparity when responding to suggested programme revisions received from the IWM, as he stated that 'one can hardly expect every member of our immense audience to take sufficient interest in this subject to obtain and read books'.[51] The corporation's foundational triad of 'inform, educate, entertain' is evidently a precarious balancing act.

Narrative Keystones

Specific analysis of programmes can shed further light on prominent narrative tropes. Programmes associated with two of the BBC's keystone anniversaries, specifically *The Somme 1916: From Both Sides of the Wire* (BBC2, 2016) for the titular battle and *They Shall Not Grow Old* (BBC2, 2018) for the Armistice, are particularly indicative new narrative content and delivery in centenary programming. While the BBC was only involved in production of the former, their promotion and broadcast of the latter highlights it for consideration. Both series were championed as presenting revolutionary aspects; respectively, a transnational approach to the Somme, and a colourised, veteran-driven account of the war. Yet the use of colourised footage in historical television documentaries was not new, having been an evolving televisual trend for some time.[52] Anglo-German presentations of the battle were not a new development where historiography is considered either. Neither of these aspects were actually revolutionary in the wider context of histories of the war; rather, they were indicative of the disconnect between television and history as practice, and also of a tendency to treat a technique as new when it is applied to different footage.

The Somme 1916: From Both Sides of the Wire

This three-part documentary, presented on the battlefields by historian and battlefield archaeologist Peter Barton, had the outlined intention to redress the primarily Anglo-centric focus prevalent in previous histories of the Somme.[53] This was reflected in the naming of the episodes, with the title for each given in English and German. The presentation of this Anglo-German approach as 'pioneering' did not sit well with some historians, with one complainant highlighting that Anglo-German histories of the

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[50]Andrews, 'Mediating Remembrance: Personalization and Celebrity in Television's Domestic Remembrance', *Journal of War & Culture Studies*, 4, 3 (2011), p. 361.
[51]Imperial War Museum, EN1/1/BRO/001.
[52]Ebbrecht, 'History, Public Memory and Media Event', pp. 225–226.
[53] This point is acknowledged by BBC History commissioning editor Simon Young in *Bringing the Marginal into the Mainstream*.

Somme were not a new development.[54] This was true, yet it is likely this 'unique' aspect was in specific reference to previous television programmes rather than previous histories as a whole. Throughout the series, first-hand accounts from soldiers were read out to give authenticity to the narrative, though this authenticity was impaired by painfully artificial German accents. This jarring element was slightly immersion-breaking, and the decision to not read the accounts in German with subtitles (or to use German voice actors) was baffling given the transnational impetus. The programme's historical consultant suggested the use of German actors, but he was overruled.[55] This is also indicative of a divergence between BBC producers and the historians they employ. Given the efforts for continental unity in the centenary, it is also surprising that a German production company was not involved with the programme. Nevertheless, the episodes do have considerable merits in terms of shifting the common narrative about the Somme. The series also reached a substantial audience, as viewing figures remained around 1.8–1.7 million.[56]

Despite the overwhelming focus on the first day of the battle elsewhere, this series dedicated one episode to it, and endeavoured to explain failed objectives in terms beyond blundering generals. 'First Day — Erster Tag' covered familiar aspects of the battle alongside German perspectives, such as accounts of the physical and psychological impact of the preceding bombardment; the defensive nature of their trench and dugout systems; interception of British phone calls relating to the attack using a Moritz machine, and the gathering of intelligence by Germans from British prisoners of war. None of these were revelations in historiographical terms, but they were counterpoints to the prevailing narrative that the Somme failed purely because it was a bad idea.[57] 'Defence in Depth — Verteidigung in der Tiefe' continued the account of the offensive from the Battle of Bazentin Ridge. There was a detailed consideration of the tactical developments made by the German army during the battle, specifically of a more fluid defensive line by defending from camouflaged shell holes. There was also mention of when the Germans clamped down on British intelligence efforts, arrested 'watchers' behind their own lines and sealed the Dutch

[54]Tweet by Rob Schaefer, Twitter, @GERArmyResearch, 18 July 2016, http://twitter.com/GERArmyResearch/status/755127813750095872, Accessed 18 June 2018.

[55]Tweet by Jeremy Banning, Twitter, @jbanningww1, 1 August 2016, http://twitter.com/jbanningww1/status/760211147320651780, Accessed 18 June 2019.

[56]Weekly Viewing Data, Broadcasters' Audience Research Board, http://www.barb.co.uk/viewing-data/weekly-top-30. Accessed 19 June 2019,

[57]See Christopher Duffy, *Through German Eyes: The British and the Somme 1916,* (London: Phoenix, 2nd edn 2007), pp. 13–19; Robert Kershaw, *24 Hrs at the Somme: 1 July 1916,* (London: WH Allen, 2016), pp. 10–43; Martin Middlebrook, *The First Day on the Somme: 1 July 1916,* (London: Penguin, 2001), pp. 61–62.

border, and the differences in interrogation techniques. The episode concluded with the end of the Battle of Ginchy, noting the replacement of General Erich von Falkenhayn with Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and Quartermaster-General Erich Ludendorff. The final episode, 'End Game — End Spiel [*sic*]' discussed the introduction of tanks to the battlefield, the debut of the 'creeping barrage', the difficulties presented by the mud in winter, the differing attitudes towards execution for desertion, and ultimately the German withdrawal to the *Siegfriedstellung* (Hindenburg Line), which Barton argued was where the Battle of the Somme actually ended. In his closing remarks, he noted that some historians have viewed the Somme as a 'bloody but critical testing ground where vital lessons were learned that helped speed the Armistice.' He retorted that while the battle did indeed damage German defences, it did not hasten the end of the war and was ultimately a German defensive victory. Barton also noted that 1917 was the most costly year of the war, in which the campaigns at Arras, Champagne and Passchendaele were a consequence of the lessons the Germans had learned at the Somme and Picardy — the eventual German downfall occurred under very different circumstances.[58] In this manner, the programme directly challenged reductionist narratives which focus on the first day of the battle with little regard for its progression.

The documentary was well-received by media critics. *The Guardian* praised it as a 'clear, authoritative guide to the most costly war in the history of the British army'.[59] *The Telegraph* gave it four stars, and in a familiar cultural pairing of war and football, noted the British experience of the war 'was a tragic tale of tactical naiveté, faulty ammunition and fatally underestimating the enemy. Not unlike the England football team at major tournaments, in fact'.[60] The review also noted the emotional impact of the footage showing grinning soldiers about to face death, an impact mirrored in similar footage used in *They Shall Not Grow Old*. Evidently, the disparity between television and history is not a concern for media reviewers, rather a criticism of the 'historian-cop'[61] seeking to critique programmes on their terms.

[58]'End Game — End Spiel', *The Battle of the Somme 1916: From Both Sides of the Wire*, BBC2 England, 17 August 2016.

[59]'The Somme 1916 Review — a Fresh Take on an All Too Familiar Story', *The Guardian*, 19 July 2016, http://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio/2016/jul/19/the-somme-1916-review, Accessed 20 June 2019.

[60]'The Somme 1916: From Both Sides of the Wire Debunks the Myths of Britain's Bloodiest Battle: Review', *The Telegraph*, 18 July 2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/tv/2016/07/18/the-somme-1916-from-both-sides-of-the-wire-debunks-the-myths-of, Accessed 20 June 2019.

[61]Robert Sklar, 'Historical Films: Scofflaws and the Historian-Cop', *Reviews in American History*, 25, 2 (1997), *passim*. See also Badsey, 'A Muddy Vision', p. 48.

They Shall Not Grow Old
A key event in the BBC's centenary schedule was the screening of *They Shall Not Grow Old* on the anniversary of the Armistice. The film was directed by Peter Jackson, renowned for having directed, written and produced the film trilogy *Lord of the Rings* (2001–2003). The film takes its title from Laurence Binyon's *For the Fallen* (1914), although the third and fourth words have been switched. This was unlikely to be an error, given the involvement of the IWM and 14–18 NOW. It is possible the language was modernised in a similar vein to the colourisation of the footage, with artistic license taking precedence over poetic nuance. This is not an issue that the BBC was responsible for. The decision to broadcast it for the final anniversary in the centenary schedule means it merits some attention.

The sole use of recorded testimony was clearly an attempt to allow soldiers to speak of their experiences in their own words with a minimal impact of bias. Indeed, Jackson noted that he had not intended to 'impose' anything on the narrative.[62] Aside from the notes in the opening and closing sequences, the film ran contemporary footage and recordings of veterans without any interruption. This was praised by one American reviewer as having left the film 'blessedly free of the sapient sounds of experts and academic historians'.[63] This comment is at odds with the film credits, which thanked the oral historians who captured the voices of the veterans. It also disregards an unavoidable aspect of the historical method — the selection of sources. It would have been impossible to present every piece of footage filmed during the war, and every account recorded since, in the confines of one film. Therefore, a selection process had to occur in which certain sources were used and others were not, thus (albeit indirectly or unconsciously) forming a narrative.

There was further evidence of creative licence. The initial black-and-white footage gradually filled the screen to the whistled tune of *Hanging on the Old Barbed Wire*, yet the song was listed under a different title in the soundtrack, and the end credits rolled to a lyrically-sanitised version of *Mademoiselle from Armentières*..[64] These adjustments did not detract from the film's sense of authenticity though, as they were unlikely to be noticed by a general audience unfamiliar with wartime songs. Certain editing aspects

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[62]Blavatnik School of Government, They Shall Not Grow Old: Peter Jackson Q&A, YouTube, 12 February 2019, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KFMU_BGkleA, Accessed 21 June 2019.
[63]'A Few Thoughts on the Authenticity of Peter Jackson's "They Shall Not Grow Old"', *New Yorker*, 14 January 2019, http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/a-few-thoughts-on-the-authenticity-of-peter-jacksons-they-shall-not-grow-old, Accessed 20 June 2019.
[64]It is officially recorded as *If You Want to Find — Official Trench Song* performed by Plan 9 and Hamish McKeich.

could also be interpreted as having affected the narrative. Following the discussion of features of an unnamed battle (which was undeniably the Somme), the footage flashed from footage of smiling young men to photos of corpses evoking a disturbing before-and-after montage. One notably unusual aspect, however, was that the content of the film did not seek to obscure the variety of wartime experience — there were many instances where the soldiers responded to their surroundings with humour, a feature largely devoid from such programming since *Blackadder Goes Forth* (BBC1, 1989).

Again, the film received positive reviews in the media. *The Guardian*'s reviewer gave it five stars, noting that the modernising alterations made it appear 'as though 100 years of film history had been suddenly telescoped into a single moment'.[65] It was also given five stars by *The Independent*, with the tag-line 'No *Lord of the Rings* battle could match the sheer hellishness of what the filmmaker recreates here'.[66] The use of the term 'recreates' is a striking, though possibly unintentional, reflection on the extent to which this is a documentary or a creative work. More noteworthy still is the reference to J.R.R. Tolkien's iconic work — it was argued elsewhere in the BBC's centenary that Tolkien did not believe in the concept of 'a war to end all wars', which resulted in the perpetual conflict in his narratives.[67]

However, while the film let the soldiers tell their own story, the lack of any information about events resulted in a confusing chronology. It was a depiction without context, giving the viewer a sense of the war rather than detailed knowledge about it. An obsession with authenticity appears to have overridden the desire to educate. One of the film's opening statements noted that the war was different from year to year, so the lack of reference to relevant time periods was a puzzling omission. The film did not necessarily require direct narration; in keeping with the period, informational slides could have been used in the style of contemporary films such as *The Battle of the Somme* (1916). Furthermore, despite the good intentions behind the colourisation process, the colour grading itself was not without dispute, as one historian criticised

[65]'They Shall Not Grow Old Review – an Utterly Breathtaking Journey into the Trenches', *The Guardian*, 11 November 2018, http://www.theguardian.com/film/2018/nov/11/they-shall-not-grow-old-peter-jackson-review-first-world-war-footage, Accessed 20 June 2019.
[66]'They Shall Not Grow Old Review: Peter Jackson's astonishing WW1 documentary is like no other', *The Independent*, 11 November 2018, http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/films/reviews/they-shall-not-grow-old-peter-jackson-review-first-world-war-ww1-lord-of-the-rings-hobbit-a8586401.html, Accessed 20 June 2019.
[67]*War of Words: Soldier-Poets of the Somme,* BBC2 England, 15 November 2014. John Garth provides a more in-depth analysis in *Tolkien and the Great War: The Threshold of Middle-Earth* (London: HarperCollins, 2003).

'the highly stylised palette of washed out colours [as] used in "Private Ryan"'.[68] The colourised presentation lifted the footage out of its original time for a modern audience, yet consequently removed its historical context. The same American reviewer who praised the lack of expert interjection in the film noted that contemporary audiences would not have bemoaned its lack of colour or sound, and that while we might interpret the men smiling through the screens as broadly good-humoured, it is possible that they were simply amused by the novelty of being filmed, or of being recognised by viewers back home.[69] Once again, the application of modern cultural frameworks to historical events can shape interpretation of them.

One major criticism of the film is the representational lacunae of groups other than white British soldiers. Understandably, there was only so much Jackson could cover within the time constraints of the film. It is also possible this was the result of a lack of variety in the source material available.[70] Particularly apparent is a lack of representation for the experiences and role of women in the war. Jackson explained this was an issue of time, and that had the film been longer, 'the nurses would have been there'.[71] Yet women *are* present in Jackson's film, albeit passively. They were present in the veteran's recollections of visits to brothels, an aspect further amplified by the playing of *Mademoiselle from Armentieres* in the credits. To portray women in this light alone leaves them as 'the butt of men's jokes, rather than flesh-and-blood actors in their own right'.[72] Jackson may have been unable to efficiently convey the breadth of women's roles during the war, but giving some women a voice to demonstrate their own part would have provided some counterbalance. As noted by Susan Grayzel, 'it remains worth asking why the filmmakers chose to have women reduced to their sexual functions as the way to capture the male perspective on them in relationship to this war'.[73] When we consider that this film was one of the major

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[68]Tweet by Jonathan Boff, Twitter, @JonathanBoff, 12 November 2018, http://twitter.com/JonathanBoff/status/1061933692636020737, Accessed 18 June 2019.

[69]'A Few Thoughts', *New Yorker*; Roger Smither, '"P'raps I Shall See You…": Recognition of Loved Ones in Non-Fiction Film of the First World War', in Nicholas J. Saunders and Paul Cornish (eds.), *Contested Objects: Material Memories of the Great War,* (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 181.

[70]'Colorizing and Fictionalizing the Past: A Review of Peter Jackson's *They Shall Not Grow Old*', *Nursing Clio*, 12 February 2019, http://nursingclio.org/2019/02/12/colorizing-and-fictionalizing-the-past-a-review-of-peter-jacksons-they-shall-not-grow-old/, Accessed 3 December 2020.

[71]Quoted in 'Colorizing and Fictionalizing the Past'.

[72]Ibid.

[73]Susan R. Grayzel, 'Who Gets to Be in the War Story? Absences and Silences in *They Shall Not Grow Old*', *American Historical Review*, 124, 5 (2019), p. 1787.

keystones of the BBC's centenary schedule, and that it was sent to schools across the country, the lack of representation of different groups feels very much like a missed opportunity.

As previously noted, while the battle featured in the middle of the film was never named, the characteristic moments of the Somme were apparent to historians. Yet the chronology of events was muddled: the men spoke of the bombardment; then the tanks advanced (which did not occur until several months into the battle at Flers-Courcelette); followed by the acknowledgement that it had been a beautiful morning; then the explosion of a mine in the wrong place which gave the Germans time to prepare; recollections of walking steadily behind a barrage (the creeping barrage technique was not deployed on the first day of the battle); and discovering that despite the bombardment, the wire remained uncut. There was also the mention of *Flammenwerfer* troops in the German trenches, yet no mention of the debut of the British Livens Large Gallery Flame Projector. Of course, these were ultimately technicalities which would only be picked up by those with previous knowledge of the Somme — as the battle was not named, the audience was not being intentionally misinformed. However, the film did present a narrative which essentially played out thus: war was declared; the troops went to France; the battle of the Somme took place; the Armistice was signed. Ultimately, this reflects an ongoing issue of programmes about the conflict, in which they can appease the public while frustrating historians. The two audiences remain disparate, and without any evidence of change, this is not a feature of media war commemoration which is likely to change.

Conclusion

Despite apparent attempts to present the war in new ways and on new platforms, the tone of the centenary programming was often familiar, with piecemeal deviations drowned out by the broader presence of futility narratives. This clash between repetition of old tropes and revisionist interpretations confused the overall tone. While historians were featured on BBC programmes, their restriction to answering questions posed by the presenter and comparatively diminutive involvement in the flagship programmes suggested that opportunities to challenge overriding narratives were missed. There was a clear drive to discuss the war from different angles and perspectives, yet alongside the regular presence of familiar tropes elsewhere, their impact was questionable. It is not transparently clear how the overall narrative connects with Winter and Prost's generational model outlined earlier; there were elements of all three in a bewildering amalgamation. While there was some involvement of military and cultural history, the bulk of the narrative was influenced by the social history reminiscent of 1960s historiography. This indicates that representations of the war on the BBC have struggled to evolve in recent decades.

An Experiment inside an Experiment: Improvements in First World War Tank Wireless Communications

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ABSTRACT
During the First World War, new mobile fighting platforms, including aeroplanes and tanks, presented novel problems for an Army reliant on visual and line communication. Wireless was considered unwieldy, unreliable and non-secure. Unit War Diaries for Tank Signal Companies show only tentative and limited success for early experiments with wireless, with most researchers focusing on the small number of messages sent. This article re-evaluates this picture, balancing what were, indeed, limited achievements in message-carrying, against the rapid development of sound, highly effective radio procedures still recognisable today. Inverting the traditional focus on command decisions, the article strives to illuminate the achievements of those actually operating the equipment.

The First World War witnessed major advances in the development of battlefield technology, both tactical and in the sphere of communications. These were combined in the first tank units to take the field. The use of primitive wireless sets by early British tanks was described by one contemporary observer as 'an experiment inside an experiment'.[1]

The few modern researchers in this field have largely fallen into two camps. One group has downplayed the achievements of early wireless on the grounds of its primitive technology, technical limitations and paucity of messages sent, relative to those sent by other means, arguing that under the circumstances, the Army did the best it

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[1]Major R. E. Priestley, *The Signal Service in the European War of 1914 to 1918 (France)*, (Chatham: W & J Mackay & Co. Ltd., 1921), p. 245.

possibly could with wireless.[2] The other group holds that Continuous Wave (CW) wireless sets marked a paradigm shift in technology. One which could have shortened the war and which the British Army failed to exploit, due to a lack of insight and hidebound conservatism in the high command.[3]

This article takes an independent line, as it does not address attitudes within high command (from the top down), but focuses on the operators of the equipment (from the bottom up), crediting their growing confidence with CW technology and the rapid development of their procedures. It will argue that progress was driven more effectively by experience and experiments in the field than by direction or strategic decisions from above.

Analysing War Diaries from the 1 Tank Brigade Signal Company, this article will compare the Company's communication performance in its first two major engagements: the battle of Cambrai, in November 1917, and the German Spring Offensive of 1918. Compared to other Tank Brigade Signal Company War Diaries, that of the 1 Tank Brigade was more candid and comprehensive, perhaps a reflection of the personality of the Commanding Officer. Whether the unit was representative is a moot point. However, in September 1917, the entire establishment for Tank Corps Signals was 436 personnel in three Signal Companies.[4] By mid-1918 there were still only five Tank Brigade Signal Companies in total, many officers swapping between units, sharing best practices. Furthermore, the unit's account was fully supported by the War Diary of the 3 Tank Brigade Signal Company, which also served in both engagements.

The technology of wireless telegraphy involved messages transmitted using Morse Code, not voice. The place of wireless was not assured at this time and it contended with other communication methods including line telephone, the Dispatch Rider Service and the Army Pigeon Service. Far from being obsolete methods, these possessed complementary qualities and each made a major contribution. The

[2]Brian N. Hall, 'The Development of Tank Communications in the British Expeditionary Force, 1916- 1918', in Alaric Searle (Ed.), *Genesis, Employment, Aftermath: First World War Tanks and the New Warfare, 1900-1945,* (Solihull: Helion & Company, 2015), pp.161-162.

[3]Mike Bullock, Laurence A. Lyons, 'Response to Dr Brian N. Hall's Articles on British Wireless in the First World War', in *War in History*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (2016), pp. 230-250. Note: CW Wireless used transmitter valves to produce continuous waves. Energy was concentrated over a narrow frequency band, producing a signal with a stable amplitude and greater range.

[4]Priestley, *The Signal Service,* p. 252.

combination allowed the 1 Tank Brigade to enjoy a comfortable redundancy of communication means.

1 Tank Brigade Signal Company, Royal Engineers

The War Diary of the 1 Tank Brigade Signal Company records that the unit was authorised by the War Office in August 1917. Like all Signal units at this time, it was part of the Corps of Royal Engineers. The Unit Establishment consisted of four commissioned officers, one Warrant Officer, four Staff Sergeants, one Artificer and 92 Other Ranks, a total strength of 102. This number remained relatively stable over the next six months.[5] The unit's transport included 20 bicycles, 20 Triumph motorcycles, a box car and a lorry.

The Company was based near Arras in the sector run by the British Expeditionary Force's Third Army. Under its Commanding Officer, Captain E. F. Churchill, it operated four types of communication systems: Dispatch Rider Service, telephone, pigeons and wireless. Whereas the former two means predominated within camp, the latter two were intended for forward communications by tanks on the front line. Its first major operation was the battle of Cambrai in November 1917.

Captain Churchill, whose papers are held at the Imperial War Museum, had enlisted in 1914 at the Inns of Court OTC in Hertfordshire. Arriving on the Western Front in November 1915, he had already accumulated 13 months of experience as an Infantry Signal Officer with 32 Division and ten months as an Artillery Signal Officer with the 45 Heavy Artillery Group, Royal Garrison Artillery, before joining the Tank Corps in October 1917.[6]

Tank Communications during the Battle of Cambrai: A Comedy of Errors

Captain Churchill's account of the battle of Cambrai was disarmingly honest about the shortcomings of wireless. Indeed it reads like a comedy of administrative errors. These included: vital kit being missing; run down accumulators [7]; a wireless set being dismantled in error; and tanks unhelpfully departing before a set could be loaded.

Little prior training was recorded other than lectures on electricity and magnetism and some practical lessons in erecting antennas. The unit therefore went into battle with limited experience. Its intentions with wireless were modest. The apparatus and personnel for two Brigade Forward Stations would be dropped by Fighting Tanks at

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[5]The UK National Archives (hereinafter TNA) WO 95/100/6, War Diary of 1st Tank Brigade Signal Company, August 1917, Appendix I, Brigade Tank Corps War Establishment, p. 5.

[6]E.F. Churchill papers at the Imperial War Museum (83/23/1).

[7]Re-chargeable low voltage lead acid batteries which powered valve heaters.

the Grand Ravine and Hindenburg Support Line, for working back to a Directing Station.

When establishing the Directing Station, the Army practice of 'adapt and overcome' was utilised: 'The 80 foot masts required for the Directing Station were unobtainable but makeshift masts were constructed out of telephone poles, which although cumbersome answered the purpose'.[8] As might be expected for a new technology, communications took up to one and a half days to establish. Communication was established with the first station at 1:30pm on 20 November and with the second at 3pm on 21 November.

> Several messages containing valuable information were received... During the evening of the 20th inst. the accumulators of the Directing Station ran down, but a message was transmitted to the station in the GRAND RAVINE by means of the Third Army Directing Station.[9]

Administrative problems were caused by confusion, acting on rumours, and by uncooperative attitudes from tank crews beset with problems and priorities of their own.

> The "G" Battalion Tank which took up the other Wireless set having been abandoned, the operators were told there was no further use for the set and it was accordingly dismantled. A third or reserve set was to be taken forward after Zero in a Gun Carrying Tank but although the operators made repeated enquiries they could not ascertain which was the tank allotted, and this set therefore remained at the Tankodrome.[10]

The battle of Cambrai saw the first mass use of tanks, and this demanded effective command and control. In all, 378 Fighting Tanks and 98 Support Tanks were deployed.[11] Each Battalion in the I Tank Brigade comprised 42 tanks, and wielded significant firepower.[12] Captain Churchill recorded several learning points from the battle. Transporting forward bulky accumulators was difficult (each wireless used

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[8]TNA WO 95/100/6, WD 1st Tank Brigade Signal Company, Appendix I, Report on Communications During Operations, 20-23 November 1917, Captain E. F. Churchill, p. 23.
[9]TNA WO 95/100/6, WD 1st Tank Brigade Signal Company, Appendix I, pp. 22-23.
[10] Ibid., p. 23.
[11]Peter Simkins, Geoffrey Jukes and Michael Hickey, *The First World War*, (Oxford: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 2013), p. 144.
[12]Captain D. G. Browne, MC, *The Tank in Action*, (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1920), p. 268.

three, plus three charging) and all charging sets were fully occupied when wanted. The use of Fighting Tanks for logistical arrangements was unsatisfactory. 'In one case the apparatus had to be divided between two Tanks, one of which broke down and owing to the lack of room a 30 foot mast had to be carried outside. This fell off in transit and was lost.'[13] However, all this should not detract from the bravery of the signallers under fire:

> In the other case the Tank went into action with the first wave and was knocked out. The enemy being only 200 yards away and firing heavily on the Tank with machine guns, the Station could not be erected until they had been driven back. On account of the weight of these stations… it was impossible to move the apparatus and take advantage of cover for men and instruments. In one case the masts were erected under machine gun fire.[14]

More authoritative direction was clearly needed. The Wireless Officer, instead of being sent forward to one of the Stations, might have been better utilised checking that Tanks were allotted correctly and their Commanders knew exactly where to drop the Stations, and he later could have supervised re-supply and accumulator charging. Finally, the entire rationale of what information would be conveyed by the wireless links had not been fully thought out. The most valuable message sent during the battle was obtained by the Wireless Officer asking an Artillery Officer for a situation report to send. Captain Churchill's honesty in compiling these points must be admired. The shortcomings do not diminish the ingenious improvisation and bravery in what was to prove a highly valuable learning exercise.

The number of messages sent was small. In fact, it compares unfavourably with the number of messages sent by carrier pigeon. While both means were neglected after an initial surge of messages, carrier pigeons could probably be seen as more important than wireless during this battle. Captain Churchill wrote of the pigeons: 'fairly good results were obtained on the first day. Little use was made of the pigeons on the remaining days.'[15] The chief difficulty was the non-return of baskets from the tanks. In addition: 'On account of the fog and rain a few birds released late in the afternoon did not home until the next morning'.[16] This is in line with other generally favourable reports on the use of pigeons, with few birds being lost and average message delivery times being 10-20 minutes.[17]

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[13]TNA WO 95/100/6, Appendix I, Report on Communications During Operations, 20-23 November 1917, p. 25.
[14]Ibid., p. 25.
[15]Ibid., p. 22.
[16]Ibid., p. 24.
[17]Priestley, *The Signal Service,* pp. 89-92.

Communications Type	20 Nov	21 Nov	22 Nov	23 Nov
Wireless				
D Battalion Station	10	3	1	-
G Battalion Station	-	4	-	-
Pigeon				
Messages received Bapaume Loft	38	-	-	8
Messages received Vaulx-Vraucourt Loft	-	5	-	-

Table 1: Signals sent by 1 Tank Brigade - Cambrai, 20-23 November 1917

Figure 1: A pigeon being released from a British Mark V tank.[18]

Interestingly, the War Diary of the 3 Tank Brigade Signal Company gives a similar account of the battle of Cambrai. Also authorised by the War Office in August 1917, the unit was commanded by Acting Captain H. S. Carnegie and was at a similar level of inexperience. Its first action in the battle was to set up a Directing Station at Nurlu, the Diary stating: 'The set was of Wilson type, and the aerial put on a factory chimney about 50 feet high.'[19] The reference to the wireless set used is a valuable one, as it confirms that the sets this unit used at Cambrai were Wilson spark plug sets, which were more primitive than CW sets.

[18]Image from Imperial War Museum Collection – August 1918.
[19]TNA WO 95/107/12, WD 3rd Tank Brigade Signal Company, 18 November 1917.

The W/T Trench Set 130 Watt Wilson Transmitter, to give it its full name was used primarily for Division to Corps communication. Unlike the BF set, it had a fixed spark gap with a motor-driven, high-speed interrupter. The result was a greater number of sparks were produced per second giving a musical note at the headphones, thereby making the Morse signal easier to hear through interference. The transmitter had the same three fixed frequencies as the BF set and the higher power meant that the range was up to 9000 yards (approx. 8.3 km).[20] By elevating the antenna onto a factory chimney, the Directing Station was trying to maximise the range of its transmission and reception. The War Diary of the I Tank Brigade Signal Company does not explicitly mention the sets used at Cambrai, but it is highly likely that they also were Wilson sets.

As battle commenced, 'the Signal party and wireless in two tanks (Mark IV) moved up with the second wave and eventually reached the Rallying Point. One wireless set got into communication with back directing station, but signals got weak owing to distance - 12 miles - and running down of accumulators.'[21] It would seem the problem with the accumulators was a common theme in both units, which strongly suggests that the operators were not made aware of the issue until it happened. Meanwhile, expecting a wireless set with a range of 9000 yards to communicate effectively to a Directing Station 12 miles away was the fault of staff planners. To call it wishful thinking would be a gross understatement.

As for the I Tank Brigade Signal Company, the detailed communications instructions were to say the least sparse. They state, 'The Back Wireless Station of this Brigade will be situated at D 3 d and will be in telephonic communication through NURLU Exchange with Tank Brigade and Divisions. The Forward Wireless Station will be at Brigade Rallying Point in communication with Back Station.'[22] Operators searching for which frequencies to use and details of expected range, call signs, ciphers, link engineering codes, battery charging and so on would have searched in vain.

In his post-operation appraisal, Captain Carnegie noted that: 'For the 20th 50 birds were allotted to each battalion, but good results were not obtained, due to dull

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[20]Keith R. Thrower, OBE, 'Army Radio Communication in the Great War', pp. 5-6, http://blogs.mhs.ox.ac.uk/innovatingincombat/files/2013/03/Army-radio-communication-in-the-Great-War_V2.pdf. Accessed 30 October 2020. The BF (British Field) set's three frequencies were: 857 kHz, 667 kHz and 545 kHz on wavelengths 350, 450 and 550 metres.

[21]TNA WO 95/107/12, WD 3rd Tank Brigade Signal Company, 20 November 1917.

[22]Ibid., Appendix III, Preliminary Instructions No 2 - Signal Communications - 3rd Brigade Tank Corps, 15 November 1917.

weather and bad treatment of the birds. The company reconnaissance officers and company commanders evidently did not need the birds issued to them as they did not use them, and pigeons were left in some cases, in dugouts &co until returned by police and salvage people.'[23]

Regarding wireless, Carnegie was slightly more positive: 'Two forward stations (Wilson Cabinet sets) were in female tanks which went forward after the second wave of attacking tanks and took up their position at the Brigade Rallying Point, getting into communication with the directing station at 10.30 a.m. on Z Day, after which several messages were sent through.' Signals were weak owing to the 12 miles between the Forward and Rear Directing Stations and the loss of battery power. A lot of messages were sent in clear (unencrypted) as the simple code used 'was not sufficient for stationary operations'.[24] This mysterious aside suggests that the codes may have been time-limited and the provision of the codes was insufficient. Nevertheless, 'the wireless station detached with No. 3 Tank Company got into communication back from MARCOING at 2.30 p.m. Z Day and sent many messages for 88th Infantry Brigade and other units. It was dismantled on 24th inst. when good telephone communication was obtainable to MARCOING.' Carnegie concluded: 'With a full code, and facilities for charging accumulators immediately prior to a battle, this method of communication should prove of the greatest use even with the present rather cumbrous apparatus.'[25]

Writing after the war, J. F. C. Fuller, a senior Tank Corps officer, historian and theorist of armoured warfare, painted the battle of Cambrai as a success for wireless communications: 'During this battle a much more complete system of signals was attempted, and wireless signalling proved invaluable in keeping in touch with rear headquarters and also in sending orders forward…'[26] Some modern researchers seem to have accepted Fuller's view at face value, perhaps overlooking some degree of subtlety in his argument:

> The most successful use of wireless in 1917 occurred at the battle of Cambrai… Most divisions reported very favourable results from the use of wireless… Clearly wireless was used on a far greater scale at Cambrai than in any previous British offensive of the war. Nevertheless, although the work done by wireless

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[23]Ibid., Appendix IV, Signal Communications of 3rd Tank Brigade prior to and during Operations of 20 to 27 November 1917, Captain H. S. Carnegie.
[24]Ibid.
[25]TNA WO 95/107/12, Appendix IV, Signal Communications of 3rd Tank Brigade prior to and during Operations of 20 to 27 November 1917.
[26]J. F. C. Fuller, *Tanks in the Great War, 1914-1918*, (John Murray: 1920), Chapter XXIV. Tank Signalling Organisation, p. 180. http://allworldwars.com/Tanks-in-the-Great-War-1914-1918-by-John-Fuller.html. Accessed 26 November 2020.

> proved invaluable, it was widely acknowledged that a far greater proportion of messages could have been sent by this means, which suggests that the army was still not taking full advantage of it.[27]

The key word in Fuller's account was 'attempted', which seemingly was not the same thing as 'achieved'. Fuller's most perceptive comment was:

> The signalling experiences gained during the battle of Cambrai proved of great value. The most important being that it became apparent that it was next to useless to attempt to collect information from the front of the battle line. Even if this information could be collected, and it was most difficult to do so, it was so local and ephemeral in importance as to confuse rather than to illuminate those who received it.[28]

For the 1 and 3 Tank Brigade Signal Companies, wireless was not a success at Cambrai. It was not that more messages could have been sent by wireless, nor that the army failed to take advantage of a successful means of communication; there was little success to exploit, because the wireless procedures were either immature or non-existent and the personnel inexperienced and inadequately instructed. The main success was learning what not to do, as Fuller later hinted.

A Step Change: Wireless Performance in the 1918 Spring Offensive

The next major engagement for the 1 Tank Brigade Signal Company was a counter-attack against the German Spring Offensive of 1918. After Cambrai in 1917 wireless training had been intensified. In December 1917 and February 1918, three separate groups comprising a total of two officers and 45 soldiers travelled to the Tank Corps Wireless School in Fleury for training in CW Wireless Sets. 'Good progress had been made both in reference to Theoretical Knowledge of the instruments and also to procedure.'[29] This training appears to have been pivotal in what happened next.

On 20 March 1918, one day before the German Offensive, 'Wireless station opened. Call SAI working to FLEURY (SAR) for Tank Corps. Wavelength 1400 metres.'[30] This time the arrangements possessed a professional quality. Care was taken to ensure a supply of accumulators. Six High Tension (HT) emergency batteries were drawn (the wireless sets needed both types of power source). On 1 April 1918, revised codenames and Call-signs were issued:

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[27]Brian N. Hall, 'The British Army and Wireless Communication, 1896-1918', in *War in History,* Vol. 19, No. 3 (2012), pp. 307-308.
[28]Fuller, *Tanks in the Great War,* p. 181.
[29]TNA WO 95/100/6, WD 1st Tank Brigade Signal Company, 3 February 1918, p. 46.
[30]Ibid., 20 March 1918, p. 59; note, 'Call' would today be 'Call-sign'.

> Following Codenames and calls allotted for use in forward areas:
> 1st Brigade Tanks - CRIMSON - CGA
> 7th Battalion - RED - CGB
> 11th Battalion - WHITE - CGC
> 12th Battalion - BLUE – CGD[31]

Further signal arrangements were made on 16 April 1918 and in Electronic Warfare terms they have a remarkably modern ring:

> Attended conference called by AD Signals, Tank Corps, at 2nd Tank Brigade Headquarters… it was decided that special attention was to be paid to training operators in sending and receiving through jamming, and also having one man at each Station who could erect set and tune to correct Wavelength.[32]

Two wireless nets were specified, each working to a Directing Station, with an attempt at frequency separation between the two nets: 'The W/T System was divided into 2 groups A and B, each of three stations, one directing two. Group A was on Wavelength 695 metres and Group B on Wavelength 710 metres.'[33] On 9 April, it was recorded that six Standardised CW sets were drawn from the Wireless School. These were described as: 'CW Mark II as altered by Tank Corps Wireless Workshops. Standard Aerials 25 or 50 yards were used on 15 feet masts.'[34]

Continuous Wave Wireless sets were mainly used by forward artillery observers, due to their superior range to power ratio, and could be tuned to a particular frequency, unlike the more primitive "Trench Sets" used by the Infantry, but doing so required delicate handling and more technical ability from the user.[35]

It is not clear from the Diary whether this was the first issue to the unit of CW Wireless sets or whether it was the first issue of CW Mark II Wireless sets. The latter seems most likely, as the wavelengths referred to in March - of 14,000, 695 and 710 metres - suggest those used by CW sets. The first reference to training in CW sets

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[31]TNA WO 95/100/6, WD 1st Tank Brigade Signal Company, 31 March 1918, p. 60; note, "D", "E" and "G" Battalions had been re-designated the 7th, 11th and 12th Battalions in January 1918.
[32]TNA WO 95/100/6, 16 April 1918, p 68; note, AD Signals was Assistant Director Signals, the Corps' senior Signal officer.
[33]Ibid., May 1918, Appendix VI, Report of Working of Wireless at 1st Tank Brigade, p. 83.
[34]Ibid.
[35]Priestley, *The Signal Service,* pp. 226-227. Also, Thrower, pp. 8-9.

was on 8 December 1917, when Lieutenant Mainprize and six Other Ranks were sent on a course, with further courses in February 1918. In December 1917, following successful trials, the Army had placed an order for 882 CW sets and they began to arrive in January 1918.[36] It is likely therefore that the unit had several months of experience using this technology before the German Spring Offensive.

In stark contrast to the muddle of Cambrai, comprehensive key information required for link engineering and operational procedure was provided. This included: arrangements for how to charge accumulators; technical data on how to tune the wireless sets; how to use the "Blinker" Wavemeter to pick up a wavelength; the Wavelength Matrix; a Call-sign Matrix; and a diagram showing the required links; commonly-used Address Groups; instructions on correct use of Voice Procedure; action on enemy jamming; and the use of codes and ciphers.[37]

The problems with accumulators were resolved during training. It was found that, when charged slowly using the ABC Charging Set, three accumulators could last for five days. Codes called 'X Numbers' were used for link engineering, examples being:

X150 - Your wavelength is too high
X151 - Your wavelength is too low
X152 - Your wavelength is now OK
X159 - Is my wavelength OK?[38]

Firm control was asserted over the wireless nets to ensure priority messages were not drowned out by routine messages. The Voice Procedure used included instructions on handling long messages: 'Directing Stations before sending "G" to an offer of a message will always listen in for 30 seconds in case any Station has a message of higher prefix or in case the Control Station is sending.'[39]

Network set-up followed a hierarchical pattern. The Directing Station and Control Station were set up first on 2 May 1918: 'No 1 W/T Directing Station established Cambligneul Exchange - working to 7th and 12th Battalion Stations, Brigade Control Station established on hill near Brigade HQ. Call allotted AXI.' [40]

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[36]Priestley, *The Signal Service,* p. 227.
[37]Ibid., the entry for 6 October 1918 states that ALPHA code 5th Edition was used.
[38]TNA, WO 95/100/6, WD 1st Tank Brigade Signal Company, May 1918, Appendix X, Procedure for Wave Measurements, p. 88.
[39]Ibid., Appendix VIII, Notes on Wireless Station Working, 5 May 1918, p. 86.
[40]Ibid., 8 May 1918, p. 75.



Figure 2: 1 Tank Brigade Diagram of Communications[41]

The Orders Group for the forthcoming operation occurred on 7 May 1918 where instructions were given to provide communication for companies of the 7 and 11 Battalions, who were deployed on the 1 and 18 Corps fronts. On 8 May, the arrangements all came together smoothly. It was reported that A Company of 7 Battalion established a wireless station and B and C Companies established another (Call-signs ASI and ATI), reporting to a Battalion HQ Station with Call-sign AVI. A Company of 7 Battalion established a wireless station and B and C Companies established another (Call-signs ASI and ATI), reporting to a Battalion HQ Station with Call-sign AVI. [42]

Enemy 'Direction Finding' notwithstanding, the Wireless Stations remained *in situ* for a long period, the only recorded move being on 29 May 1918 when A Company, 7 Battalion Wireless Station moved from Annequin Fosse to Enguingatte. The following day, most Wireless Stations closed down on the companies being withdrawn.

[41]May 1918, © Crown Copyright. Pigeons are denoted by bird symbols.
[42]TNA WO 95/100/6, WD 1st Tank Brigade Signal Company, 8 May 1918, p. 75.

4. The Prefix "SG" or "XG" is sufficient to indicate that the message is to and from the Signalmaster and therefore no further address to or from is nessessary.

Controlled working by Bde. Control (AVI).

ARI Souchez A Coy 11 Bn — AQI Roclincourt B Coy 11 Bn — ASI Simencourt 12 Bn. H.Q. — Forward Stations.

AUI Mt.St. Eloi 11 Bn.H.Q. — ATI Olhain Wood 1st Bde H.Q. — Directing Stations.

AVI Olhain Wood Control Station. — Bde. Control Station.

5. The Control Station AVI will listen in always and see that the proper procedure is used.

6. In case of AUI or ATI breaking down they will send a message to AVI by wire or Wireless ZZZX38. AVI will acknowledge by X37 and carry on with the forward Stations. When the D.S. is ready to take over again it will send X36 to the Stations concerned and to AVI.

Figure 3: Excerpt from Notes on Wireless Station Working[43]

The experiences of the 1 Tank Brigade Signal Company during the German Spring Offensive were once again mirrored by those of the 3 Tank Brigade Signal Company. In December 1917, it also sent a small cadre of six wireless operators to the Tank Wireless School for training in the use of Continuous Wave sets after the issue of these sets to the unit at some time in the first quarter of 1918. The first mention of CW use was in late March, five days after the German attack. Albert was bombed and the telephone lines smashed beyond repair. As units tried to break contact with the enemy, the tanks had to move out and the established line Signal system collapsed. 'Operators brought instruments away from Southern Training Camp and destroyed stationery. Wireless communication established direct HQ Tanks, distance of 29 miles. Set a CW Mark III.'[44]

Major efforts were made by the unit to re-establish line communications, but wireless usage became much more important than it had been previously. By mid-April, a wireless station at Toutencourt, with four personnel, was working to a distance of 8,000 yards. Another, south east of Longueau, with five personnel, was working 16,000 yards to Brigade Headquarters. Here, at Mollien-au-Bois, was the Directing Station, with six personnel.

Frequency changes were being implemented at this time, another sign that CW wireless was in use: 'Wave length of wireless stations altered to 670 metres', then

[43] May 1918, © Crown Copyright.

[44] TNA, WO 95/107/12, WD 3rd Tank Brigade Signal Company, 26 March 1918.

'Wireless to work in groups of three stations, one group being on 670 metre wave length and one at 680 metre.'[45] This would have been unworkable for both groups, with severe mutual interference, as it did not allow sufficient frequency separation.

Clearly such lessons were being learned the hard way. Personnel were assigned to build links with the headquarters of neighbouring units: 'Wireless station and 4 men set up with New Zealand Division at BUS-LES-ARTOIS working 18,000 yards to Brigade.'[46] Finally, the rapid growth in wireless traffic in Spring 1918, both Allied and enemy, led to personnel being assigned to listen to transmissions to gather intelligence. On 10 May 1918, the 3 Tank Brigade Signal Company established a wireless intercepting station at Beauquesne.

In Fuller's account, he gave credit to one individual, a junior officer at the time, for the considerable progress in wireless training between early 1917 and the summer of 1918:

> In February 1917 Captain J. D. N. Molesworth, MC, was attached to the Heavy Branch to supervise the training in signalling. This officer remained with the Tank Corps until the end of the war, and in 1918 was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel and appointed Assistant Director of Army Signals in 1918. Under his direction classes in signalling were at once started and considerable progress was made in the short time available before the battle of Arras was fought.[47]

A Further Experiment: Radio-Telephony Between Tanks and Aeroplanes

The 1 Tank Brigade War Diary makes an intriguing reference to a further experiment run at Noulette Wood from June to July 1918. Lieutenant Mainprize of the 1 Tank Brigade Signal Company and Lieutenant Moody of No. 22 Squadron, Royal Air Force (RAF) jointly conducted experiments in radio-telephony between tanks and aeroplanes. This was ground-breaking in two ways: the use of speech rather than Morse code over wireless and the intention to communicate between ground and air forces on the battlefield in real-time. The conveying of speech over wireless was only made possible by the use of CW sets. 'After certain experiments it was found possible to make an adapter for the CW Mark II set, by means of which speech could be transmitted at any Wavelength.'[48] This in itself was a major development, particularly as it allowed speech in both directions.

[45]TNA, WO 95/107/12, WD 3rd Tank Brigade Signal Company, 16-17 April 1918.
[46]Ibid., 22 April 1918.
[47]Fuller, *Tanks in the Great War,* p. 180.
[48]TNA WO-95-100-6_2, WD 1st Tank Brigade Signal Company, 22 June 1918, Appendix II, Experiments in Radio-Telephony, June 1918.

Three different tank-mounted antenna configurations were trialled, which were denoted as Type 1, 2 and 3. It was found: 'From an aeroplane, speech was received but was not very strong except when the aeroplane was diving or very close… From Tank to Tank on this aerial very good results at 300 yards… With aerials of Type 3, excellent signals were received from and also transmitted to an aeroplane, the observer remarking that the speech was quite as good as any he had received from a ground station, and quite loud and intelligible.'[49] Receiving audible speech from an aeroplane was particularly challenging, more so than for an aeroplane receiving speech from the ground. Major Prince, an early researcher in this area, made a telling point about the open cockpits of First World War aeroplanes: 'The transmitter must work in a region of intense noise, vibration and often violent air disturbances in which... the very muscles of the face can hardly retain their true shape under the varying wind pressures.'[50]

The diagram of the Type 3 antenna shows what today would be described as 'an inverted L antenna'. This was a potentially fruitful design in respect of communicating with aeroplanes, as it was a compromise antenna combining a small amount of groundwave signal (2 foot 6 inches being in vertical configuration) with a large amount of skywave signal (in horizontal configuration). Theoretically this would appear to be the most promising of the three antennas for the purpose under test.

'A demonstration of the results obtained was given on Friday, 5th July before the GOC, Tank Corps. The conclusion reached is that it is quite practicable to speak from Tank to Tank or from aeroplane to Tank, but further experiments are necessary to get the most efficient aerial to suit all requirements.'[51] Such an experiment at this early stage was over-ambitious, combining as it did multiple complicating factors, but was nevertheless impressive. While it is fair to say that: 'wireless telephony between tanks and between tanks and aeroplanes was at a very basic experimental stage when the war ended', the findings were concrete and practical, down to the type of antenna required and how it would be mounted on the tank.[52],

[49]Ibid.

[50]Major C. E. Prince, OBE, 'Wireless Telephony on Aeroplanes', *Journal of the IEE* (Institution of Electrical Engineers), Issue LVIII, 1920, p. 377.

[51]TNA WO-95-100-6_2, WD 1st Tank Brigade Signal Company, 22 June 1918, Appendix II, Experiments in Radio-Telephony, June 1918.

[52]Hall, 'The British Army and Wireless Communication, 1896-1918', p. 314.


AERIAL TYPES USED.

1. Inclined or horizontal earth mat. Not conspicuous at distances greater than 100 yards.

2. Several wires on level of unditching rail, stretched from front cab to the box at back of Tank. 2 - 8 wires may be used.

3. As above but with both ends raised about 2'6". Quite inconspicuous.

Figure 4: Diagram showing experimental antenna types.[53]

One researcher wrote of these trials: 'On 1 July, No. 8 squadron RAF was attached to the tank corps in order to conduct experiments with a view to finding the most efficient signalling method to facilitate co-operation between aircraft and tanks. The wireless-telephony trials were given up as a failure at the end of July but wireless telegraphy proved to be very successful.'[54]

The conclusion from the historian of a multi-volume history of the RAF was more nuanced:

[53]Experimental Work on Radio-Telephony, June 1918, © Crown Copyright.
[54]Andy Powell, 'The Use of wireless at the Battle of Amiens, 8 - 11 August 1918', Unpublished MA Thesis, 2013, available at: http://www.westernfrontassociation.com/world-war-i-articles/ma-dissertations/the-use-of-wireless-at-the-battle-of-amiens-8-11-august-1918/ . Accessed 15 December 2020.

> It was found that talk from the air could be heard inside a tank only under the most favourable conditions and so long as the aeroplane was within a quarter of a mile of the tank at a height not greater than 500 feet: it was accordingly decided that this means of communication was of no immediate practical use. At the end of July tests with wireless telegraphy proved successful, messages being clearly received in the tanks from aeroplanes which were 9,000 yards away and at 2,500 feet altitude. It was too late, however, to perfect the organization, equipment and methods of liaison, by which advantage could be taken of this success.[55]

Having promising results of no immediate practical use should not altogether be called a failure. Other researchers have been more positive, pointing out that: 'by the end of the war, Prince and his engineers had achieved air-to-ground, ground-to-air, and machine-to-machine wireless speech transmission. The Royal Air Force had equipped 600 planes with continuous-wave voice radio and set up 1,000 ground stations with 18,000 wireless operators'.[56]

Conclusions

For the 1 Tank Brigade Signal Company, the average daily traffic for May 1918 was 12 wireless messages. This must, however, be set against '277 DRL (Dispatch Rider Letter Service) packets, 249 Messages (which included pigeon and line messages) and 299 'Phone Calls' daily, thus proving that wireless occupied only a small niche in the overall communications picture.[57] Tank wireless at this time was limited in two ways: it involved telegraphy rather than voice, although promising voice experiments were only two months away; and wireless was only carried by tanks, and was dismounted for use.[58]

'Very satisfactory results' were reported for the 50 yard antennas used at the Directing Stations. The performance of the 25 yard antennas used by the Forward Stations was mixed. Even so, 'the average range was 6 ½ miles, but in one case was 12 miles'. [59] For comparison, "Trench" sets had a range of 4000 yards. Signal strength

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[55]Henry Albert Jones, *The War in the Air; being the story of the part played in the Great War by the Royal Air Force* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1922), volume VI, pp. 464-465.

[56]Allison Marsh, https://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-history/dawn-of-electronics/in-world-war-i-british-biplanes-had-wireless-phones-in-cockpit. Accessed 15 December 2020.

[57]TNA WO 95/100/6, WD 1st Tank Brigade Signal Company, Appendix VIII, Notes on Wireless Station Working, 5 May 1918, p. 77.

[58]Experimental work was later done to copy the French Tank Corps in mounting wireless sets in tanks.

[59]TNA WO 95/100/6, WD 1st Tank Brigade Signal Company, May 1918, Appendix VI, Report of Working of Wireless at 1st Tank Brigade, p. 83.

was 'R9 both ways'.[60] Importantly, messages were being encrypted, not sent in clear text.

There is little doubt that CW wireless was a conspicuous improvement in technology relative to spark gap wireless sets, directly paving the way for voice telephony. There is also evidence that some Tank Corps personnel saw the General Headquarters (GHQ) as obstructive. For example, one decorated tank commander wrote in his memoirs, 'The Corps was consistently disregarded in official despatches. It was hampered at every turn by the conservative outlook of senior officers.'[61] However, in contrast to the development of this argument by Mike Bullock and Laurence Lyons, this article considers the success of the technology ultimately rested in the hands of junior officers like Captains Churchill and Carnegie and their technical experts. Whatever scepticism about tanks or wireless existed within high command, this does not seem to have been shared at the very top: 'Haig had faults but opposition to new technology was not one of them.'[62]

The superiority of CW wireless over spark gap sets, although clear with hindsight, was not clear in 1918. The attitude of the Royal Engineers Signal Service was that both types of technology – 'half-brothers' – had an assured place in the Army. Each had advantages and disadvantages. Indeed in one particular detail, CW wireless was singularly ill-suited to use with or inside tanks. The sets were extremely delicate instruments, not easy to carry 'in the interior of a wildly-gyrating machine whose chief title to fame is a disregard for obstacles and unevennesses in its path.'[63]

This research endorses Brian Hall's conclusion that: 'the BEF's tank communications system in the summer and autumn of 1918 was certainly much more flexible, robust and sophisticated than it had been in 1916.'[64] Hall's research rigorously demonstrates that, regarding tank-to-tank communication: 'the limitations of the communications technology at the time, combined with the inadequacies of the tanks themselves, continued to impose profound restrictions on the tactical and operational effectiveness of tanks in battle.'[65]

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[60]The 'R' (Readability) Scale ran from 'R1' (weakest) to 'R9' (strongest), each step being 4 decibels.
[61]Browne, *The Tank in Action* p. 7.
[62]J.P. Harris, *Men Ideas and Tanks: British Military Thought and Armoured Forces, 1903-1939*, (Manchester: MUP, 1995), p. 56.
[63]Priestley, *The Signal Service,* p. 246.
[64]Hall, 'The Development of Tank Communications in the British Expeditionary Force, 1916-1918', pp.161-162.
[65]Ibid.

However, this article is more commendatory than Hall in its assessment of evidence of the promising early developments in tank-to-aeroplane communication and the considerable practical progress made with CW Wireless in tank-to-headquarters communication. The latter, high-level, signals merit more attention from researchers, who tend to focus on low-level signals, because they are more interesting and due to their obvious tactical importance.

Fuller divided the system of field signalling into 'local' (between tanks and tanks and tanks and infantry) and 'distant' (between tanks and unit headquarters, infantry and artillery observation posts, balloons and aeroplanes). Significantly, Fuller's appreciation of the importance of signals was geared towards the operational level and related more to 'distant' signalling:

> The importance of signalling in a formation such as the Tank Corps cannot be over-estimated, and this importance will increase as more rapid-moving machines are introduced, for, unless messages can be transmitted backwards and forwards without delay, many favourable opportunities for action, especially the action of reserves, will be lost. Making the most of time is the basis of all success, and this cannot be accomplished unless the commander is in the closest touch with his fighting and administrative troops and departments.[66]

With respect to high-level signals, the spark gap technology used at Cambrai had been superseded by CW Wireless Mark II and Mark III, with hindsight, a significant step forward. Of equal importance was the improvement between the amateurish, desultory wireless usage in November 1917 and the well-organised, competent usage of Spring 1918. This technical and procedural professionalisation, over a period of only seven months, was an impressive achievement.

The debate about tank communications represents in microcosm the larger debate about the utility of tanks, which again falls into two camps. One argues that First World War tanks were primitive, cumbersome and of limited value: 'Both mechanically and humanly, the tank of 1918 was not a war-winning weapon.'[67] The other sees tanks as possessing great potential but as having been held back by traditionalists who favoured the infantry and cavalry, 'Tanks could have provided (and did provide at Amiens) the

[66]Fuller, *Tanks in the Great War,* p. 183.

[67]John Terraine, *To Win A War: 1918 The Year of Victory*, (London: Cassell, 2008), p. 117.

centre-piece and breakthrough weapon… All of this required a change of attitude at GHQ.'[68]

While this article does not address this wider debate the lessons drawn here from tank communications seem equally applicable. The difference between the Mark I tank used on the Somme in 1916 and the Mark IVs and Vs which took the field from summer 1917 to the end of 1918 was as much a qualitative advance as that affecting the wireless sets. For example, the Mark I tank had poor observation, no silencer on the engine, open exhausts and was highly vulnerable to explosions, with two 25 gallon tanks of petrol in the front. Four of the crew of eight were drivers. The Mark IV still had four drivers, but a 70 gallon armoured petrol tank low down in the rear while the Mark V required only one driver.

> Although similar in appearance to earlier models the Mark V was a much better tank, more powerful and easier to drive. It was equipped with the new Ricardo six-cylinder engine and Wilson's epicyclic steering system which meant that one man could handle all the controls, compared with four in the Mark IV.[69]

It also had 'a four-speed gear-box, immediately in rear of which was the reverse gear, providing "reverse" on all speeds… Further, the engine was completely enclosed in a sheet-iron casing, from which the hot foul air was exhausted through the roof of the tank by means of a Keith fan.'[70]

As the designs radically improved, and as technology was refined, negative attitudes and the motivations of elements within the high command seem to have been bypassed by events. But the technology was only part of the picture. It was the practical actions, the developing procedures and the growing confidence of the men actually operating and directing the vehicles that provided the unstoppable momentum for tanks to be successful.

The position outlined here is that technical and procedural progress in Tank Corps wireless communications - and perhaps in the Tank Corps generally - came from the bottom-up - from the operators, and it was both rapid and far-reaching. The key

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[68]Tim Travers, 'Could the Tanks of 1918 Have Been War-Winners for the British Expeditionary Force?', *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Jul., 1992), p. 402.

[69]The Tank Museum, Bovington, website, https://tankmuseum.org/tank-nuts/tank-collection/mark-v/ Accessed 29 November 2020. This contains useful videos, presented by David Fletcher, MBE, about the Mark I, II, III, IV and V tanks on display at Bovington.

[70]Fuller, *Tanks in the Great War,* pp. 42-43.

importance of practical experimentation in the field did not escape the notice of the founding theorist of the Tank, Sir Ernest Swinton, who from an early stage had fought for 'some method whereby Tanks could signal back towards their starting-point... The obvious way was by wireless…'[71]

> At the last moment, GHQ ruled that the Tanks were not to be fitted with wireless - so far as I remember - because of the possibility of "interference" with existing installations… They were condemned to go forth to battle having eyes (of a sort) to see, and ears to hear, but no voice with which to speak. Some months later, as a result of experience in the field, the possible advantages of wireless communication were realised, and fresh experiments in this direction had to be made.[72]

[71]Major General Sir Ernest D. Swinton, *Eyewitness - Being Personal Reminiscences of Certain Phases of the Great War, Including the Genesis of the Tank*, (New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc., 1933), pp. 206-207.
[72]Ibid., p. 226.

Steele Brand, *Killing for the Republic: Citizen-Soldiers and the Roman Way of War*. Baltimore, MA: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2019. Xix + 392pp. ISBN: 978-1421429861 (hardback). Price £26.

Killing for the Republic: Citizen-Soldiers and the Roman Way of War is a study of the citizen-soldiers of the Roman Republican army. It contains descriptions of five 'key' military engagements involving these citizen-soldiers, a narrative of the fall of the Republic, explorations of the links between the Republic and the models used by the Founding Fathers in building a newly independent state and a call to the people of the 21st Century United States to beware lest their own republic follow the pattern of decline and collapse that Rome experienced. Written by Steele Brand, a scholar who goes to some length to point out that as a former intelligence officer in the US Army, he fits the modern American equivalent of the citizen-soldier, this book is trying to do a whole range of things under the guise of considering those citizen-soldiers, the small landowners and farmers who were conscripted into Rome's legions and helped to carve out a Mediterranean-wide empire – and went on to bring about regime-change in the 1st Century BCE.

The book is divided into four parts. The first introduces the concept of the citizen-soldier and the importance of land-ownership, farming and shared values, and the nature of the Roman Republic. On the latter point, Brand highlights its developing state from pre-foundation to decline and fall, presenting Harriet Flower's argument for a complex gradation in different periods in the Republic's life as it matured and mutated, and as the relationship between elite and lower orders changed. It is the citizen-soldier though that is core to the work as a whole, and these sections have huge potential for critical evaluation of the sources and genuine questioning of the motives of Republican legionaries for fighting. Did they share the values and perspectives of the elite who dominate the literary sources, and indeed wrote them? Unfortunately Brand assumes that ordinary plebeians had the same interests and outlook as the elite; he draws on Cato and other elite Roman sources to build up an image of the upbringing, training and patriotic values of ordinary Roman soldiers, but doesn't seriously question the vast gulf in wealth, status, power and influence between soldier and elite. These differences are likely to have become more significant as the property qualification for the *assidui*, those with the property qualification that made them liable for conscription, was lowered between the Second Punic War and the end of the Republic. Would the descendants of those defeated by Rome, the descendants of slaves, have had the same buy-in to *patria* as the wealthier landowners who Brand concentrates on? Despite his argument that Roman soldiers were able to assert their power in the military context and that the hierarchies of the civilian world were levelled on the battlefield, in reality soldiers swore an oath that put them under the

potentially brutal command of their general and removed the usual protection citizens enjoyed from summary judgement and punishment. Simon James' analogy with the British Royal Navy during the Napoleonic Wars works well here: that they did so because of limited opportunities elsewhere in life, and because of the potential rewards that came from booty, or naval prize money. More robust exploration of alternatives – the values of the plebians rather than the elite – would have been valuable here. The speech of Spurius Ligustinus, despite all its problems in representing Livy's ideal of the Republican soldier, is an essential piece of evidence about the lower orders which Brand does discuss, but he does not explore the vital importance of patronage to his career progression, which serves to highlight both the relationship and the separation between elite and lower orders.

Whilst the emphasis is rightly on the legionaries – the citizen soldiers – the Roman army did not just consist of these men. There is little discussion of the *socii* or the non-Italian *auxilia* who contributed as much to the creation of Rome's Mediterranean empire as the citizens. Brand follows Livy in criticising the Carthaginian army for being polyglot without noting that the Roman army was rarely more than half 'Roman', and that by the later 2nd Century BCE may regularly have been well under that, if writers like Velleius are to be believed.

Criticisms aside, this is a well-written and easily accessible exploration of the rise and decline of the Republic with a clear narrative of events and some of the key battles along the way. Particularly welcome is the treatment of Mutina, a relatively 'unfashionable' battle in terms of proper tactical analysis of the engagement, and the detailed exploration of Philippi. The exploration of Rome in America is also fascinating, and a welcome addition that will benefit both general readers and students helping them to understand where ideas have come from and why studying the past remains so important, but that has to be accompanied by an awareness that this is as much a personal take on the past and a message for the author's compatriots.

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Christopher Tyerman, *The World of the Crusades. An Illustrated History*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2019. 520pp. 160 illustrations + 14 maps. ISBN: 978-0300217391 (hardback). Price £25.

Modern surveys on the Christian holy wars known as crusades are easy to find and range from numerous popular works by non-specialists through to Christopher Tyerman's own *God's War* (2006), arguably the best general study on the crusades to date, which *The World of the Crusades* follows in numerous respects. However, the scope and emphasis on the material reality of holy war, combined with a judicious selection of illustrations and grey-shaded, standalone inserts on particular themes, create in Tyerman's latest survey a unique, lavishly illustrated book.

Following a useful introduction, chapters range geographically from South America to the Near East, and from the Nordic countries to the Maghreb. The chapters not only rupture the Near Eastern confines of many entry-level books, they breach their chronological borders as well. Attention is paid to the eleventh-century origins of the crusades, but unusually for a survey of this nature, two whole chapters are devoted to the crusades and other forms of Christian holy war beyond the fourteenth century, including the wars against the Ottoman Turks, Protestant heretics and American pagans. The final chapter follows Tyerman's *The Debate on the Crusades* (2011) and outlines the historiography of the crusades since the end of the Middle Ages. It explores how interest in the crusades transcends historiography to find various expressions in popular culture.

General studies of this nature must always cover familiar ground and rely extensively on previous scholarship. As Tyerman indicates in his *Debate* (pp. 228-33), a Cambridge-London 'school' of scholars, consisting of the late Jonathan Riley-Smith and his pupils, dominated a major trend in the expanding field of crusade studies in Britain. Their work was frequently concerned with the crusaders' faith and the papacy's initiation and authorisation of legitimate crusades. The spiritual and judicial were central.

Tyerman was an admirable, prominent outlier in this historiographical trend, and as the present work demonstrates, he continues to tread a less familiar path in the modern historiography. Whilst his narratives offer overviews of the crusades, he seeks to place the military endeavours in their political, social and economic settings. The numerous images illustrate the materiality of the crusading past. The standalone inserts on themes such as the crusaders' baggage confirm the materialism of the crusaders.

Together, they help place the crusaders and the crusades very much in the physical and tangible realms of the crusaders' worlds.

This book is not the place to find analyses of sources and deft use of innovative methodologies. Without them, some of Tyerman's assertions come close to echoing those found in the socio-economic hypotheses on the origins of the crusades and the motivations of the crusaders, which were vigorously challenged by Riley-Smith and his pupils, and that, incidentally, can still dominate the works of popular authors. Statements that, for example, refer to the First Crusaders as "just one among many bands of intruders on the make" (p. 31) in the Near East (which finds an unfortunate echo in the video series titled *Crusades* (1995), co-written and narrated by the late Terry Jones) will confirm a popular audience's preconceptions.

It may be worth noting here that crusaders had various temporal reasons – the attainment and maintenance of honour and family tradition, a desire to augment the heroic deeds of forbears, the creation, expansion and exploitation of new and existing commercial opportunities and so on – for engaging in crusades. At the same time, the evidence does not allow a neat separation of religious from worldly matters. The ubiquitous medieval concern for the soul was no less important to contemporaries than the desire for land or various other forms of temporal gain. Spiritual matters intertwined with temporal concerns in the minds of contemporaries. A mass of evidence suggests that the processes of conquest, subjugation and extraction were considered spiritually beneficial, and that God was believed to reward spiritually meritorious acts with earthly gains.

Tyerman knows well that the "physicality of crusading did not deny its religiosity" (p. xx), although he calls attention to the possible, probable or established material realities of crusading warfare at almost every opportunity to contend that crusades were fuelled as much, if not more, by the concrete objectives of land, resources, power and reputation. Tyerman prophesied in his *Debate* (p. 234) that "materialism will probably have its day again". The present book may steer future works in this direction.

A postscript neatly sums up the importance of the crusades to medieval contemporaries. There is no doubting that different sections of society - in numerous places often far removed in space and time - felt in one way or another the presence of sundry crusading phenomena as supporters or victims of holy war. Regrettably, Tyerman frequently refers to all of this as "the crusade", with the definite article. Using "the crusade" as a synecdoche for, say, the "First Crusade" is understandable. But the whole sweep of the book's multifaceted subject matter cannot and should not be reduced to a single phenomenon, what some historians have tended – perhaps just as problematically – to call the crusade (or crusading) movement.

Nonetheless, authoritative and incisive, and spanning centuries and vast geographical distances, this beautifully illustrated book brings to life the incredible variety and richness of the crusaders' material worlds. It sets the new standard for entry-level books on the crusades.

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Katrin Möbius & Sascha Möbius, *Prussian Army Soldiers and the Seven Years' War: The Psychology of Honour*. London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2020. Viii + 228 pp. 4 illustrations. 1 Table. ISBN 978-1350081574 (hardback). Price £85.

Recent research has transformed our understanding of the motivations of eighteenth-century common soldiers. English-language readers will be most familiar with Ilya Berkovich's book *Motivation in War* (2017), but there have also been many important works by German historians such as Jürgen Kloosterhuis, Jörg Muth, Michael Sikora, Martin Winter and Sascha Möbius. Sascha Möbius and Katrin Möbius have now provided an expanded and re-worked English version of his 2007 book *Mehr Angst vor dem Offizier als vor dem Feind?* The original German work showed that the tactics of the Prussian army during the Seven Years War (1756-63) were much more flexible than previously thought, and that they reflected the decisions of officers in particular situations and the willingness of the soldiers to follow them. It also disproved the idea that Prussian soldiers were motivated only by the threat of brutal punishments. Möbius showed that the threat of force (though rarely its actual use) did help keep Prussian soldiers in battle formation, but that the soldiers' sense of honour, their religious faith, and the encouragement given to them by their officers were much more important.

This English version retains much of the original text, but draws on new letters from Prussian common soldiers. Those who can read German and who are primarily interested in battle tactics may find the original book more approachable, but the English version draws new conclusions about the motivations of Prussian soldiers, asking, for instance, whether they were motivated by concepts of manliness and examines in detail the motivational role of music. It also presents twelve translated letters from Prussian common soldiers.

The work contributes to a growing literature which emphasizes that common soldiers in the eighteenth century were part of the broader contemporary society of orders, and that they fought to win honour and material gain commensurate to their position in that society, just as noble officers and rulers did. This book focuses on letters from cantonists: native Prussian subjects conscripted into the army. The Möbiuses argue that '*Kantonisten* . . . were not only bound to the men marching and fighting with them, but also to their families and the rural community' (p.34). They fought to defend their communities and uphold their own standing within those communities, as well as from a religious-inspired sense of duty to their king. The achievements of their units and of the Prussian army as a whole reflected honour on the soldiers, while 'dishonourable behaviour – or even the suspicion thereof – would be transmitted home' by other cantonists (p.78). The Möbiuses even argue that, since cantonists did not mention their comrades in letters unless they were from the same village, the concept of small-group cohesion did not apply to the eighteenth-century Prussian army. This claim is less believable. Soldiers' letters were written for the specific audience of their home communities, and it is therefore not necessarily surprising that they should focus on comrades from the same community.

The book brings vividly to life the terrifying experience of serving in the battles of the Seven Years' War. Prussian casualties during the war were so great that, for individual soldiers, 'it was nearly impossible to make it through alive' (p.20). In comparison to the heroic expectations of some modern soldiers, Prussian soldiers approached war without any illusions. They processed their fear overwhelmingly in religious terms. One regiment's thanksgiving text after battle was Romans 8: 36-7: 'we are considered as sheep to be slaughtered' (p.183). The Möbiuses note that the hymn *Ich bin ja Herr in deiner Macht*, which the Prussians sung while advancing to the attack at the battle of Zorndorf, 'is centred around the expectation of death' (p.156). Fear was considered perfectly honourable, and soldiers reported the danger they had faced to their relatives in detail as proof of God's protection of them, and saw the prayers of others on their behalf as their best protection from future harm.

The book contains some repetition, and the writing misses some of the flair of the German original. It is however a valuable work for those studying the social history of eighteenth-century Europe or examining the motivation of soldiers in any age, and it will provide Anglophone students with an introduction to the common soldiers of the eighteenth-century Prussian army.

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Rick Atkinson, *The British are Coming: The War for America, 1775-1777*. New York, NY: Henry Holt, 2019. Xviii + 776pp. 32 plates. ISBN: 978- 1627790437 (hardback). Price £25.99.

The initial volume of a 'Revolution Trilogy', Rick Atkinson's *The British are Coming* is an extensive narrative undertaking, one that minutely examines those formative, but crucial, years of the American War of Independence, 1775-1777. For the British, the opening salvos of the war consisted of promises of victory, missed opportunities and, to quote Robert Harvey, another of the 'popular' historians of the epoch, a 'few bloody noses'. For the American colonists, from 1776 committed to winning their independence from a nation considered *the* global superpower of the era, the goal was to survive; and to keep the embers of rebellion burning long enough to cement international support for what was, at times, a precarious cause.

Atkinson, an acclaimed 'popular' military historian, has a masterful ability to weave together, through lucid prose and acute eye for detail, those key martial events and crisis characters that shaped the war from Lexington to Princeton. Undoubtedly, the depth of research and insight the author affords in this narrative are impressive. Academic titles such as Matthew Spring's, *With Zeal and with Bayonets Only,* which examines the minutiae of the British Army's martial culture and conduct during the war, have been integrated into the work's underlying research base, demonstrating the author's willingness to bridge popular history and those works at the forefront of 'New Military' historiography. *The British are Coming* is, therefore, a balanced title; a far cry from early Whig-inspired narratives that simplistically portrayed the Revolution and War of Independence as an instance of providentially favoured, liberty-loving colonists arising to defeat a tyrannical mother country that had lost its way, and sense of 'Englishness' (or 'Britishness'), as it emerged as a true 'blue water' power.

The manner in which Atkinson's work conveys the exploits of the war's more minor participants, whose actions have often been subsumed by the great events and individuals that surrounded them, should also be acknowledged. Indeed, those familiar with the American Revolution will be very aware of *certain* rebel exploits that took the war to the British mainland; John Paul Jones' burning of Whitehaven (1778) being one of the most famous (or infamous) examples. How many, however, will have learned of, through lesson, reading or entertainment (or would easily recall), the fate of James Aitken – alias John the Painter – whose acts of sabotage so alarmed the British population and whose pursuit by authorities was intimately followed by George III. That Aitken's eventual execution at Portsmouth was witnessed by 20,000 persons

reveals not only his notoriety, but the degree to which his actions shocked and threatened the British state and its people.

Nevertheless, as a largely battlefield-centric account of the War of Independence's formative years, *some* might suggest that, at times, Atkinson is a little too dismissive of the significance of other themes that shaped the conflict between 1775-1777. Indeed, from Thomas Paine's *Common Sense* to the Declaration of Independence, the power of ideas – and the influence of words – can hardly be understated. However, in suggesting that George Washington's soldiers, accompanied by a 'chirpy throng of citizens' (Page 348) were bored and restless, shifting from 'foot to foot' as their Commander-in-Chief read aloud a 'pruned' version of the Declaration of Independence, Atkinson is perhaps too ready to underplay the role of revolutionary words and ideas. After all, none other than John Adams would argue that the war was an 'Effect and Consequence' of a Revolution that, at its core, was shaped by its ideas. Certainly, one might also examine post-war evidence to advance this perspective. At the signing of the Constitution (admittedly, beyond this book's remit), citizens from all walks of life, including those who had served in Washington's army, celebrated with vigour a Constitutional settlement that enshrined the principle of the sovereignty of 'the People'. Furthermore, the role so-called ordinary Americans played in the Revolution and its aftermath gave many citizens, such as the Masons of New York, the confidence to proclaim that 'Buildings and Rulers are the Work of *our* Hands'. It is a little difficult, therefore, to imagine that Washington's soldiers grew restless and bored as many of the now-codified principles upon which the revolution was fought were conveyed to them at so perilous a time.

However, Atkinson is a military historian, and *The British are Coming,* never pretends to be a social, ideological or constitutional study of the Revolutionary era. For these fields, individuals have the scholarship of Bernard Bailyn, H. T. Dickinson or Gordon S. Wood. What is advanced in Atkinson's work is a detailed, balanced, rigorously researched, and engaging narrative. It should find a welcome place on the shelves of any student, scholar or history buff examining the martial course of the War of Independence from 1775-1777.

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Ian F W Beckett, *A British Profession of Arms: The Politics of Command in the Late Victorian Army*. Norman, OK: Oklahoma University Press, 2018. Xviii + 350pp. 3 maps. ISBN 978-0806161716 (hardback). Price £32.95.

Too often the British army is seen as *apart from* rather than *a part of* broader society. Ian F. W. Beckett's *A British Profession of Arms* clearly argues that, in many respects, the Army of the Late Victorian era did not materially differ from other professions such as the church, law, and medicine. While duty and service were key touchstones of the professions of arms, so too were 'material reward and career advancement' in the form of money, honours, and awards. Beckett, a retired professor of military history at the University of Kent and an authority on the late Victorian army, takes the reader through the complex, murky workings of command where personality, politics, and patronage could make or break an officer's career. The result is an impressive, meticulously researched book that makes an important contribution to our understanding of the British army in this period and beyond.

The book is divided into two parts with four chapters in each: the first part explores the appointments and selection process through which officers navigated, detailing the internal and external factors that could influence a military career. This half of the book provides readers with a rich tapestry of factors that influenced military careers, ranging from the well-known 'Rings' which surrounded leading figures such as Garnet Wolseley and Frederick Roberts, to confidential reports, and the overlooked importance of levees. Beckett also explores more subtle influences upon progression within the Army, with thoughtful sections on the impact of social skills, politicians, royalty, and officers' wives. The second part of the book then examines how those myriad factors played out in practice through a series of case studies with chapters on the Second Afghan War (1878-81), the Anglo-Zulu War (1879), and the South African War (1899-1902).

While authoritative throughout, Beckett is at his most compelling in Chapters 2 and 4, which detail the promotion and selection process and external influences upon military careers. Chapter 2 takes the reader through the 'highly complex affair' associated with promotion, detailing how factors such as the 'smartness' of regiments and an officer's religious conviction could weigh for or against him. This chapter highlights a core theme of the book, namely the tension between promotion based on selection, merit, and seniority. As Beckett notes in the conclusion, '[d]ependence on seniority alone would have led to military atrophy, but … "reliance on natural aptitude was the path to amateurism, not to professionalism"' (pp.247-48). Chapter 4's focus on external influences highlights the importance of viewing the Army as a part of society, subject to its various slings and arrows, rather than as a hermetically sealed

monolith. It is in this chapter that we see how complicated internal processes were made more complex by 'private considerations' that 'intruded on appointment, advancement, and reward' (p.109). The inclusion of the importance of officers' wives in this chapter was a welcome addition to our understanding of both military careers and the Army itself, complimenting Verity McInnis' recent work in this area (*Women of Empire: Nineteenth-Century Army Officers' Wives in India and the US West*, 2017).

A British Profession of Arms is the product of decades of thorough, painstaking research. Beckett deploys this wealth of knowledge with skill to illustrate the considerable complexity of the inner workings of the late Victorian army. Yet it must be noted that the sheer volume of information contained in this book may make it challenging to readers coming to the topic afresh. The prominence of the central figures of the period, such as Cambridge, Roberts, and Wolseley, provides a narrative spine to the work. However, the deluge of other officers' names, ranks, and appointments occasionally make the argument difficult to follow. In this respect the inclusion of a 'dramatis personae' may have been helpful as a handrail for the general reader in particular. Similarly, the second half of the book may be confusing to readers who lack a good working knowledge of the three campaign case studies which is required in order to understand those campaigns through the lens of the politics of high command.

This book represents a lifetime's scholarship and research on the British army. Its encyclopaedic coverage of the ins and outs of the military careers of many of Britain's imperial officers means it will become a 'go to' work for students and scholars working on Late Victorian military history.

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Timothy Bowman, William Butler and Michael Wheatley, *The Disparity of Sacrifice: Irish Recruitment to the British Armed Forces, 1914-1918*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2020. Xiv + 298 pp. (hardback). ISBN: 978-1789621853. Price £85.00.

In the interests of transparency, this reviewer should declare that he peer reviewed the initial proposal and final manuscript of this title, and on the basis of comments made then, was asked to write some words for the book's back cover. So this book

is not being viewed afresh for this review, but – and this might be an advantage – has been engaged with over a significant period of its development.

The words provided for the cover are worth repeating because they sum up the thrust of this review: 'This is a tremendously important and academically rigorous book, which will come to be seen as a seminal text in the study of Ireland's First World War. It punctures a number of myths about recruitment, and also has significant relevance to wider studies of the Irish Revolution.'

The book is divided into six chapters in addition to its introduction and conclusion, plus a wealth of detailed appendices. Chapter One looks at patterns of pre-war recruitment, before two chapters examine recruitment on a regional basis, one covering the South and West of Ireland, the other being on Ulster. The mechanics of recruitment (how it was organised along with propaganda and the conscription crisis) form a fourth chapter. The two remaining chapters consider officer appointments and comparisons between Britain and Ireland.

A strength of the work is that it does not solely deal with 1914-18 but (in Chapter One) examines the significant pre-history of wartime recruitment by going back to the South African War. Such a starting place is increasingly common in studies of this period and illustrates that the work is informed by trends in research which broaden the context of First World War studies (and can contribute towards those broad debates). Meanwhile, the work is alive to different regional patterns on the island of Ireland and as such, it can (perhaps unexpectedly) also contribute to debates emerging within studies of the Irish revolutionary period about differences between counties and provinces as regards attitudes to the war.

As regards propaganda, Chapter Four offers an appropriate mix of analysis of broad approaches to recruitment alongside consideration of specific local impacts, and general readers will find much to engage them in the case studies included here. Chapter Five deals thoughtfully with the complicated issue of recruitment of officers and its main contribution will probably be seen as its consideration of those with a background in the Ulster Volunteer Force or the Irish National Volunteers.

The book's key departure from previous thinking about recruitment is best situated in relation to the much-revered late David Fitzpatrick's argument about 'the logic of collective sacrifice', set out most clearly in his 1995 Historical Journal article. In so doing, it makes a persuasive case for rethinking, for example, the impact of propaganda and the relatively limited extent of incidents of 'collective sacrifice'. This is achieved especially in the final substantive chapter comparing Ireland with Great Britain. This is a long overdue piece of work, in an area which has largely been left to Fitzpatrick and to some extent to Patrick Callan. Those authors pointed to significant similarities

between Ireland and Great Britain, saw wartime recruitment as breaking the mould of pre-war recruitment, and down-played the importance of religion. In contrast, Bowman, Butler and Wheatley argue that, at least in nationalist Ireland, 'the mould of pre-war recruiting patterns was not broken' (p. 203), with wartime recruitment remaining mainly working-class, unskilled and urban. More widely, the authors point to Irish recruitment being 'materially lower than that of the rest of the UK' (p. 236), with a 'gulf' not only between Britain and Ireland, but also within Ireland along several fracture lines: Ulster and the south/west, urban and rural, Protestant and Catholic, and unionist and nationalist. In each comparison, the former had significantly higher levels of recruitment and both politics and religion were central to this 'disparity of sacrifice' (p. 236). Moreover, it is in this chapter that the book's reach beyond Irish history will be felt most strongly. Although its conclusions are primarily relevant to Ireland, by holding an Irish mirror to Britain, it has the potential to inform debates on UK recruitment as a whole.

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Meysut Uyar, *The Ottoman Army and the First World War*. London: Routledge, 2021. Xviii + 499pp. + illustrations + maps. ISBN: 978-0367471774 (hardback). Price £120.00.

The Ottoman Army and the First World War is a thorough analysis of the Ottoman Army on all fronts during the Great War. It describes its operational military history and military effectiveness during that war, and it is difficult to disagree with Uyar in his assessment that Western historiography has for too long ignored the so-called peripheral campaigns of the war.

He reminds us that in 1914 it was by no means a foregone conclusion that the Ottomans would join the Central Powers. Once committed, the author contends that the First World War exposed Ottoman unpreparedness, having taken no steps prior to the war to secure stocks of food, fuel or munitions. Another of the book's themes is the constant interference of Germany's High Command and Ottoman acquiescence to both its strategic vision and its demands.

Western scholars have long struggled with access to Turkey's war archives, let alone the translation of both old and modern Turkish. If only for this reason Uyar's book is

tremendously important for those interested in the Ottoman contribution to the First World War. The footnotes contain some archival material which sees the light of day for the first time. There is an extensive and up-to-date bibliography providing a handy synthesis of non-English language sources, although the author has not included Klaus Wolf's 2020 in-depth study of the German-Ottoman Alliance.

Uyar highlights the problems found in the wake of army reorganisation when, in 1911, 'triangular divisions were established but insufficient attention was given to doctrine and combat services support, which were ignored. He details the vastly over-stretched military resources of the Ottoman Empire in the lead-up to and subsequent prosecution of the First and Second Balkan Wars.

The author examines the genesis of German military advisors and support. Initially the German alliance appeared to provide security against the territorial aspirations of both greater and lesser powers. But the optimism of the German High Command in using pan-Islamism as a force multiplier soon foundered on the reality of regional and tribal politics. In the body of the text, it is refreshing to see that Austro-Hungarian units and armaments deployed to Turkey receive more than a passing footnote. Little-known Ottoman contributions to Macedonia, Galician and Romania are also included in this study.

While the Ottoman Army of 1914 was far more representative of the empire's population than that of any other period, it lacked well-trained NCOs. This hindered the effectiveness of mobilisation and the sudden appearance of tens of thousands of new recruits. In this the empire was not alone. The British Dominions shared a similar experience. The Ottoman Army was initially hampered by the total absence of aviation assets and any organisation to manage line of communications issues. In addition, much heavy equipment and weapons had been lost in the Balkan Wars (1912/13). Unfortunately, the Ottoman High Command made no systematic effort to resolve or at least reduce the impact of these problems. Lack of a good road and rail network did not help matters. In 1914 the Ottoman Army was burdened by the inheritance of a dying empire: rampant corruption; inefficiency and inadequate lines of communications; and hopelessly inadequate medical and veterinary care.

There was an abysmal lack of understanding in Berlin of not only the cultural and political mores of its Ottoman ally, but the challenges facing a collapsing empire from 1917 onwards. We learn too that as early as April 1914, senior German advisors worked actively to deny Ottoman officers positions of influence and kept them uninformed of developments on the Western Front. The author also highlights fundamental tactical flaws in General von Sanders' initial defence plan for the Dardanelles in March-April 1915, where his interference further exacerbated tensions between the Ottoman staff and their German advisors.

The Ottoman Army never recovered from its manpower losses during the Dardanelles Campaign, especially the death of experienced junior officers. The war was a constant search for manpower (both for fighting and for a labour force), and a search for resources. The Ottoman Empire would face the same privations and black markets in food that its allies experienced from 1916. The author provides an interesting statistic, namely that at least three soldiers were allocated to gather and transport the food needed to keep one combatant alive and ready at the front line. This vexing problem of fodder supplies was never resolved. More generally, the efficient allocation of scarce resources was not a strong feature of the Ottoman General Staff and the civilian population across the empire was largely neglected.

Overarching Ottoman strategy appeared to gamble on success in the Caucasus, no matter at what cost to recapture lost territorial possessions and to create buffer states.

It is the discussion of these campaigns that highlights the need for more maps when many intricate operations are canvassed across various theatres. Those maps which have been produced often have place names which are difficult to read and lack a distance scale. The author occasionally uses some sources uncritically, particularly Birdwood's *Khaki and Gown* which is cited widely, while simple typographical errors, that are hard to excuse in such an expensive book, cause distractions for the reader.

Uyar argues that throughout the war, the empire was highly responsive to its ally's demands and needs despite its own frequent and grave crises. He concludes that for the Ottomans, the First World War was an imperial war from beginning to end against a backdrop to the Central Powers Alliance. The Ottoman Army, forced during the war to fight on eight fronts, proved remarkably resilient to the end, but was let down by poor political and military leadership in Constantinople.

This book is a long overdue addition to the modern historiography of the First World War

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Brandon M Schechter, *The Stuff of Soldiers: A History of the Red Army in World War II through Objects*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2019. Xxiv + 315pp. ISBN 978-1501739798 (hardback). Price: £27.99.

For all that it has long been recognised as *the* formative and foundational event of the Soviet era, there is still a good deal about the social and cultural dimensions of the Great Patriotic War (World War II) and its aftermath that remain unknown and unexplored. In his book Brandon Schechter breaks new ground by not only addressing some of the lacunas that persist in our understanding of the war and its impact, but does so through the medium of material culture. Drawing on archival collections of diaries and letters, reports given to high profile commissions, and materials generated by the state directly, Schechter provides the reader with invaluable insights into how the dynamics of Soviet everyday life were both shattered, and in some cases reinforced, by the experience of conflict.

The Stuff of Soldiers is organised in three parts. The first addresses what is referred to as 'biological needs', starting with the bodies of the soldiers before dressing them in uniform and sustaining them with rations (or not, as the case may be). Part Two focusses on the twin concerns of not being killed and killing, moving from the humble spade and its role in creating a 'safe' space for soldiers, to the more obvious tools of the trade – the rifle, bayonet, machine gun, mortars and tanks – and the relationship between man and machinery in this war-time context. The final part of the book focusses on possessions, and takes the reader from the intermingling between state-issued gear and personal treasures in the kit bag to the treatment of the possessions of others in the form of destruction, looting and the acquisition of trophies.

Moving through these different aspects, Schechter effortlessly blends his focus on the everyday with the greater overarching Soviet project and the experience in the extremes of war with the often extreme experience of life under pre-war Stalinism. This is seen in the interplay between the public and the private, the individual and the collective, and the relationship between the citizen and the state that carry over to the frontline context. There are other, perhaps less obvious, parallels that are drawn here too; these include the link between expropriation as a punishment for enemies, as seen during dekulakisation, and the looting and destruction of property by Soviet soldiers – who were themselves largely of peasant origin – once on foreign soil.

While on the whole Schechter's situating of the experience of war and the state's treatment of its soldiery within the broader framework of the Soviet project is compelling, there are a few points where this connection felt a little tenuous, such as the discussion of trenches as being in line with Soviet urbanisation. There were other

parts where the focus on the thing itself seemed to fade into the background with a prioritisation of the larger narrative. Still, the poignant analyses of the significance of spoons, correspondence, and trinkets soon brings the reader back into the intimate space of these soldiers' daily lives and interior worlds.

There are many aspects of Schechter's work that make it a significant contribution to knowledge; most obviously is his investigation into everyday life during the war through material culture, but the interweaving experiences of the Russian and the non-Russian soldier and the male and the female soldier are undoubtedly contributory factors to the richness of the story being told here. Likewise, the dynamic between what made some of these approaches or experiences uniquely Soviet and what could be seen in parallel in other armies means that this is a book that offers much to those whose interests lie beyond the USSR.

Given the author's lively and accessible style this is surely a work that will reach an audience outside of academia, while the deeply-researched and insightful content equally makes it an invaluable addition to scholars of both the Soviet Union and those interested more broadly in the history and legacies of the Second World War. In terms of its scholarly use though, as has been noted by others, the lack of bibliography is a frustrating omission in what is otherwise a nicely produced publication.

Thus, while the premise of this book is to 'tell the story of the most central event in Soviet history, the Great Patriotic War, through objects' (p. 3), Schechter has used the history of 'things' to construct an intensely human account of this experience.

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Daniel Todman, *Britain's War: A New World, 1942–1947*. London: Penguin Random House UK, 2020. Xiv + 963pp. Maps + Illustrations + Index. ISBN 978-0241249994 (hardback). *Price £35.00*

Being a west coast of Scotland Presbyterian, I am naturally inclined to approach anything with the whiff of general Establishment approval with some scepticism, and resolved early doors to be firm, fair, and friendly. I have never been influenced by the opinions of so-called "great minds" and have always preferred to plough my own,

oftentimes lonely, furrow. But, happily, I find myself falling in line with the enthusiasm for Todman's "total history" of the Second World War, at least for volume two.

Starting with the fall of Singapore to the Japanese in 1942, described by Churchill as "the worst disaster and largest capitulation in British history", when around 80,000 British, Indian and Australian soldiers surrendered to a Japanese force roughly half their size, and ending with the early negotiations over the Marshall Plan in 1947, this volume is a political history of wartime. Those looking for a detailed description of military campaigns will be disappointed, arguably that story has been well told many times elsewhere.

Todman's book uses the chronology of the Second World War as the basis for a political analysis from a British perspective. What makes it a particularly attractive record, though, is the analysis provided via the views of the ordinary people of Britain, as well as those of politicians, generals, and civil servants, during those testing times. I found, for example, that the evidence gathered by investigators from the social research organisation Mass Observation, sprinkled liberally through the book, most interesting.

Todman does not, however, explode the national myth of wartime Britain, all pulling together in adversity and putting a collective brave face on the fears and difficulties experienced by most. Rather he explores the depths of the myth, and in many ways such exploration reinforces it. Beneath the image of plucky Britain defying the odds, political rivalries, petty jealousies, ambition, infidelities, crime and laziness continued as it does to this day, but were somehow still subsumed into a national spirit which was something so much greater than the sum of its constituent parts. I found this strangely reassuring.

A theme which runs throughout is Britain's relations with its allies, and that with the USA in particular. It is generally accepted that Britain would not have emerged victorious from the Second World War if it had not been for the efforts of both the Soviet Union and America. The former was, of course, fighting for its very survival, and Britain and the USA supplied their eastern ally with what they could to help sustain its efforts while the west was building up its own military strength and resources.

On the other hand, aid from the USA was hardly selfless and altruistic. There was a hard-nosed edge to American aid to Britain, and it seems to have been approached pragmatically and with care so as never to place the USA at any disadvantage. The Americans were keen not to prop up Britain's ailing colonial empire, whether for reasons of ideology or envy, and they certainly seemed to have attempted to garner economic advantage at every appropriate opportunity.

This is the enduring theme of Todman's second volume, perhaps; the beginning of the end of the British Empire and the transition of Britain from first class to second class global power. The stresses and strains of the war were too much, and change came fast after its end. And yet, the image of a defiant Britain still shines through its pages, notwithstanding repeated disappointments and disasters. It did indeed keep right on to the end of the road.

I have read elsewhere this book described as "the definitive account" of Britain during the Second World War. That is a bit too far for me, but it's probably one of "the" definitive accounts.

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SUBMISSION GUIDELINES (March 2021)

Articles

The British Journal of Military History (the BJMH or Journal) welcomes the submission of articles on military history in the broadest sense, and without restriction as to period or region. The BJMH particularly welcomes articles on subjects that might not ordinarily receive much attention but which clearly show the topic has been properly researched.

Papers submitted to the BJMH must not have been published elsewhere.

The editors are happy to consider papers that are under consideration elsewhere on the condition that the author indicates to which other journals the article has been submitted.

Authors should submit their article manuscripts, including an abstract of no more than 100 words, as an MS Word or RTF attached to an e-mail addressed to the BJMH Co-editors at editor@bjmh.org.uk.

Authors must provide appropriate contact details including your full mailing address.

The editors are keen to encourage article submissions from a variety of scholars and authors, regardless of their academic background. For those papers that demonstrate great promise and significant research but are offered by authors who have yet to publish, or who need further editorial support, the editors may be able to offer mentoring to ensure an article is successfully published within the Journal.

The BJMH is a 'double blind' peer-reviewed journal, that is, communication between reviewers and authors is anonymised and is managed by the Editorial Team. All papers that the editors consider appropriate for publication will be submitted to at least two suitably qualified reviewers, chosen by the editorial team, for comment. Subsequent publication is dependent on receiving satisfactory comments from reviewers. Authors will be sent copies of the peer reviewers' comments.

Following peer review and any necessary revision by the author, articles will be edited for publication in the Journal. The editors may propose further changes in the interest of clarity and economy of expression, although such changes will not be made without consultation with the author. The editors are the final arbiters of usage, grammar, and length.

Articles should be a minimum of 6000 words and no more than 8000 words in length (including footnotes) and be set out according to the BJMH Style Guide which is based on the Chicago Manual of Style.

Authors should note that articles may be rejected if they do not conform to the Journal's Style Guide and/or they exceed the word count.

Also note that the Journal editors endorse the importance of thorough referencing in scholarly works. In cases where citations are incomplete or do not follow the format specified in the Style Guide throughout the submitted article, the paper **will** be returned to the author for correction before it is accepted for peer review.

Authors are encouraged to supply relevant artwork (maps, charts, line drawings, and photographs) with their essays. The author is responsible for citing the sources and obtaining permission to publish any copyrighted material.

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The BJMH also welcomes the submission of shorter 'Research Notes'. These are pieces of research-based writing of between 1,000 and 3,000 words. These could be, for example: analysis of the significance a newly accessible document or documents; a reinterpretation of a document; or a discussion of an historical controversy drawing on new research. Note that all such pieces of work should follow the style guidelines for articles and will be peer reviewed. Note also that such pieces should not be letters, nor should they be opinion pieces which are not based on new research.

Book Reviews

The BJMH seeks to publish concise, accessible and well-informed reviews of books relevant to the topics covered by the Journal. Reviews are published as a service to the readership of the BJMH and should be of use to a potential reader in deciding whether or not to buy or read that book. The range of books reviewed by the BJMH reflects the field of military history, taken in the widest sense. Books published by academic publishers, general commercial publishers, and specialist military history imprints may all be considered for review in the Journal.

Reviews of other types of publication such as web resources may also be commissioned.

The Journal's Editorial Team is responsible for commissioning book reviews and for approaching reviewers. From time to time a list of available books for review may be issued, together with an open call for potential reviewers to contact the Journal Editors. The policy of the BJMH is for reviews always to be solicited by the editors rather than for book authors to propose reviewers themselves. In all cases, once a reviewer has been matched with a book, the Editorial Team will arrange for them to be sent a review copy.

Book reviews should generally be of about 700 words and must not exceed 1000 words in length.

A review should summarise the main aims and arguments of the work, should evaluate its contribution and value to military history as broadly defined, and should identify to which readership(s) the work is most likely to appeal. The Journal does not encourage personal comment or attacks in the reviews it publishes, and the Editorial Team reserves the right to ask reviewers for revisions to their reviews. The final decision whether or not to publish a review remains with the Editorial Team.

The Editorial Team may seek the views of an author of a book that has been reviewed in the Journal. Any comment from the author may be published.

All submitted reviews should begin with the bibliographic information of the work under review, including the author(s) or editor(s), the title, the place and year of publication, the publisher, the number of pages, the ISBN for the format of the work that has been reviewed, and the price for this format if available. Prices should be given in the original currency, but if the book has been published in several territories including the UK then the price in pounds sterling should be supplied. The number of illustrations and maps should also be noted if present. An example of the heading of a review is as follows:

James Gow, *The Serbian Project and its Adversaries: a Strategy of War Crimes*. London: Hurst, 2003. xii + 322 pp. 1 map. ISBN 978-1850654995 (paperback). Price £17.50.

The reviewer's name, and an institutional affiliation if relevant, should be appended at the bottom of the review, name in Capitals and Institution in lower case with both to be right aligned.

Reviews of a single work should not contain any footnotes, but if the text refers to any other works then their author, title and year should be apparent in order for readers to be able to identify them. The Editorial Team and Editorial Board may on occasion seek to commission longer Review Articles of a group of works, and these may contain footnotes with the same formatting and standards used for articles in the Journal.

BJMH STYLE GUIDE (July 2019)

The BJMH Style Guide has been designed to encourage you to submit your work. It is based on the Chicago Manual of Style and more about this style can be found at:

http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/home.html

Specific Points to Note

Use Gill Sans MT 10 Point for all article and book review submissions, including footnotes.

Text should be justified.

Paragraphs do not require indenting.

Line spacing should be single and a single carriage return applied between paragraphs.

Spellings should be anglicised: i.e. –ise endings where appropriate, colour etc., 'got' not 'gotten'.

Verb past participles: -ed endings rather than –t endings are preferred for past participles of verbs i.e. learned, spoiled, burned. While is preferred to whilst.

Contractions should not be used i.e. 'did not' rather than 'didn't'.

Upon first reference the full name and title of an individual should be used as it was as the time of reference i.e. On 31 July 1917 Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), launched the Third Battle of Ypres.

All acronyms should be spelled out in full upon first reference with the acronym in brackets, as shown in the example above.

Dates should be written in the form 20 June 2019.

When referring to an historical figure, e.g. King Charles, use that form, when referring to the king later in the text, use king in lower case.

Foreign words or phrases such as *weltanschauung* or *levée en masse* should be italicised.

Footnoting:

- All references should be footnotes not endnotes.
- Footnote numeral should come at the end of the sentence and after the full stop.
- Multiple references in a single sentence or paragraph should be covered by a single footnote with the citations divided by semi-colons.

Quotations:

- Short (less than three lines of continuous quotation): placed in single quotation marks unless referring to direct speech and contained within that paragraph. Standard footnote at end of sentence.
- Long (more than three lines of continuous quotation): No quotation marks of any kind. One carriage space top and bottom, indented, no change in font size, standard footnote at end of passage.
- Punctuation leading into quotations is only necessary if the punctuation itself would have been required were the quotation not there. i.e. : ; and , should only be present if they were required to begin with.
- Full stops are acceptable inside or outside of quotation marks depending upon whether the quoted sentence ended in a full stop in the original work.

Citations:

- For books: Author, *Title in Italics*, (place of publication: publisher, year of publication), p. # or pp. #-#.
- For journals: Author, 'Title in quotation marks', *Journal Title in Italics*, Vol. #, Iss. # (or No.#), (Season/Month, Year) pp. #-# (p. #).
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- Primary sources: Archive name (Archive acronym), Catalogue number of equivalent, *'source name or description' in italics* if publicly published, p. #/date or equivalent. Subsequent references to the same archive do not require the Archive name.
- Internet sources: Author, 'title', URL (with date accessed) The time accessed may also be included, but is not generally required, but, if used, then usage must be consistent throughout
- *Op cit*. should be shunned in favour of shortened citations.
- Shortened citations should include Author surname, shortened title, p.# for books. As long as a similar practice is used for journals etc., and is done consistently, it will be acceptable.
- Ibid., with a full stop before the comma, should be used for consecutive citations.

Examples of Citations:

- Michael Howard, *War in European History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 21.
- Michael Collins, 'A fear of flying: diagnosing traumatic neurosis among British aviators of the Great War', *First World War Studies*, 6, 2 (2015), pp. 187-202 (p. 190).
- Michael Howard, 'Men against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914', in Peter Paret (ed.), *Makers of Modern Strategy*, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994), pp. 510-526.
- The UK National Archives (TNA), CAB 19/33, Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Sclater, evidence to Dardanelles Commission, 1917.
- Shilpa Ganatra, 'How Derry Girls Became an Instant Sitcom Classic', *The Guardian*, 13 February 2018 https://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio/2018/feb/13/derry-girls-instant-sitcom-classic-schoolgirls-northern-ireland. Accessed 1 January 2019.

Note: Articles not using the citation style shown above will be returned to the author for correction prior to peer review.